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ABSTRACT
This study presents an overview of the planning techniques recently
used in empirical income distribution studies. The principal tools reviewed
are a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework and the methodology of
conventional empirical fiscal incidence studies. A new methodology for the
improvement of empirical fiscal incidence studies is proposed. The proposed
methodology consists of linking two different concepts: (1) a SAM data
framework, and (2) the Harberger general equilibrium model of tax incidence.
As demonstrated by the study, such an approach considerably improves the data
base of empirical studies of fiscal incidence. The approach is also very
useful in general on the modeling side, because it facilitates the explicit
expression of the linkages between the accounting structure of the data base
and the accounting structure of the Harberger model, including simultaneous
relationships between prices, incomes, and the structure of production. In
this way the data of empirical fiscal incidence studies are put into
perspective, i.e., a SAM concept facilitates compilation, organization,
reconciliation, and presentation of the data needed for tax incidence
analysis. On the modeling side, a SAM framework facilitates a solution of the
Harberger model, its extensions and modifications, as well as applications to
the actual country data base.
This methodology is applied to a SAM for Egypt. The results of the
SAM model provide some insights into the distributional implications that
would arise from various changes in domestic commodity taxes and subsidies in
Egypt. Recommendations for future research include modifications of some of
the basic assumptions of the model (such as treatment of foreign trade,
consumption, and intrasectoral distribution) and various possible
disaggregations of a SAM data framework. The approach developed in this study
deals only with the analysis of tax incidence of domestic taxes. An approach
dealing with foreign trade and taxation is contained within the effective
protection literature. This study recommends that ideally the best solution
to the absence of foreign taxes in the conventional tax incidence analysis
requires a combination of these two different approaches. In this respect,
the approach developed in this study establishes the groundwork necessary to
achieve such a synthesis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The starting point of this study is a concern with income
redistribution in developing countries. There are many ways in which income
distribution can be altered. One of these, probably the most important, is
through government fiscal policies, i.e., through taxation and public
spending. However, an immediate question that arises is how to measure the
income redistribution through public finance, and what data and techniques
(tools) are available to analysts and to policymakers for policy analysis and
recommendations. As it appears in the development literature, an important
technique that has been widely used recently in income distribution studies
for data compilation, organization and reconciliation, and also for economic
modeling purposes, is a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). The SAM framework has
several uses, one of which is a recent emphasis on commodity disaggregations,
that'allows the gathering, organization, and presentation, in a consistent
manner, of a data base on taxation. It has been this recent focus of the SAM
framework and an initial attempt to evaluate tax incidence using a SAM by
Pyatt (1981a) and Newlyn (1980), that also initiated this study.
However, in order to carry out a study that could expand the SAM
framework for tax incidence analysis, two basic prerequisites are necessary.
One of these is a basic understanding and knowledge about the present uses and
the conceptual potential of a SAM framework as a tool for data organization
and economic analysis. On the other hand, it is necessary to know the most
common techniques and concepts used for fiscal incidence analysis, that could
be linked to the SAM framework and used for an emirical analysis of fiscal
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incidence. For these reasons, this study proceeded from two different
angles. One of these is a review and analysis of the basic concepts of the
SAM, and the other is a review of the conventional empirical studies of fiscal
incidence. However, because the SAM concept has not been used explicitly in
the past for fiscal incidence analysis, and because there is no single tool
(that does not have several shortcomings) in the conventional fiscal incidence
literature, a new approach has been developed in this study for empirical tax
incidence analysis. In essence, this approach consists of linking together
two different concepts, i.e., the SAM framework and a modified Harberger
general equilibrium model of tax incidence. The approach is outlined at the
end of this chapter, and is developed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
An application of this approach to a SAM for Egypt is presented in Chapter
V. The next two sections present a brief introduction to the SAM concept, and
a short review of the basic concepts and limitations of the conventional
empirical fiscal incidence studies.
An Introduction to the SAM Framework
In the last decade, the major international institutions--the I.L.O.,
the U.N., and the World Bank--have been supporting improvements of national
accounting systems and/or modeling efforts to study policies for income
distribution and employment in developing countries. Several large-scale
models evolved that deal explicitly with income distribution issues. A common
denominator to these economic models is the social accounting matrix (SAM).
Pyatt et al. (1972) developed a model for Iran where income and factor
payments are endogenous. Pyatt and Roe (1977) produced a social accounting
matrix for Sri Lanka, and Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976) described the conceptual
framework. Other recent work in this area, which is explicitly or implicitly
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based on a SAM, includes the computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of
Adelman and Robinson (1978) on Korea, Lysy and Taylor (1978) on Brazil, Eckaus
et al.. (1981) on Egypt, the macroeconomic model of Drud et al. (1982) on
Thailand, and work by Dervis et al. (1982).
The case for a social accounting matrix (SAM) approach to
macroeconomic data systems has been set out by the United Nations in UNSO
(1968). Recent adaptations of this system of national accounts (extensions of
the input-output framework) in developing countries were conceived as an
initial step towards understanding income distribution, and social accounting
matrices have been developed in parallel with work on planning models. In
essence, a social accounting matrix is a consistent data system that provides
comprehensive base-year information on such variables as: (a) the structure,
composition and level of production; (b) the factoral value added; and (c) the
distribution of income among household groups. Typically, a SAM is structured
around an input-output table, and includes summary statistics on consumption
and production patterns, exports, imports, investment, and savings. Depending
on the particular issues of interest and the data available, a SAM may include
more detailed information on income distribution, tax structure, and monetary
variables. The most important feature of a social accounting matrix is that
it provides a consistent and convenient approach to organizing economic data
for a country, and it can provide a basis and a starting point for improving
modeling efforts in order to answer various economic policy questions.
Empirical Studies of Fiscal Incidence
A number of empirical studies for different countries have been
carried out in recent years which estimate tax burden and expenditure benefits
by household groups. Two countries where studies of income redistribution
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through public finance have been most frequently undertaken since the Second
World War are the United Kingdom and the United States of America (Ruggles and
O'Higgins 1981). In the United Kingdom, the Government Central Statistical
Office (CSO) has carried out such studies annually for -the past twenty years,
and its analyses and related papers constitute almost the entire body of
empirical work on this sublect in the United Kingdom (Nicholson 1974, 1977;
O'Higgins and Ruggles 1981). The same type of studies, although academic
rather than governmental, have been nearly as frequent in the United States
(Colm and Tarasov 1941; Musgrave et al. 1951, 1974; Gillespe 1965; Pechman and
Okner 1974; Ruggles 1980; Okner 1980). Among the less developed countries the
most represented region in this respect is Latin America, with over 25 studies
being conducted in twelve countries (Bird and De Wulf 1973).
A common denominator to these studies is their basic methodology,
i.e., the differential incidence approach, which, although it has changed over
the years, has not advanced considerably. The changes reflect more the
increased availability of data coverage, changes made with respect to basic
assumptions about allocation of taxes, and the greater emphasis on
redistributional government policies, rather than improvement in the
theoretical underpinnings of these studies.
It should be made clear initially that no study in any country has
attempted the probably impossible task of tracing the total effects of
government finance on the economy, or on the distribution of income in the
economy among different subgroups. Instead, most studies, in essence, compare
the observed incomes net of taxes under the existing tax system with those
that, it is assumed, would prevail if the same revenue were collected through
a proportional tax. This "differential incidence" approach was employed
because taxes cannot simply be subtracted from the income in order to yield an
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estimate of after-tax incomes, and a proportional tax is assumed to be the
most neutral alternative means to finance government expenditure. Musgrave
and Musgrave (1980) define this "differential incidence" as distributional
changes that result if one tax is substituted for another while total revenue
and expenditures are held constant. The resulting total change in the state
of distribution is referred to as differential incidence. In other words,
substitution of one tax for another will improve the position of some
households and worsen that of the others. Changes in the position of any one
household may be measured in terms of the resulting change in its real income.
Early studies in the United States concentrated on the tax side,
reflecting the greater difficulties encountered when dealing with public
expenditures, but Gillespe's 1965 study made clear the extent to which it is
possible to allocate expenditures (using alternative assumptions where
necessary), and thus to assess the redistributive impacts of both parts of the
public finance system. Basic differences between the recent studies are the
variations made in the assumptions of allocating taxes and expenditure
benefits, and the quality and scope of coverage of their data base.
Limitations of Redistributional Studies
There are several problems with the methodology of conventional
empirical studies that attempt to measure income redistribution through public
finance. The first weakness of these empirical studies is that in these
studies, analysts allocate the total tax burden by income groups under
assumptions that ignore many findings developed in the theoretical literature
of tax incidence. The second major weakness of these studies is a lack of
sufficient and reliable data, especially for developing countries. The data
of these studies are weak, especially with respect to income distribution.
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The first weakness of the conventional empirical studies is caused by
the fact that there is a wide gap between theoretical and empirical tax
incidence studies. On the one hand, the empirical work has yet to incorporate
many of the concerns that arise in the theoretical literature. On the other
hand, many of the theoretical models are far removed from being empirically
implementable (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980). However, so far no alternative to
these conventional empirical studies of the incidence of all direct and
indirect taxes has been proposed.
Approached in rigorous terms, the problem involves full-fledged
general equilibrium analysis with all its difficulties. However, most of the
existing theoretical general equilibrium models, although they give .useful
insights into the distributional impact of (tax) policy measures, are very
aggregate, rely on simplifying assumptions, and thus give approximate
results. No detailed, highly disaggregated economy-wide general equilibrium
model that could take into account all the available statistical data on
taxation for an economy and closely approximate behavioral relationships
(e.g., functioning of markets and behavior of firms) has been built so far.
And nonavailability of detailed and appropriate data precluded any extensive
econometric work in this area (Boskin 1976). Therefore, the limitations of
tax incidence studies apply to both empirical studies and theoretical general
equilibrium models, i.e., to the methodology of redistributional studies in
general.
The second weakness of empirical fiscal incidence studies is the
organization, presentation, and reconciliation of the statistical data used.
These studies require substantial time to implement, and do not have a common
organizational framework that could improve clarity of presentation of their
basic data, their results, as well as facilitate a comparison over years
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(time) and among the studies themselves. On the data side, the major problem
of these studies is with income distribution estimates. The studies deal with
the redistributive effects of government revenues, and the most common
approach is to attempt to distribute the tax burden by'income size classes or
household groups. Because of the lack of data on income distribution in
developing countries, most analysts have used any available size
classification that seemed halfway reliable (Bird and De Wulf 1973). For
example, in Latin America, where most of these studies were conducted, a
number of techniques have been used to estimate the income distribution in
particular countries. These vary from specially constructed income
distribution series (McLure 1971) to the simple assumption that the income
distribution of Venezuela is a good enough approximation to the income
distribution of other Latin American countries to permit the study of tax
incidence for these countries on the basis of the Venezuelan income
distribution (Musgrave 1965). This latter assumption is obviously crude, as
illustrated by Hunt (1971) for Peru, where a substantial change in the
structure of effective tax rates resulted when the Colombian income
distribution was used instead of the Venezuelan one. Some analysts are aware
of low reliability of their results, for example, as stated by McLure (1971,
pp. 239-40):
It must be recognized at the outset that because of the
difficulty of obtaining data on income distribution, the
estimates ... can give no more than rough indications of
the true patterns. Thus, these should be interpreted
with extreme caution.
Besides problems with income distribution data, these studies have to deal
with numerous and various sources that do not agree with each other. For
example, different sources of data such as national accounts, household income
and expenditure surveys, population census, taxation data, and various other
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sources that constitute a basis for these empirical studies, have to be
adjusted each time in order to achieve consistency. Presently, these
adjustments depend on the inventiveness of the investigator. No technique or
framework has been used to improve consistency of data, or to allow for use of
statistical techniques for reconciliation. All of these would, however, help
to provide a common procedure.
The primary purpose and premise for the continuous and large number
of conventional empirical tax incidence studies that have been undertaken has
been that even "approximate" information is better than a random choice
(Musgrave et al. 1974). Thus, although these empirical studies have several
limitations (common also for most theoretical studies) because they are based
on simplifying assumptions and a methodology that falls short of a full
general equilibrium approach, the studies have nevertheless been important as
a contribution for policy information. Policymakers make assumptions every
day regarding the distribution burden of various taxes, and the question for
the tax expert or economist is whether and how to help in formulating the
assumptions.
Therefore, the question is not whether one can wait until the science
progresses enough to give a "definite" answer to some of the difficult aspects
of fiscal incidence, but rather whether the existing methodology of tax
incidence (including empirical studies) can be improved so as to be able, at
least partially, to close the gap between theoretical and empirical findings
and to provide policymakers with improved tools of analysis of fiscal
incidence. The basic point with respect to the issues raised above is simply
that "scientific information" is only acquired at the intersection of
theoretical and empirical research. There are three ways in which knowledge
can be improved: (1) new and better theoretical insights may be developed:
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(2) more and improved data may be obtained, or both: and (3) superior methods
by which to analyze data may be developed. The following section will outline
the ways in which empirical fiscal studies could be improved along these
lines.
Suggestions for Improvement of Redistributional Studies
As it appears, there is a need for: (1) an organizational framework
to bring the data of fiscal incidence studies under one single organizational
concept, and (2) a need for a technique that could easily translate these
adjusted and reconciled data into a picture of tax incidence and expenditure
benefits for a particular country, i.e., to develop superior methods by which
to analyze the data.
An organizational framework for the data base would prove especially
useful for the developing counries where the scarcity of data require the best
use of available information, and where such a framework can be the most
helpful to bridge the gaps in the data, either by clearly stated and
documented assumptions on the basis of well-documented secondary sources, or
by using available statistical techniques. There is also a need to facilitate
updating of such empirical studies in order to compare them over time.
Another area for potential improvement of these empirical studies is
to show clearly the relationship between the alternative assumptions made
about incidence of different taxes (tax shifting) and the sensitivity of the
final results obtained. As Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) note, any future
investigation of empirical studies is likely to lead to results conditional on
a range of alternative assumptions. For linking together theoretical
considerations and empirical studies, they propose that the standard incidence
assumptions of empirical studies should be related to the simple fixed-factor,
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two-sector models developed in theoretical literature. Thus, these models
could be used to evaluate the possible consequences of alternative assumptions
and to suggest different approaches. This could be accomplished by presenting
the basic features of simple general equilibrium models for a particular tax
in relation to the data concept, i.e., by presenting both the models and the
data within the same accounting framework.
Organizational Concept -- Data Framework
A data system that is potentially the most promising to bring
together an improved solution to some of the problems of empirical studies
presented above is a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).
1 / Recently, social
accounting has been increasingly and widely used for both (1) data
organization and reconciliation, and (2) modeling on the basis of the
accounting structure of a SAM. The social accounting matrix is focussed on
detailed disaggregation of factor and households accounts and income
distribution (as well as production structure)--implying its usefulness for
fiscal incidence studies on two grounds. First, a SAM organizes income and
expenditure data, which are a primary basis for empirical incidence studies,
in a consistent manner. The social accounting matrix closely approximates the
final form of data used in empirical incidence studies, with an advantage that
it provides a consistent but flexible framework as opposed to tabular and "ad
hoc" organization of the data base in the fiscal incidence studies. Second,
its focus on income distribution coincides with the focus of fiscal incidence
studies, since the malor questions confronting public finance and fiscal
studies have always been distributional in nature. In this respect, a
1/ For references to the SAM literature, see Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976), and
Pyatt et al. (1977).
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methodology that would allow empirical studies of fiscal incidence to be
undertaken within a context of a SAM can improve the scope for which the SAMs
can be used. Considering the increasing number of SAMs being built for
different countries and their recent emphasis on commodity accounts (which
permit explicit treatment of indirect taxes and subsidies), a methodology that
could translate the data of these SAMs into a picture of fiscal incidence
would be an important extension of the present scope of analysis undertaken on
the basis of SAMs. It should be noted that an attempt at using the SAM
framework for tax incidence analysis has been made by Pyatt (1981a). However,
as it appears, his method of "collapsing SAMs" is useful only for apportioning
general commodity taxes to household groups (in a static sense), and for
reducing the size of a SAM.
On the other hand, the methodology of empirical fiscal incidence can
be improved by using the SAM framework because of the following advantages.
First, existing or future SAMs provide a ready information on income
distribution and taxation. Second, the SAM framework guarantees consistency
of the accounting framework. and is well suited for use of statistical
techniques for data reconciliation. And finally, SAMs can be used as a basis
for modeling purposes.
A Methodology Used in This Study
While the conventional empirical studies of tax incidence are a
standard tool for statistical calculations of tax burdens, the Harberger
(1962) two-sector general equilibrium model of tax incidence is a technique
most often used in the theoretical literature. As noted by McLure (1975) and
Nizar (1979), this model, with various modifications and extensions, has
become the standard tool of incidence analysis in situations requiring a
- 12 -
general equilibrium framework. Although the conventional empirical studies of
tax incidence would ideally require a general equilibrium framework, they are
actually dealing only with partial equilibrium static analysis of tax
incidence, as discussed in the following chapters.
The attempt of this study is to narrow the gap between theoretical
and empirical tax incidence studies, and to integrate the advantages of the
SAM data framework with some of the theoretical findings developed in the
field of tax incidence. For this purpose, the Harberger (1962) general
equilibrium model is used in the context of a SAM data framework. Because of
the flexibility (Pyatt 1981b) and conceptual features of the SAM data system,
the incorporation of the Harberger model into the accounting structure of the
SAM, in the first instance, allows the exact correspondence of the algebraic
formulation of the Harberger general equilibrium model to be clearly shown
within the accounting structure of the data base. Second, as demonstrated in
the following chapters, such an approach facilitates the solution of the
model, its extensions and modifications, as well as applications to the actual
country data base needed for tax incidence analysis. A detailed methodology
incorporating the outlines suggested above will be developed in subsequent
chapters.
The previous research in the field of empirical studies of fiscal
incidence is reviewed in the next chapter. The methodology used in this study
is discussed in detail in Chapter III, and it is compared with the methodology
of the previous empirical research. This methodology is extended in Chapter
IV, where the standard Harberger model written in a SAM framework is modified
in order to include preexisting taxes and interindustry transactions, both of
which are a part of the SAM framework. The empirical application of the
methodology developed in this study to the SAM for Egypt, 1979, is presented
-13-
in Chapter V. The results and policy implications of this methodology,
including recommendations for future research, are discussed in Chapter VI.
- 14
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY OF FISCAL INCIDENCE IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Purpose of Analysis and Underlying Theory
Increasing concern with income distribution in recent years has
initiated numerous empirical studies that attempt to estimate the incidence of
different aspects of public activity. Traditionally, the focus of these
studies has been on tax incidence. Recently, there have been numerous
estimates of the incidence of total public expenditures (Musgrave, et al.,
1974: Ruggles 1980: Meerman 1979). Some studies combined the two types of
incidence into fiscal or budget incidence. The following chapter will review
the purpose and underlying theory of all three types of empirical incidence
studies: (1) tax incidence, (2) expenditure incidence, and (3) budget
incidence. The review of the previous research will include definitions,
concepts of measurement procedures, methodology used in these studies as well
as their limitations. It should be noted that this review covers only
empirical studies of the redistributive impact of the government budget, and
the major theoretical issues related to these studies. This includes a review
of the major theoretical features of the Harberger model of tax incidence.
Purpose of Studies
The main purpose of fiscal incidence studies has been to derive
policy judgements regarding the distributional effects of various taxes and
expenditure benefits among household groups. A policy-relevant question asked
in tax incidence or tax burden empirical studies is- whether the burden cf
taxes (paid in a particular country) is distributed fairly by income class or
among persons with substantially equal incomes. Thus, the concern of
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empirical studies is with the vertical equity of the tax system, that is, with
the distribution of tax burdens among different income classes, and with
horizontal equity, that is, the distribution of tax burdens among household
groups with similar incomes, and sometimes with both. One issue in most
studies is whether a tax is regressive or progressive. A tax is regressive
when the ratio of tax to income falls as incomes rise: a tax is proportional
when the ratio of tax to income is the same for all income classes; and a tax
is progressive when the ratio of tax to income rises as income rise. The
results of tax incidence studies are usually presented by Lorenz curves or
Gini coefficients summarizing the before- and after-tax income distribution.
Two categories of fiscal incidence studies can be distinguished. One
is concerned with vertical equity while the other category deals with
horizontal equity. The first group of studies is concerned with vertical
equity, analyzing the redistribution of income through the fiscal system
(Snodgrass 1974; McLure 1974a) and concentrating on the effects of taxes, or
expenditures, or both, on different income-size classes of the population. A
second group of incidence studies is concerned with horizontal equity and
development strategy concentrating on the differential tax burden between
different groups of the population. The horizontal equity, as treated in
these studies, ranges between urban and rural sectors, between various
geographical areas, or between various ethnic components of the population.
Most of the studies conducted in India concentrate on the differential tax
burden between rural and urban sectors, and on the transfer of resources
between these two sectors (Gandhi 1966, De Wulf 1975). Tax incidence studies
in India attempt to estimate the "formal incidence" of the Indian tax
system. Formal incidence estimates are a quantification of the presumed
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intentions of the fiscal authorities. Most Indian studies avoid the problem
of tax shifting. However, a distinctive feature of these studies is that they
allocate the tax burden between the urban and the rural, or the agricultural
and nonagricultural sectors of the economy. Indian tax incidence studies also
estimate the tax content of expenditure for the various expenditure classes of
the urban and rural sectors (Rai 1959, Mitra 1963).
Other studies are concerned with the horizontal equity between
various geographical areas (Azfar 1972) or between various ethnic components
of a country (Adler et al. 1952, Pechman and Okner 1974). The purpose of a
now classic study in the field of fiscal incidence by Pechman and Okner
(1974), for example, was to estimate the effect of all U.S. taxes on the
distribution of income by size of income and by other characteristics
(demographic and economic) of the population. The authors drew inferences
from their results about the tax incidence in the United States. Their main
conclusion is that the U.S. tax system is essentially proportional for most
families and therefore has little effect on the distribution of income. The
results, however, may vary with different taxes. For this reason, this study
compared the distribution of tax burdens by income classes under eight sets of
assumptions for corporate, property, and payroll taxes. The objectives of
these statistical calculations, according to the authors were, first, to
determine whether it is possible to arrive at any broad conclusions about the
distribution of tax burdens in the United States, and second, to illustrate
the differences implied by the major competing views among economists about
the incidence of particular taxes.
There are three main purposes for conducting fiscal incidence
studies. One main purpose is a concern with the effects of tax shifting on
income distribution. The second purpose is a concern with the improvement of
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income distribution estimates. And the third purpose of these studies is a
concern with the distributional implications of government spending. Musgrave
et al. (1974) define the purpose of empirical fiscal incidence studies as an
exploration of the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions about
tax shifting. With respect to the limitations of the assumptions ! made in
these studies, they argue that:
As science proceeds, these assumptions will, hopefully.
come to be replaced by firm evidence, but. policy judge-
ments regarding the distributional effects of various
taxes must be made in the meantime. For this purpose,
systematic exploration of the more reasonable hypotheses
is surely better than random judgement.
The second main purpose, noted especially by Meerman (1972), and Bird
and DeWulf (1973) for studying fiscal incidence is a need to improve income
distribution studies. Most country studies on size distribution of income
ignore tax effects, benefits of government expenditures, or both. A typical
income concept in such studies comes close to that of factor payments before
taxes. However, this failure to consider fiscal incidence is a serious
shortcoming, since in many countries 15 to 20 percent of national income is
channeled through the public sector. For example, in recent years, total
public expenditures exceeded 25 percent of national income in Algeria, Chile,
Guyana, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Zambia (World Bank 1980). These data suggest
that in developing countries there is a substantial potential in the public
sector for redistributing income. This also points to a need to assess the
public sector impact when estimating the size-distribution of income.
1/ It should be noted that there is a great difference in opinion and absence
of consensus among economists as to how some of the major taxes are
shifted, especially with respect to corporate tax, property tax and
payroll tax. For this reason, alternative incidence assumptions are
usually explored and compared.
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The third main purpose of fiscal incidence studies is a concern with
the spending side of the government budget. Most fiscal incidence studies
usually concentrate on the distributional effects arising from various tax
changes, thus ignoring the effects that arise as a consequence of government
spending patterns. However, the distributional effects of government spending
may be as important as the distributional effects arising from taxes. Because
governments directly allocate anywhere from an eighth to a third of total
(final) output (Neerman 1974), a concern with income distribution carries with
it, also, a concern for the incidence of public activity on the distribution
of income. Consequently, the need to estimate such incidence is also
increasing.
The potential usefulness to policy from studies on fiscal incidence
and the redistributive role of a government budget can be presented by
assuming that the rich pay all the taxes and the poor receive all the
benefits. In such an "ideal" situation, considerable redistribution could be
achieved. The real world is, however, far from such an "ideal" situation,
because in reality, changes in tax policies are quite difficult to achieve
politically in developing countries. For example, Adelman and Morris (1973)
cast doubt on potential redistribution through government budgets in develop-
ing countries. On the other hand, in his survey of fiscal incidence studies
in developing countries, De Wulf (1975), contrary to other similar studies,
(Meerman 1973, OAS 1973) claims that budget incidence is progressive in most
countries. Many governments in developing countries do claim that their
oblective or the goal of their present tax and expenditure system is to redis-
tribute incomes. However, without an analysis of the existing situation, it
is rather difficult to argue that budget expenditures are either propoor or
prorich. More concretely, if the poor are to escape poverty through public
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expenditure, then measuring benefit incidence becomes an important policy
Input.
A useful policy approach to assist the poor requires knowledge of how
well existing programs are functioning, in terms of which reach the poor and
which do not, i.e., who pays the taxes and who receives the benefits of public
expenditures. As noted by Meerman (1978), information concerning the
distribution of public costs by the beneficiary gained through empirical
expenditure incidence studies is a necessary first step in acquiring such
knowledge! consequently whether or not the actual distribution is compared
with an ex ante hypothetical distribution, knowledge concerning benefit
incidence is valuable per se.
Most of the empirical fiscal incidence studies (e.g., Musgrave et al.
1974, Pechman and Okner 1974) are concerned with pure analytical questions,
i.e., they attempt to estimate the burden of taxes and the benefit of public
expenditures without giving any policy recommendations. Some other studies
(Meerman 1973, 1979: Bird and de Wulf 1973), on the other hand, deal with both
the analytical and the policy questions. The policy conclusion in most of
these studies is that more progression is needed in the tax system in order to
obtain a more equitable tax system and greater income redistribution.
In summary empirical fiscal incidence studies are potentially
valuable in providing information about the functioning of the public sector
(budget) In a particular country and for improving information on country
size-income distributions. It is necessary, however, to consider carefully
what questions should be asked and how they bear upon the definition of the
relevant concepts of measurement procedures, assumptions, and limitations of
the methodology used.
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Theory and Concepts of Fiscal Incidence
Regardless of their purpose, empirical incidence studies are used to
determine the incidence of a tax by following through its effects on the
incomes of the producers of the taxed commodity or sector, and on the
consumption expenditures of individual households. The burden of a tax on any
household is the sum of the burdens borne by its members both as producers and
as consumers. Thus, in the modern incidence theory, a distinction is made
between tax incidence on the sources of income side of household budgets and
incidence on the uses of income side. The sources of funds are the incomes
received by the producers of the taxed commodity, and the uses of funds are
the consumption expenditures of individual households. The fundamental
concern of empirical incidence studies is to determine how the burdens of
different taxes are distributed according to family income.
There are three ways in which the problem of incidence has been
analysed: (1) absolute; (2) differential; and (3) budget incidence. In the
absolute (or specific) tax incidence, the analyst attempts to examine the
distributional effects of a particular tax while holding public expenditures
constant. This concept of absolute incidence is generally agreed to be the
least satisfactory of the three alternatives, because it deals with the
distributional effects of a given tax change in isolation, not allowing for
changes in expenditures, transfers, or other taxes to help counteract the
effects of the given tax change on aggregate demand. For this reason, an
absolute tax incidence approach is not widely used in the field (Break 1974),
and is neglected in the remainder of this study.
The second approach, preferred by many economists at the conceptual
level, is to calculate the differential incidence of two taxes yielding equal
revenue or of two equally costly expenditure packages. In this approach, the
- 24 -
analyst examines the distributional changes that result if one tax is
substituted for another while total revenues and expenditures are held
constant. An advantage of this concept is to avoid macro economic effects
(changes in aggregate demand) that would follow if total revenues and
expenditures were not held constant. Substitution of one tax for another (of
equal yield) involves no new resource transfer to public use; it merely
involves a redistribution among households (disregarding the issue of excess
burden). The concept of differential incidence applies when alternative ways
of raising or lowering revenue are compared. As noted by Musgrave and
Musgrave (1980), this view of tax incidence is particularly useful because
actual tax-policy decisions usually involve such issues.
Although this approach has been accepted as reasonable and applied in
many empirical incidence studies, several shortcomings can be identified. The
approach necessitates the comparison of the incidence of two taxes or of two
expenditures between themselves, rather than calculation of the unique
incidence of only one tax or one expenditure. Using this concept, it is thus
impossible to specify a unique differential incidence pattern of any
particular tax; only a comparison of its incidence with the incidence patterns
of other taxes is possible (Break 1974). It should be noted that the term
"differential incidence" as used in the traditional tax literature by Musgrave
(1959) is not defined in terms of calculus. In this literature, differential
incidence simply means comparison of two different taxes.
The third approach to incidence analysis avoids the problems of
absolute or specific incidence analysis by examining the balanced-budget
incidence of equal changes in taxes and expenditures. Using this concept, as
defined by Musgrave and Musgrave (1980), an analyst considers the changes in
household level of income that result if the combined effects of tax and
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expenditure changes are calculated and attempts to determine simultaneously
"who pays the taxes?" and "who gets the benefits?" Most studies of the
distributional effects of budgetary policy attempt to compare the distribution
of real income among households, given the current budgetary practices, with
what it would be in the absence of government.
The measurement of balanced-budget incidence is usually formulated in
the following way:
AY -Y +cG - Y
where: 1 0
AY is the change in the real income of the household;
Y is the estimated real income of the household in the absence of
0
government activity (before tax income);
Y is the corresponding actual real income of the household given the
existence of government (after tax income);
Gy measures the real income--equivalent of the public services (and
transfers) enjoyed by households.
Effective tax and benefit rates can be calculated by comparing tax
burdens and expenditure benefits in each household group with the group's
total income. This means that the amount of taxes paid as a proportion of
total household income is compared across different household groups. The
comparison can be made either with Y or with Y + G . Comparison with
o 1 1
Y would indicate the percentage of zero-budget income, i.e., (taxes equal
0
expenditures) taken by taxes and increased by expenditures. On the other
hand, comparison with Y1 + G would indicate by what fraction real income
would rise due to the elimination of taxes and fall because of the elimination
of expenditures, if the government budget were to be removed. As noted by
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Gillespie (1965), there are no grounds for preferring one or the other,
because these are two different concepts. The former comparison measures the
impact the government budget has on the distribution prevailing in a no-budget
world, while the latter tells how the existing distribution would be changed
by elimination of the government budget.
Because balanced-budget incidence studies attempt to compare an
economy with the government budget with an economy without the budget, they
overlook and simplify many important issues. These studies ignore the
possibility that public provision of services may not be efficient; they also
ignore the burden of public services, bureaucratic red tape, etc. As noted by
McLure (1974b), strict interpretation of a zero budget case would entail the
comparison of the existing state of the world with a state of total anarchy.
This also means that the "rules of the game" under which an economy operates
might be vastly different in the zero-government case. For example, the
extent of monopolization and discrimination depends on the government
regulatory role. Although all these issues are important, they are ignored in
these studies, by assuming that the prevailing institutional framework would
also exist in an economy without the government budget, and that there is no
difference in efficiency between public and private sectors.
Balanced-budget incidence, as defined above, has to be decomposed
into its basic elements in order to develop measurement procedures. Musgrave
and Musgrave (1980) and McLure (1974b) define three distinct elements causing
change in real income due to a government intervention: (1) the burden (and
benefits) of taxes used to finance public activity; (2) the benefits of public
services; and (3) the redistribution of income resulting from changes in
relative factor rewards and product prices induced by the shift of purchasing
power from the private to the public sector. These three effects can be
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referred to as tax, benefit, and expenditures incidence, respectively. Most
of. the studies on budget incidence identify tax and expenditures incidence
with the change in real private income, i.e., Y1 - Y from the above
equation, and benefit incidence with the income equivalent of government
expenditures (G . This means that taxes are subtracted from the gross income
of households and government expenditures (real income equivalent) are added
to after-tax household incomes to measure the distributional implications of
the government budget. In essence, this approach takes a static view of
fiscal incidence, i.e., the distributional implications of the government
budget are evaluated at a certain point in time, ignoring the above-discussed
elements of budget incidence. These studies have been severely criticized,
especially because of inadequate treatment of expenditures incidence. In the
next section, expenditures incidence studies will be reviewed in more detail
in order to clarify the limitations of balanced-budget incidence studies.
Benefit and Expenditures Incidence
Empirical studies of incidence on the spending side are less frequent
than empirical studies of tax incidence. As noted by DeWulf (1975), among the
studies in developing countries concerned with fiscal impact on income
distribution, one-third have attempted to quantify expenditures incidence.
Unlike tax incidence studies, which are widely accepted in spite of frequent
criticism, there are neither well-developed general techniques nor theory for
handling expenditures (Meerman 1978). And, as noted by McLure (1974b), "the
methodology and theory of estimating benefit and expenditure incidence is
largely undeveloped." Nevertheless, all researchers used an approach similar
to that which has evolved in estimating tax incidence. This approach can
probably be best illustrated by the Musgrave et al. (1974) study which covers
both taxes and public spending. The tax incidence approach of the Musgrave et
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al. study will be described in the next section, while the approach to
distribution of expenditure benefits will be reviewed in this section.
On the expenditure side of fiscal incidence, three classes of
spending are identified. The first consists of goods and service expenditures
where particular beneficiaries can (in theory) be identified, such as
allocable expenditures or broadly publicly provided private goods (e.g.,
highways and education). The second group consists of transfer payments which
by their nature lend themselves to allocation. And the third group consists
of "public goods" that cannot be directly allocated to particular individuals
(e.g., defence) (Gillespie 1965). For allocable goods, the procedure adopted
by Musgrave et al. is similar to that for taxes. For example, unemployment
insurance benefits are allocated according to receipts from that source (given
in the MERGE file), education expenditures is allocated to the families of
students, using data from the Census of Population. The second group of
public goods are simply allocated using three assumptions: (1) in proportion
to total income, (2) in proportion to taxes, and (3) equally to all persons.
In making allocations of goods and services that are directly allocated, it is
assumed that costs incurred on behalf of various groups reflect the value of
benefits received (Musgrave and Musgrave 1980). Thus, in the case of
highways, expenditures are divided in line with consumer and business use of
facilities. The former are allocated according to household expenditures on
automotive products, while the latter, by reducing business costs, are assumed
to be passed forward to the consumer. Transfers are treated as negative taxes
and are assumed to stay with the recipients. After all benefits are allocated
to the household groups, a picture of total benefits is presented in three
alternatives. The first alternative assumes that general benefits are
distributed in line with total family income. The second variant allocates
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such benefits in line with tax burdens, and the third uses a per capita
distribution. The use of the last alternative results in the most favorable
pattern for the low-income groups. However, in all cases the overall benefit
rate declines towards the upper end of income scale. The overall pattern of
benefit distribution is, in all cases, much more pro-low income compared to
the relative position of low incomes in the tax incidence distribution.
Empirical studies of expenditures incidence have several
limitations. One of the major limitations of the approach is that it does not
consider the effects on the distribution of earnings, due to government
expenditures, i.e., which result as wages are paid to government employees or
to construction workers employed by private firms building public highways.
This procedure assumes that the pattern of earnings will not change in the
process.
The maior problem of expenditures incidence studies seems to be that
they attempt to estimate the value of all benefits from public expenditures to
recipients while ignoring two different but important aspects of incidence on
the spending side. 'These two aspects are that incidence has to be decomposed
into two components in order to capture two different effects of government
spending on income distribution. One component is defined as expenditures
incidence, i.e., how government spending affects private incomes; and the
other component is defined as benefit incidence, i.e., who receives government
services (McLure 1974b). Most of the criticism of these studies arises in the
literature because of confusion and lack of separation of the two components
of spending incidence. Although in conventional studies of budget incidence,
analysts claim that they attempt to solve tax incidence and expenditures
incidence simultaneously, they are actually dealing only with partial
equilibrium static analysis of tax incidence, as discussed in the next
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section. And on the other hand, these studies are dealing only with benefit
incidence, thus ignoring expenditures incidence which is a consequence of
changes in relative prices due to government spending.
Expenditures incidence can in other words be described in the
following way. Government budget policies affect personal income indirectly
by affecting the composition of output and hence changing both the relative
and the absolute prices of final goods and services, and of factors of
production. In general, expenditures incidence depends upon: (1) the changes
in the distribution of income resulting from marginal differences in private
and public spending, (2) the price elasticity of demand for various products,
(3) the degree of complementarily or substitability of publicly and privately
provided goods, (4) the supply elasticity of products, (5) differences in the
average propensities of households to consume various goods, and (6) the
differences in factor endowments of households. Theoretically, a study of
expenditures incidence should take these effects into consideration. In the
context of the budget incidence approach, this means that it would be
necessary to calculate the level and distribution of personal incomes that
would have existed in the absence of the activities of the public sector
(government). However, as noted by Dodge (1975), this calculation is not
feasible as the behavioral relationships on which such a calculation could be
based are not available, nor in practice estimable. From the above
discussion, it is clear that allocation procedures of conventional
expenditures incidence studies do not deal with the expenditures incidence
problem as outlined above, but actually attempt to estimate only benefit
incidence.
However, there are several problems also with estimating benefit
incidence as formulated in empirical studies. These studies require many
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simplifications and clearly stated assumptions in order to arrive at some
meaningful results of the analysis. One major source of criticism of country
studies of benefit incidence is their assumption that total costs of providing
public goods equal total value to the recipients. The problem with this
assumption is that the political process does not give such perfect results.
It is usually impossible to measure empirically the value of benefits as
perceived by particular households. As noted by Meerman (1978), even if
households wanted to, it probably would be impossible for them to value
consistently, i.e., decide what they would be willing to pay for a school
year, or public clinic visit. Another problem in these studies arises if the
assumption, implicit in these studies, that the public activity is carried out
at the optimal level (disregarding the possibility of nonefficient output) is
relaxed. In that case total costs no longer equal total benefits, except by
chance, and there is no reason to expect total benefits attributed to exactly
equal total budgetary costs.
As presented above, expenditures incidence studies have several
limitations. Because these studies are a constituent part of balanced-budget
analysis, the limitations of the expenditures incidence also apply to the
balanced-budget incidence. Some of the major shortcomings of expenditures
incidence studies are, on the other hand, of the same nature as the
limitations of conventional tax incidence studies discussed in the next
section.
The focus of this study is on tax incidence, specifically on the
empirical implementation and extension of the Harberger (1962) model within
the context of a social accounting framework. Expenditures incidence studies
are reviewed here only because they are a part of some traditional tax
incidence studies. As discussed above, the theory of expenditures incidence
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is largely underdeveloped, and empirical studies of expenditures and balanced-
budget incidence have several limitations. The methodology and approach of
this study deals with the expenditures side of the government budget only to a
limited extent. The approach to this problem adopted in Chapters IV and V is
that the tax revenues (indirect taxes) are allocated to the household groups
as a part of their income (in the form of transfers) instead of to the
government. This simple assumption avoids most of the problems found in the
traditional incidence studies, and on the other hand, it allows measurement of
changes in real incomes of households that arise from changes in tax revenues.
Tax Incidence
As discussed above, the basic concern of empirical tax incidence
studies is with the distribution of income among different groups of the
population. An obvious question to be addressed is whether there exists the
most appropriate partitioning of the population. As it appears from the
literature, the adequate partitioning depends on the policy question.
Distributions that appear in most studies of tax incidence involve the
distribution by income class, age-group, racial, and regional
classification. Less frequently found are the urban-rural and agricultural-
nonagricultural distributions. The reason for less interest in these
distributions is probably due to the fact that most studies of tax incidence
have been undertaken in developed countries or that their methodology has been
applied in developing countries without questioning their policy relevance or
usefulness . However, the urban-rural and agricultural-nonagricultural
distributions would be indicative of the inequality in the size distributions
in many developing countries, given the importance of economic dualism in
explaining the size distributions (Adelman and Morris 1971). These
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distributions might be especially relevant in that particular expenditure
policies might more easily be designed to benefit the rural poor than the
urban poor, and are likely to affect urban and rural groups differently. For
these reasons, the application of the methodology developed in the next
chapters will focus on the distributional implications of tax incidence by
partitioning the population into urban and rural groups.
There are three basic methods of theoretical analysis used in
examining tax incidence: (1) partial equilibrium static analysis; (2) general
equilibrium comparative static analysis; and (3) dynamic analysis. For some
taxes, where it seems reasonable to abstract from most tax-induced market
interactions, Marshallian partial equilibrium analysis is often used.
However, for partial factor taxes, such as the corporation income tax,
selective commodity taxes, and for industrial incentives tied to the use of
one factor in one region or industry tax incidence cannot be analyzed
satisfactorily without explicitly recognizing market interdependence. For
these cases, a general equilibrium analysis is required. Most often, analysis
similar to that used in the Harberger (1962) model is employed. In some
cases, the examination of tax incidence cannot be performed adequately either
with partial or general equilibrium comparative static analysis. If taxation
affects the rates of capital accumulation and growth significantly (over some
intermediate adjustment period), a dynamic analysis based on a growth model is
needed (Krzyzaniak 1967). However, as the analysis is moved from comparative
statics to dynamic analysis, it becomes more difficult to include a rich
structure of market interdependence.
The focus of this study is on the improvement of the traditional tax
incidence studies (Musgrave et al. 1974, Meerman 1978, Meerman and Shome 1980)
extended by the use of the modified Harberger model and the social accounting
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framework. For this reason, the rest of this section will concentrate on
these type of studies and on the theoretical structure, applications, and
limitations of the Harberger model.
Traditional tax incidence studies
There have been a number of major studies of the redistributive
impact of the government budget in recent years. In the United States, the
most well known are the studies by Musgrave et al. (1974) and Pechman and
Okner (1974). Most studies undertaken in other countries (e.g., O'Higgins and
Ruggles 1981, Nicholson 1977) followed the approach developed by the Musgrave
study. The studies available indicate that a conventional approach to
estimating the tax burden has evolved. The conventional methodology is
explained in more detail in the next chapter, while only a brief review of the
basic concepts is presented here. It is well illustrated by the Musgrave et
al. study on the United States. (Pechman and Okner use individual
observations from the MERGE file rather than income ranges, but apply similar
procedures.) The Musgrave et al. (1974) study of tax burdens involves three
major steps, including (1) the allocation of tax burdens by household income
brackets, (2) a corresponding allocation of income, and (3) the determination
of effective rates as the ratio of tax to income in each income bracket. To
solve the first step, the major problem is to determine what incidence
assumptions are to be made. These assumptions are then implemented by
allocation of the tax burden in line with a distributive series that reflects
each assumption. The second step involves determination of the proper income
base, and in the third involves calculation of the burden as a percent of
income.
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Musgrave et al. start from a distribution of income by ranges, and I  ,
then they allocate taxes and expenditures to these ranges. The income
distribution by ranges is derived in the Musgrave et al. study from the
Brookings MERGE file, which is based on tax data and the data from the Survey
of Economic Opportunity. The distribution of taxes depends on the assumptions
made about the incidence, discussed below, and on the allocation series
used. The latter are taken from a variety of sources, including tax data and
surveys of consumer expenditures.
Similar studies have been carried out for other countries, although
the methods vary, reflecting the differences in availability of data and in -
fiscal systems. In the United Kingdom, the estimates published annually in
"Economic Trends" use individual data, rather than income ranges, from the
Family Expenditure Survey, but the results are usually the same (Nicholson
1977). Studies with similar results have been carried out in India (NCAER
1970, 1972).
These empirical studies may be seen as implementing the simple
partial static framework outlined above, with (Yl - Yo), applied to current
income. The endowments and behavior of households are taken as given, as are
all pretax factor prices and producer prices. The effect of the income tax is
assumed to be to reduce posttax income; and the effect of indirect taxes is
assumed to be to increase consumer prices. These assumptions have been
criticized as being unrealistic. Prest (1955), for example, claimed that the
assumption about indirect taxes can be justified only where the supply is
perfectly elastic, whereas the assumption about the income tax can be
Justified only when factor supplies are completely inelastic. He states that
"calculations of the incidence of direct and indirect taxes are based on
conflicting and contradictory assumptions." (p.2 4 2). While Prest (1955) uses
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only a descriptive analysis, this point is demonstrated rigorously,
analytically and empirically in Chapter III using the Harberger (1962) model
and the SAM framework. As concluded in Chapter III, the assumptions of the
traditional tax incidence studies are valid only for general factor and
commodity taxes, while a general equilibrium framework has to be used for the
analysis of selective factor and commodity taxes.
To avoid the criticism of the methodology employed in these studies,
Musgrave et al. (1974) and Pechman and Okner (1974) empirically investigate
the consequences of these alternative assumptions about incidence. Musgrave
et al. contrast the "benchmark" assumptions used in measuring tax incidence
with "progressive" and "regressive" alternatives. All three alternatives are
defined in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: Incidence Assumptions Made by Musgrave et al.
Corporate income
tax
Property tax
Employers social
insurance
contributions
Source: Musgrave
Progressive
Falls on dividend
recipients
Falls on all capital
income receivers
Falls on employee
Benchmark
Half falls on all
capital income
receivers; half
passed on to
consumers
Residential
--occupants
Commercial
--half on all
capital receivers
--half on
consumers
Passed on to
consumers
Regressive
Passed on to all
consumers
Residential
--occupants
Commercial
--on
consumers
Passed on to
consumers
et al. (1974), p. 261.
- 37 -
The progressive assumptions increase the percentage of income paid in
taxes for higher income groups, while the regressive assumptions cause the
percentage paid in taxes for these groups to fall. The effects of the
progressive and regressive assumptions are exactly the -opposite for lower
income groups compared to higher income groups. On the other hand, over the
range of middle incomes, the percentages remain relatively constant.
Alternative incidence assumptions appear, on this basis, to be most critical
at the top and the bottom of the income scale. The same conclusion is derived
by Pechman and Okner (1974). As stated by them, the objectives of presenting
alternative assumptions are to illustrate the differences implied by the major
competing views among economists about the incidence of particular taxes.
Further, they note that the calculations do not provide any empirical evidence
either to verify or to deny the validity of competing incidence assumptions or
the analysis based on any particular set of assumptions.
In summary, the conventional empirical studies of tax incidence
actually take various assumptions of tax incidence for particular taxes found
in the theoretical literature and evaluate these assumptions empirically. The
most appropriate set of results depends on the judgement of the reader and
his/her choice of the most plausible assumptions. This is recognized by
Pechman and Okner (1974) in their statement about incidence assumptions (pp.
25-26):
For the most part, these assumptions were pragmatic
compromises made by the analysts in the absence of a
consensus among economists as to the incidence of the
major taxes in the tax system.
From this perspective the major weakness of the traditional empirical
studies seems to be that they do not use a consistent framework or a model to
evaluate tax incidence, but rather they borrow their (sometimes conflicting)
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assumptions from the literature and leave the reader to decide about the most
appropriate outcome. As noted by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), almost any
investigation of this type is likely to lead to results conditional on a range
of alternative assumptions. For this reason, they suggest that the simple
fixed-factor, two-sector models could be used for the purpose of improving
conventional empirical tax incidence studies. However, although the two-
sector general equilibrium model developed by Harberger has existed since
1962, it has not been used in conjunction with the conventional tax incidence
approach. With the exception of a recent comparison of different approaches
by Devarjan et al. (1980), the empirical findings of these studies have also
not been compared to the empirical results obtained by using the general
equilibrium approach. Analysts who have written a very extensive literature
on tax incidence and who have conducted the numerous empirical tax incidence
studies, listed in the first chapter, have so far not used a general
equilibrium approach. The only attempt at integrating the Harberger model
approach and findings with the traditional empirical studies has been a recent
study by Meerman and Shome (1980). Their suggestions are presented in the
next chapter. The remainder of this section presents the literature on the
Harberger-type, general-equilibrium models, because the modified and extended
Harberger model represents the essential part of the proposed methodology for
improvement of the conventional empirical tax incidence studies presented in
the next chapters of this study.
The Harberger Relative-Prices Model
Tax incidence analysis before 1962 was partial equilibrium analysis,
although some economists, Rolph (1954), Musgrave (1959), and Wells (1955), had
attempted to place incidence analysis in a general equilibrium context. In
- 39 -
1962, Harberger introduced to the field of public finance the two-sector
general equilibrium model of tax incidence that, with various modifications
and extensions, has since become the standard tool of incidence analysis in
situations requiring a general equilibrium framework (McLure 1975).
The.Harberger model, in its general form, is based upon standard
neoclassical assumptions, with several important exceptions. The equations of
the model are discussed extensively by Harberger (1962), and Mieszkowski
(1967), and derived explicitly by Shoven and Whalley (1972). A version of the
model equations is also presented in a Cobb-Douglas form in the next chapter
of this study. For this reason, the review of the model will concentrate on
the description of the assumptions and the advantages and shortcomings of the
model for tax incidence analysis.
The original Harberger model included seven assumptions. These
assumptions, some of which were relaxed in subsequent work with the model by
McLure (1971) and Mieszkowski (1972), are:
(1) Fixed aggregate factor supplies, which eliminates a need to consider
the work-leisure choice, the effects of taxation on saving,
investment, and growth, and interactions between the supply of labor
and capital;
(2) Perfect competition in factor and product markets;
(3) Perfect factor mobility, which does not consider obstacles to the
movement of labor and capital among industries, with the result that
net-of-tax rates of return are equalized for each factor in all of
its alternative uses. This also means that the model should be
applied to long-run analyses of tax incidence. However, McLure
(1971) extended the model to include imperfect factor mobility;
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(4) Linear homogeneous production functions; this assumption ignores
economies of scale, because increases in both labor and capital
inputs are assumed to produce equal percentage increases in output;
(5) Homogeneous marginal consumption propensities;- the model makes
marginal propensities to consume goods the same for all spending
units, even though their average propensities may differ;
(6) No fixed-money assets; the model considers only relative price
changes, ignoring the possibility that absolute changes are also
important:
(7) Closed economic system; this limitation ignores the impact of import
tariffs and export taxes on income distribution, thus allowing for
evaluation of domestic taxes only.
Because of the extensive list of the restrictive assumptions, some
authors cast doubt on the practical value of the Harberger model for tax
incidence analysis (Break 1974). However, as noted by Break (1974, p.131),
the usefulness of abstract models must be judged by the realism of both their
assumptions and their results. Although the model abstracts many features
from the economic reality the basic Harberger model effectively illuminates
several important features of tax incidence theory that have not been
recognized or demonstrated rigorously before in the public finance literature
(McLure 1975), such as the importance of relative prices for tax incidence
analysis. These features will be discussed in detail below.
For a complete picture of tax incidence in the Harberger model, it is
necessary to study in detail only a tax on one commodity, a tax on one factor,
and a tax on the use of one factor in the production of one commodity. This
methodological point was first noted by Musgrave (1959) and then confirmed
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analytically by the Harberger model (McLure 1975). Musgrave noted that under
the assumptions of perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and no
savings (assuiptions which are also a part of the Harberger model), the
following equivalences hold between taxes levied at a given ad valorem rate:
T T - T + T
XY LK L K
T - T + T
X XL XK
+ + +
T- T + T
Y YL .YK
where
X and Y are two consumer goods;
L and K are two factors of production, labor and capital;
T is a sales tax;
T is a tax on gross incomes;
LK
T X, TY are commodity taxes; and
TL TK are factor taxes.
In this basic tax matrix, X and Y stand for the two consumer goods and
L and K for the two factors of production, labor and capital. The first
propostion, which seems to be generally agreed upon (Break 1974), is that
given the assumptions of the Harberger model, a tax on gross output or sales,
T , is equivalent to a tax on gross incomes, TK , each being borne in
proportion to consumption or income, which are identical by assumption in the
model. Thus, the incidence of a single commodity tax, for example TX , makes
it possible to derive the incidence of the other commodity tax, T .
Similarly, if the incidence of one of the factor taxes, for example TL , is
known, it is sufficient to determine the incidence of the other factor tax,
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TK , by subtraction. Finally, a tax on each factor used in producing a
commodity is equivalent to an equal-rate tax on the commodity, as shown in the
second and third rows of the matrix. Thus, if the incidence of T and
T is known, then T can be obtained by subtraction.XK X
The most important contribution to tax incidence analysis of the
Harberger model is the identification of the structural parameters that
determine the direction and amount of the relative price changes brought about
by taxation. As discussed above, these parameters were identified before by
Musgrave (1959), Wells (1955), and others; however, the interrelationships
among them had never been systematically and precisely specified in a general
theoretical formulation that could be used empirically. The methodology of
this model made clear for the .first time, that in analyzing incidence, the
concern is only with changes in real (relative) prices leading to changes in
real income, and that the long-term effects of taxes on income distribution
are relevant (Nizar 1979). The model also demonstrated, that since the price
of one factor (or commodity) can be held constant and all other prices
expressed in terms of that price, only relative prices matter in tax incidence
analysis.
According to McLure (1975), the importance of the model is its
ability to deal with problems that partial equilibrium analysis can handle
only imperfectly. This model takes into account the interdependence of
markets. It should be noted that there is no problem in determining how an
excise tax affects individuals in their roles as recipients of factor incomes
by changing the relative net returns to factors, as well as how it affects
them in their role as consumers through variations in relative product
prices. Calculations of this type, i.e., evaluation of distributional
implications of excise and other taxes on the sources and uses side of income,
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will be performed in the next chapter by using the basic methodology of the
Harberger model applied to the social accounting framework.
The analysis of the Harberger model can also be extended to partial
factor taxes, rather than being confined to excise taxes. It was, in fact, to
analyze the incidence of corporate taxation that Harberger developed his two-
sector, two-factor general equilibrium model. The incidence of partial taxes
depends on the values of a number of parameters, including factor intensities,
elasticities of substitution between factors, and elasticities of substitution
of demand. Choosing plausible values for these parameters, Harberger has
shown that the burden of the corporate tax in the United States will be borne
by all owners of capital, in both the corporate and noncorporate sectors. The
explanation for the result is that the tax induces capital to move from the
corporate to the noncorporate sector, and during this process the net-of-tax
returns to capital in both sectors are equalized at a lower level.
The Harberger model also -gives answers to questions of the incidence
of general taxes, assuming fixed total factor supplies. It indicates that a
general tax on income or consumption will be borne in proportion to shares in
income or consumption, regardless of the elasticities of supply and demand of
the various commodities. And a general tax on all uses of one factor will be
borne by that factor. This result holds independently of the values of
various parameters, i.e., demand conditions for the factor, the factor
intensity of production in the various sectors, and the mobility of both
factors (McLure 1975).
As noted by Nizar (1979), substantial progress has been made in the
study of tax incidence due to the general equilibrium approach based on the
Harberger model and its extensions. On the other hand, with respect to the
conventional empirical studies of tax incidence, he states, that studies that
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allocate the total tax burden by income groups under assumptions that bear
little relation to the theory must be treated with skepticism.
The Harberger model has, however, two significant shortcomings.
Because it is constructed and analyzed in terms of differentials and assumes
the absence of any preexisting taxes (as will be shown in Chapter III), the
model can, strictly speaking, be applied only to the analysis of the
imposition of infinitestinal small taxes in a zero-tax world (Break 1974).
Studies that deal with the possible differences in incidence patterns created
by a specific tax change in a zero-tax situation compared to a situation with
existing taxes, include initial work by Feldstein (1974), Shoven and Whalley
(1972), and Fullerton et al. (1978). However, these studies are not
explicitly re'ated to the above discussed conventional empirical tax incidence
studies.
As discussed above, there is a wide gap between the theoretical
literature based on the Harberger model and the traditional empirical tax
incidence studies. One reason for this gap or lack of interest of the
conventional analysts to use findings of this model has probably been caused
by the inability of the standard Harberger model to deal with the preexisting
taxes. The attempt of this study is to extend the Harberger model for
analysis in a SAM context and to incorporate preexisting taxes and to design a
framework for empirical evaluation of the distributive implications of
existing taxes in a given economy.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY USED IN THIS STUDY
Analysis of Tax Incidence Using the Harberger Model
and Social Accounting Framework
In a recent article, Meerman (1978) presented a review of empirical
studies of budget incidence and asked a question whether these studies make
sense. His answer was that the studies are sensible and useful, but
restricted, because ceteris paribus conditions are implicitly assumed for
relative prices, technology, and output in making the incidence assumptions.
He concluded that the most serious restriction of these ceteris paribus
conditions - that for relative prices - is an unsolvable problem.
Consequently, he developed a simple fiscal incidence model that does not take
into consideration changes in relative prices due to taxation and applied this
model to Malaysia (Meerman 1979) using the traditional approach regarding tax
and benefit incidence.
However, a subsequent article on the same subject by Meerman and
Shome (1980) attempted to correct the statement that changes in relative
prices are unsolvable in empirical tax incidence studies. The two authors
used the Harberger (1962) general equilibrium model to demonstrate a possible
solution concerning how to account for changes in relative prices in empirical
tax incidence studies. In their demonstration, they present the Harberger
model and how it can be used to calculate the effects of taxes on the sources
side of income for corporate tax, and how to obtain pretax (or counterfactual)
incomes from which corporate taxes can be subtracted in order to obtain tax
burden or tax incidence measurements for particular households. With respect
to their approach, the authors conclude, that:
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We should also emphasize that some investigators are very
much aware of the effects of government tax and
expenditures on relative prices. But it has hitherto
been widely believed that it is impossible to in any way
come to grips with the problem. This is not completely
the case, as suggested by the work on the Harberger
model. We do have a beginning in dealing with'the more
general issues of the impact of taxes on counterfactual
incomes.
Although the approach suggested by Meerman and Shome represents an
important step forward towards improving the traditional approach of empirical
fiscal incidence studies, at least two important issues still remain
unanswered. These are: (1) how to calculate general equilibrium effects of
various taxes (excises, selective factor taxes, general taxes) on both the
sources and uses side of income, and (2) what kind of data are required or
from where these data can be obtained to make the approach operational. A
methodology to solve these critical problems will be proposed below.
The methodology of this study takes the approach suggested by
Meerman and Shome (1980) as a departure, but introduces several essential
improvements and extensions. The improvements are designed to test the
accuracy of the traditional approach of empirical tax incidence studies as
well as to develop a better methodology of empirical tax incidence studies.
The major components of the proposed methodology are:
(1) The Harberger model is written in a social accounting matrix (SAM),
showing the explicit relationship between the accounting framework
and the model;
(2) Analytical calculations of the impacts of taxes on relative price
changes will be performed for all of the critical taxes (tax on all
uses of capital or labor, selective factor tax, excises, sales
taxes), showing effects on both sources and uses of income.
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(3) Analytical expressions obtained from (1) and (2) will be tested
empirically using a hypothetical SAM.
(4) The results obtained by this methodology will be compared with those
obtained from the traditional (Musgrave et al. 1974, Pechman and
Okner 1974, and others) methodology. Eventual errors of the
traditional approach due to lack of .consideration of both sources and
uses of income, factor intensity, and differences in consumption
In the following section, the traditional methodology of estimating
tax incidence will be discussed in brief. The Harberger model will then be
presented analytically in a SAM framework, and the major steps for
implementing the proposed methodology will be outlined.
Traditional Methodology of Empirical Tax Incidence Studies
A brief description is given here of the major steps typically
involved in the traditional approach to empirical tax incidence studies, as
followed by Musgrave and others. The objective of these studies is to allocate
tax burdens by income groups. This is done for each tax by taking the total
amount collected and imputing the resulting burden to households grouped by
income class. The total burden for each tax equals revenue collected.
The procedure is to stipulate the specific response of the economy
to various taxes, based on theoretical analysis and market-structure
specifications, and then to allocate the burden by income groups. Thus, it is
assumed that excise and sales taxes will be borne by the consumers of the
taxed products and that the income tax is borne by the taxpayer. For some
taxes, alternative assumptions are explored. The burden distribution of the
corporation tax may be examined by assuming that the tax is borne by
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shareholders, that it falls on all capital income, or that the burden is
spread to wage earners or to consumers of corporate products. Similarly,
alternative assumptions may be examined for the property and payroll taxes.
This procedure has the advantage that it can be implemented readily,
that the underlying assumptions are explicitly stated, and that the
implications of alternative hypotheses can be evaluated. However, the
weakness of this procedure is that the (stipulated) incidence is limited to
only partial responses of the economy (S. Devari an, Don Fullerton, and R. A.
Musgrave 1980). Thus, taxes on products or commodities are taken to affect
households from the uses side of their accounts only, the burden being
distributed in line with the distribution of consumer expenditures. This
procedure ignores two important aspects of tax incidence. First, distribution
of tax burdens according to proportion of household consumption ignores
effects from the uses side that are due to changes in relative prices of
goods. And second, further effects of selective commodity taxes on factor
prices, which may simultaneously affect the position of households from the
sources side (changes in factor incomes), are disregarded. Thus, in these
studies, it is concluded that a sales tax on luxury items will be progressive
(because high income households consume more luxury goods), whereas one on a
necessity will be regressive.
Similarly. taxes on factor income, such as the income tax, are taken
to affect household positions from the sources side only, the burden being
distributed according to earnings subject to tax. Factor taxes are in this
case distributed in proportion to factor income, disregarding relative price
effects that may change the price of labor or capital and corresponding factor
incomes in both taxed and untaxed sector because of factor mobility or
different factor intensity. Moreover, additional effects of factor taxes that
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may simultaneously affect income from the uses side (change in prices of
consumption basket due to factor taxes) because of changes in relative product
prices are ignored! The underlying argument of this procedure is that the
distribution burden of a tax that initially impacts from the sources side will
be dominated by sources side effects, because secondary effects operating from
the uses side have no systematic relation to sources effects. The same is
assumed for the taxes on the uses side as indicated above.
The following section is intended to present a methodology that can
take account of tax incidence on both the uses and sources of income. In this
methodology, the Harberger model will be used in a SAM framework in order to
compare the traditional and modified methodology. Although the Harberger
model employs many simplifying assumptions,1 it allows measurement of the
magnitude and direction of the changes in relative prices caused by allowing
general equilibrium interrelationships. The model as used below represents a
first step in reproducing real world effects of taxation on changes in
relative incomes.
The Analytical Model
The model presented below is based on the model developed by
Harberger (1962) and its illustration developed by McLure and Thirsk (1975).
The model is modified for present purposes to take into account the allocation
of tax burden between two types of individuals (in this case, workers and
capitalists); it is structured to investigate the impact of a tax allowing for
1/ As indicated above, these effects are disregarded as well as in the
Meerman and Shome (1980) proposal for calculating counterfactual incomes.
2/ Of the seven assumptions of the Harberger model given in the previous
chapter, four are major: perfectly competitive economy, fixed technology,
fixed supply of factors, and closed economic system.
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all general equilibrium effects. The purpose of the model is to identify the
strategic variables that determine the outcome of tax incidence analysis.
Four major taxes are considered in this illustration: (1) taxes on all uses
of capital, (2) taxes on capital or labor in one sector, (3) selective taxes
on one good (excise), and (4) taxes on all goods or incomes. These four
categories represent all of the major taxes that are relevant for tax
incidence analysis.
Description of the Model
The Harberger model is a two-sector model. For the present purpose,
Cobb-Douglas assumptions are made. An economy with two goods (X, Y) is con-
sidered; each good is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function, using
only capital and labor, which are available in fixed total supply, K and L
Y =La K
1
-a
x x x
(1)
S 1-8
Y =L K aS > 0
y y y
There are three consumers: (1) workers, (2) capitalists, and (3)
government. Each consumer makes his/her purchasing decision by maximizing
his/her utility subject to a budget constraint derived from his/her endowments
of capital and labor. If Y is worker's income and w the price of labor;
Yk is capitalist's income and r the price of capital; Y is government's
income (equal to the tax), then consumption expenditures are defined as:
Y = X =a(Y + Yk + Y
Y = Y =(1-a)(Y + Yk + Y )
1/ Assumptions about average propensity to consume can be relaxed at a later
stage for implementation purposes, i.e., instead of aY and (1-a)Y : aYk'(1-a)Yk , a consumption matrix from the SAM can be used.
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where:
Y /wL Y - YY x 1-a y
Yk = rK (2)
Y - tax
g
I. Equilibrium with Tax on All Uses of Capital
In this model, it is assumed that the economy is initially at an
equilibrium (with no taxes), with quantities normalized so that all prices are
unity. Then taxes t and t are imposed on capital for both goods X andx y
Y . In order to keep the analysis simple at this stage, it is assumed as in
the McLure and Thirsk (1975) exposition of the Harberger model that the
government spends the tax revenue exactly to replace the loss in private
demand in each sector from tax-induced income loss2
national income is constant before and after the imposition of the tax.
If primes define the prices and quantities in the new after-tax
equilibrium, then
P'X' = P X = X; P'Y' = P Y - Y (3)
x x y y
Because of the Cobb-Douglas assumptions, factor payments have a
constant share of net revenue in each industry.
1/ Instead of workers and capitalists, household groups receiving both
capital and labor income will be used for implementation purpose of the
model. Data will be obtained from a SAM (see the next section).
2/ This procedure ignores the excess burden of the tax, so that the sum of
net gains and losses to consumers equals the yield of the tax.
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Labor: (no tax is imposed on labor)
ax w' ax'
x x
3Y w' aY'
y y
(4)
w'L' = aX'P' = aX = L
x x x
w'L' = SY'P' =
y y
w = w - 1
(Tax t and t
x x
respectively)
is imposed on capital in each sector,
r'I
1-t
ax x
x
r'I
liK P'
y
(1-a)X'
SK'r
x
(1-S)Y'
K'
y
r'K' = (1-t )(1-a)X'P' = (1-t )(1-a)X = (1-t )K
x x x x x x
(1-t )K
K' - X
x r
r'K' = (1-t )(-)Y'P' = (1-t )(-6)Y = (1-t )K
y y y y y y
(1-t )K
K'- yyy r
8Y = L
y
Capital:
(5a)
(5b)
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Note that P' and P' define the new gross-of-tax price of X and
x Y
Y . From the fixed factor-supply assumption, (K' + K' = K) 2/, and from the
expression for r' , the new net rental price of capital services, from (5a
and 5b), it is possible to obtain the net price of capital, which is equal in
both sectors:
r' -
(1-t K)(1-a)X + (1-t )(-6)Y
K
- (1-t )K + (1-t )K
or K (6a)
since K = (1-a)X + (1-O)Y , [from (2) and (5)].
(6b)
(1-t )-)a)Y+ (1-t )(1-)Y
r' x 1-a y
(1-a)( a)Y + (1-6)Y
. . if t - t = t, then
x y
r (1-t)(1-a)a + (1-t)(1-)(1-a) (7)+ =(1-a)a + (1-a)(1-a)(7
- (1-t)
Following the same procedure, and using the above expressions, it is
possible to solve for all the new quantities, prices, and incomes:
x X
La K -a
-f x x
p.L (1-t )K
x a x x 1-a
w r
from 1 and 5
1/ Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between the two sectors.
(1- )(1-a)a + (1-t y)(1-0)(1-a)
(1-a)a +(1-a)(1-a)
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P' w'"(1 r' c1-
x
P' -
LOK 1-8
y L (1-t )K
y w y
if t= ty = t, and substituting for r', then
r'O 1-a 1-t 1-a
P( ) =(j 1) =1
y 1-t 1-t
P 1
y
The above analytical expression represents a traditional way of
solving the Barberger model to obtain after-tax (net) prices for wages (w'),
the gross-of-tax price of good X(P'), and the gross-of-tax price of goodx
Y(P'). From the new after-tax prices, assumptions of fixed supply of labor
y
and capital, and constant nominal national income, it is possible to obtain
the new after-tax incomes for workers, capitalists, and government. It is
also possible to show the effects of the tax on both the sources (factor
incomes) and uses (consumption expenditure) of income side. The methodology
for obtaining after-tax incomes and the distributional effects of a particular
tax on household incomes will be demonstrated by the use of a SAM. As it will
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be shown below, a SAM facilitates the presentation of the underlying
accounting structure of the Harberger model, as well as its generalization,
extensions, and applications. The SAM framework also guarantees consistency
of the model and accounting structure and allows the analyst to trace through
the effects of different taxes on income distribution. Extensions of the
standard Harberger model will be presented in Chapter IV, while an application
to the actual SAM country data will be presented in Chapter V. The rest of
this chapter presents the Harberger model in a SAM framework, including its
empirical exposition and comparison of the results with the methodology and
results of the traditional tax incidence studies.
Analytical Exposition of the Harberger Model in a
Social Accounting Framework
Table 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 present the Harberger model in a SAM
context. The SAM presented in these tables has four accounts: (1) current
institutions account, (2) tax account, (3) factors-of-production account, and
(4) activities-of-production account. The accounts of this SAM are indicated
by the roman numerals I through IV, while the rows and columns of the SAM are
numbered with arabic numbers I through 10. The general accounting rule of
this SAM is the same as in any SAM, i.e., that the columns of a particular
account represent expenditures and the rows represent receipts.1/ However,
the difference between this SAM and the conventional social accounts is that
its cells are represented by the analytical expressions of the economic model,
instead of actual statistical numbers. The purpose of this presentation is to
show explicitly the relationships between the model and its underlying
1/ For references to the SAM literature, see Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976), and
Pyatt et al. (1977).
Table 3.1
Schematic Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
Expenditures
Receipts
INSTITUTICS TAXES FACTORS
-orkers ICapital Govt. jj jj jj Labor Capital
1l 2 .1 3 4 15 /
ACTIVITIES
, I
Workers T1 .6-workers 1 .10 - Total income1 income of workers
a T 2.1 - Total income2.7 21
Capitalist 2 capitalists of capitalists
-_ 
income
T3.1 - Total govern
overnrent 3 Taxes Ta 3 ment income
on X Ion YTT 
_ Toatx
4.8-m4.10revenues from
X 4 Taxes on X X
II AXES T Total tax
Y 5 5.9 5.10 revenues fromYT 'axes on Y Y
618 - ValuT6. 9 -Valu T6 10 - Total
adAed by added by abor income
labor in labor inABOR 6X
CAPITAL 7 added by Value added capital income
capital by capital
in X in Y
T - '.2 ' 8 T  - Total8.1 8.2 - 8.3 demand for
workers capita- govt. good X
X 8 consumf lists cons.
tion of cons. of X
X of X I
IV T T T - T =Total9.1 9.2 9.3 9.10 demand for
Y 9 worker: capi- govt. good Y
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of Y cons. of Y
of Y
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10.2
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govt.
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10.4
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Total
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'10.7
Total
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-
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accounting framework and to find a solution of the model for changes in
relative prices and incomes.
For the purpose of clarity of presentation, Table 3.1 presents
entries of the SAM first in a schematic form. In section I of Table 3.1,
current institutions are divided into three categories: workers, capitalists,
and government. Workers and capitalists are domestic institutions receiving
factor income from labor and capital, respectively. Government income is
collected in row 3 from the tax account. The sum of the first three rows
shows the total income of institutions. This income is spent on commodities
X and Y in the first three columns of the institutions account. In section
II, receipts of the tax account are shown in rows 4 and 5. Taxes are paid by
the activities account and are received by the government from columns 4 and 5
of the tax account. In section III, two factors of production, labor and
capital, are represented. Factors of production identify the receipt and
disbursement of factor incomes within the economy. Factor income is derived
from the activities of production account. This is shown in rows 6 and 7,
while the allocation of this factor income between domestic institutions is
shown in columns 6 and 7. Row account totals for each factor give a detailed
view of the functional, or factorial, distribution of income within the
economy, while the columns of the factor account indicate who receives these
incomes. In section IV of the final account, expenditures of activities of
production, on labor, capital, and payment of taxes are presented in columns 8
and 9. Demands for output of the activities account, i.e., final consumption
expenditures are shown by the intersection of rows 8 and 9 with columns 1 to
3. This brief description of the SAM thus presents the accounting structure
underlying its accounts and the accounting structure of the above outlined
version of the modified Harberger model.
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Table 3.2 presents the analytical expressions of the Harberger model
written in the cells of the SAM. The cells of the SAM can be represented by
the T notation. The convention adapted is that i refers to the row and
j to the column in which a particular T is situated (Pyatt and Round
1978). T 's correspond to T = 1,2,...,10 . Only those T 's that are
not empty by definition are indicated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and only the
nonempty cells need to be estimated. Description of the SAM model will start
from the production activities account and the factor account. Columns 8 and
9 of the activity account in Table 3.2 show the generation of value added by
activities. This value added is received by the factor account rows. Columns
of the activities account can be expressed, in this instance, by Cobb-Douglas
production functions, where net production expenditures by activities can be
expressed as follows:
Columns 8 and 9 (activities account):
T + T = a Y P + (1-a)Y P = Y P (from Table 3.2)6.8 7.8 x x x x x x
T + T = Y P + (1-)Y P = Y P
6.9. 7.9 y y y y y y
On the other hand, receipts by the factors of production account of
value added from the activities account, can be expressed as follows:
Rows 6 and 7 (factor account):
T + T = a Y P + a Y P = wL + wL = wL= Y7.8 6.9 x x y y x y Z (from Table 3.2)
T + T = (1-a)Y P + (I-O)Y P = rK + rK = rK = Y7.8 7.9 x x y y x y k
Factor income from labor -- Y , and capital -- Y , is distributed
to the current institutions account, i.e., to workers and capitalists, at the
Table 3.2
The Harberger Model Written in a SAM Context
Expenditures
Receipts
INSTITUTICNS TAXES FACTORS ACTIVITIES TOTAL
orkers, Capital Govt. X y Lrbor Capital X __
1 I 2 : 4 5
Werkers 1 Y
1 apitalist 2 k k
z covernment 3 x0 Y
X 4 t- -I 0 0 Y - 0
II TAXES 0
Y 5 0ty 0 ty 0
cY P - Y P
XX yY. - WL
LABOR. 6 WL WL
- (1-)Y P - (1-0)Y P
III CAPITAL 7 r KYk r
rK
--. -Y - Y |-yX
X 8 A ak
IV *
Y(-I 4 y ( 1 - a) Y ( l ) y t  ( 1 &P
15k
TOTAL
it1
Y -o Y -0 Y -0O I V£ k y P
a(Y +
.X S)
a
yPy -
(1-a)(Y +Y:X y
Io
V
6 7 8 9 10
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intersection of the factor account columns and the institutions account rows
(T1.6  and T9. The income of institutions is in turn all spent on good X
and Y , according to given average consumption patterns indicated by (a), and
(1-a) and obtained from the SAM. In column 1, for example, workers spend
aYI of their income on good X , and (1-a)Yt on good Y , and capitalists
spend aYk on good X , and (1-a)yk on good Y . This exhausts all of the
national income. Government revenues and expenditures are in this case zero,
because no taxes are assumed in this description of the economy.
In Table 3.3, an equal rate of tax is imposed on all uses of
capital, i.e., on the gross income earned by capital in production of X and
Y . In such a case, the net return to capital falls immediately. Because
capitalists earn equal return no matter where their capital is employed, the
net price of capital is the new equilibrium, with the gross price or cost of
capital unchanged.
This is demonstrated in Table 3.3 of the SAM, where primes define
new after-tax prices. The tax on capital in X is shown in the cell T =
t(-a)Y' P' , and the tax on capital employed in production of Y is shown in
. x
the cell T - t(l-$)Y' P' . The sum of both taxes is, in turn, received by5.9 1 y y
the government as its revenue. This is shown as payment of the tax account
columns to the row of the government (intersection of the row 3 with columns 4
and 5). Because the tax is imposed on all capital employed in producing X
and Y , it has to be subtracted from the capital factor income, intersection
of row 7 with columns 8 and 9. Columns 8 and 9 thus show that net return to
capital employed in producing X and Y declined for the tax amount, while
the gross return of capital stays the same, because the tax is paid to the
government out of gross capital income. This is expressed in the SAM by
Table 3.3
Equilibrium With Tax on All Uses of Capital
iNSTITUTICi) I TAXkE I FACTORS
a%
'SI
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summing the Ti 's of the activities account columns and the factor account
rows:
Columns 8 and 9 (activities account):
T + T + T =T Y' P'4.8 6.8 7.8 10.8 x x
T + T +T =T =Y'P'5.9 6.9 7.9 10.9 y y
t(1-a)Y' P' + a Y' P' + (1-t)(1-a)Y' P' = Y' P'
x x x x x x xx
t(1-O)Y' P' + a Y' P' + (1-t)(1-0)Y' P' = Y' P'
yY y y y y y y
Rows 6 and 7 (factor account):
T + T =T Y
6.8 6.9 6.10 1
T + T =T7.8 7.9 7 .10 k
a Y' P' + a Y' P' = w'L + w'K = Y' = w'L
x x y y x x X
(1-t)(1-a)Y' P' + (1-t)(1-a)Y' P' = r'K + r'K = Y' - r'K
x x y y x y k
The cost of labor is unchanged, because no tax is imposed on labor,
and consequently w = w' = 1 . On the other hand, the net price of capital
(r') can be obtained straight from the SAM as follows:
r'K' = (1-t)(1-)Y' P' = (1-t)(1-a)Y = (1-t)K
x x x x x
r'K' - (1-t)(1-)Y' P' = (1-t)(1-)Y = (1-t)K
y yy y y
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(1-t)(1-a)Y + (1-t)(-s)Y
-x y
r (1-a)Y + (1-)Y
- (1-t)(1-a)a + (1-t)(1-)(1-a) [since Y - a(Y + Y ) from T ](1-a)a + (1-0)(1-a) x x y 10.8
r - (1-t)
Because the after-tax wage is equal to the before-tax wage
w - w' - 1 , labor receives the same income as before in row 6 of the SAM,
i.e., T = Y= Y This income is received by workers in row 1 (T1.6.10 1 2 1.6
and spent in column 1 on goods X and Y (T 8 1  and T 9 ). However,
capitalists receive income reduced for the tax, i.e., T7.10 =
YO = (1-t)K < Yk The reduction of the capitalists' income on the sources
side is shown in row 2 (T2 7 ), and the spending pattern of this after-tax
income is shown in column 2 (T8 2  and T9.2
The next step is to calculate changes in relative prices due
to taxation. New prices for goods X and Y are indicated by primes.
P' and P' can be obtained from the SAM in a generalized form by expressing
x y
columns of the SAM as before and after-tax price equations and rows of the SAM
as quantity equations. Price equations for P' and P' can be obtained asx y
follows:
Columns 8 and 9 of the activities account can be written as,
0 pi1a+ 0 pi 1al 1ai (i)l~ai + ai (- = 1
a is the value of a in the base period, derived from T
0  (in this
ij 1
case a = a, (1-a), and $, (1-s). 1/ii
1/ T tij is a SAM and To the matrix of the values of tij in a base
period such that To = |lt0 i| , j
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aj is a parameter (elasticity of substitution)
Substituting for the Cobb-Douglas production function, using the
same example as above:
a( ) ~ax + (1-a)
x
{ 
~ 
-]
x
where lim P and w = w' =1
a +1
x
P- , a( r) 1-a
x 1-t
I (r' 1-a
P' =1-t
Substituting for r' = 1-t,
P r' 1-a 1-t 1-a
x 1-t 1-t
1
1-a r 1
Y+ (1-8)( ) y =
y
wa( r')1-1-t
P = 1
y
= 1
P' I
x
y
P' =
y
1
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Summary Implication of a Tax on all Uses of Capital I
r - w - w' = 1 (from (4))
r - (1-t) (from (7))
I r 1~-a 
1-at
x (1-t)1-a (1-t l-a "
1 (-0 1-a
, r' 1-) (1-t) =
7 (l-8 (-)~
P'
y
1
1
1
Changes in income:
By summarizing and using the above information obtained from the SAM
on changes in relative prices, it is possible to calculate changes in real
incomes or after-tax incomes for workers, capitalists, and government.
(a) Sources side:
(1) Workers:
(2) Capitalists:
(3) Government
w'L = (1)L = Y' = Y
r'K = (1-t)K = Y < Y
tK = Y' * 0
g
(b) Uses side:
P'-
T - 1 } no relative price changes in X and Y
y
1/ When t # t , the analysis can be performed in a way that will be
demonstrateg in the next section (III).
L
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The general tax on capital is entirely borne by capital. Product
prices experience no relative change. Capital bears the entire burden of the
tax. In the same way, a general tax that is levied on all sources of labor
income would be borne entirely by labor. The gross price of K and L is in
this case unchanged.
The percentage change in real income after taxes can alternatively
be presented by calculating price indices:
if P' is a measure of the price level facing workers in the new
w
equilibrium (where P is one), then the percentage change in the
real income of workers would be:
Y'/P' - Yi w L
Y
where Y = income of workers, and
P = aP' + (1-a)P' is the cost of the workers'
w x y
consumption basket or the Laspeyres price
index
Similarly, for capitalists the change in real income is:
Y'/P' - Y
c c k
where Yk = income of capitalists
P' = aP' + (1-a)P'
c x y
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For capitalists to suffer a greater real income loss than workers in
proportional terms, it must be the case that:
w'L 
- wL r'K 
- rK
aP' + (1-a)P' aP' + (1-a)P' W
x yx y
wL rK w' = 1
r-1
(1)L (1-t)K
a(l) + (1-a)(1) 1Kr
(1)L1K
0 > -t
The above expressions confirm the previous result that the
percentage change in real income of workers due to equal tax on all uses of
capital is zero. On the other hand, the percentage change in real incomes for
capitalists, due to the tax is reduced by the tax amount, i.e., (-t) as
expressed above.
It is generally agreed in public finance literature that under
competitive assumptions a general tax on capital or labor is entirely borne by
capital or labor and affects only the sources side of incomes. It is also
agreed that these taxes can be properly taken into account by using the
traditional approach employed in empirical tax incidence studies. However,
the problems arise when selective commodity or factor taxes are introduced,
because they change relative incomes on both the sources and uses of income
side. To demonstrate the issues involved and to propose a solution, the above
methodology will be used for excise taxes and selective factor taxes.
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II. Equilibrium with tax on one commodity
(tax on good X : t Lx, t )
A tax on one commodity can be calculated by imposing the same rate
of tax on labor and capital in producing X , i.e.,
t9 - t = t
Following the same methodology as above, it is possible to derive
new prices for r', w', P' , and P'.
x y
(1-t)(1-a)a + (1-0)(1-a) (1-t)K + K
r- (1-a)a + (1-0)(1-a) or r =- K
, (1-t)aa + 8(1-a) or w, = (1-t)Lx + Ly
aa + 8(1-a) L
w' r'
P': a( -- ) -x + (1-a)( -t- )1 x=1
x P. PI
x x
P' ( )a r 1-a
x 1-t 1-t
,a ,l-a
x 1-t
F': w'-a r, 1-a
P' :0(-) y + (1-0)()l-
y y
P' - w'O . r'
y
, = w'0 * r ,1-
y
(since no tax is imposed on Y)
wa rl-a
1-t w, a ,-a w a- r
Y , ,1- , 1-a = -t
y w r w r (1-t)
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Changes in income:
(a) Sources of income:
(1) Workers: w'L
(2) Capitalists: r'K, Depends on factor intensity 
(see below)
(3) Government: tax
(b) Uses of income:
P' a ,1-a
x = w' r depends on factor intensity
r , s ,1-6 and consumption patterns
y w r (1-t)
if a = a = >
x w r1
y w'a r' 
-
1
(8)
P' - (1-t)P'
y x
P'
P' yx 1-t
The preceding analytical expressions clearly show that the analysis
is not as straightforward as in the previous case (I), especially when a # 8.
The magnitude and direction of changes in relative incomes can be obtained
only by making assumptions about factor intensity, for example:
(i) If the tax is imposed on a capital-intensive commodity, the price of
capital will fall relative to the price of labor, i.e.,
K,
if > => r <
L L w
x
since (1-t) (1-a)a + (1-0) (1-a)r' = (1-a)a + (1-0) (1-a)
, (1-t)aa + (1-a)
aa + 8(1-a)
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(ii) Changes in income:
(a) Sources of income:
A tax on a capital-intensive commodity will result in a greater
percentage loss in income to capitalists;
(iii) (b) Uses of income:
If X is capital intensive, then the gross-of-tax price of the
taxed commodity (X) increases relative to the price of the
untaxed commodity: P' > P'
x y
Therefore, consumers who consume larger proportions of good X
will bear the larger burden of the tax.
However, to evaluate properly the magnitude of real income changes
due to the tax, it is necessary to know factor shares (a, 0), both of which
can be obtained from a SAM, as well as consumption patterns, which can also be
obtained from any SAM. The procedure for a numerical analysis will be
outlined below.
Before proceeding to an analysis of relative income changes due to
taxes within a SAM, assumptions followed by the traditional Musgrave approach
to an evaluation of the tax burden of excise taxes will be presented
briefly. In the traditional approach of empirical incidence of excise taxes
(tax on one good), it is assumed that these taxes affect households from the
uses side of their accounts only (as noted beforehand). Consequently, the
burden is distributed in line with the distribution of consumer expenditures.
The following illustration will show that this is a special case
that holds only when a = a. In other words, these studies implicitly assume
that both sectors have the same factor intensities and that the tax burden is
borne entirely in proportion to consumption, for example:
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if a - P -> - (from (8))
y
In this case, changes in incomes are:
(a) Sources:
If there were no difference in factor intensities, both factor prices
would diminish by the same percentage amounts and the tax would be
borne in proportion to initial shares of national income on the
sources side.
(b) Uses side:
If factor intensities were the same in the two sectors, the relative
price of X would rise by exactly the tax percent. Because, in that
case, the tax would be neutral on the side of the sources of income,
the tax would be borne exclusively by consumers of good X (the tax
would be shifted entirely to consumers of good X ).
As stated above, this is exactly the assumption followed by the
traditional approach of empirical tax incidence studies followed by Musgrave
and others. However, this is only a special case, as demonstrated by the
above analytical expressions of the model that allow for the general
equilibrium effects. Thus, it is possible that when factor intensities differ
between the sectors, the errors of the empirical incidence studies for excise
taxes can be substantial, both on the sources and the uses of income side.
However, to do the analysis properly, it is suggested here to use a SAM
framework, because any SAM gives ready information on functional income
distribution and consumption patterns. For example, to test income
distribution implications of a tax imposed on the housing sector (housing is
usually capital intensive), it is possible to take value added data for labor
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and capital from a SAM and thus obtain point estimates for a, and (1-a) for
X : at the same time, it is possible to aggregate all other sectors into Y
and obtain 8 and (1-a). On the other hand, from the consumption expenditures
account of a SAM, it is possible to obtain a matrix of consumption
expenditures of different households on X and Y . Following the above
analytical procedures for obtaining r', w', P' and P, after-tax incomes canx y
be calculated for the sources and uses side of household income. These
results can then be compared to the traditional approach, and the magnitude of
errors can be estimated.
The methodology outlined above has several advantages compared with
the traditional approach. This methodology allows for general equilibrium
effects of taxes that affect both sources and uses of incomes. The
information available in the SAM can be readily used, accuracy of the
empirical studies can be improved, and a set of rules can be developed on how
to use SAMs for calculating tax incidence. This methodology also allows the
calculation of counterfactual incomes, i.e., what would the incomes be if
there were no taxes. This will be demonstrated by the following example for a
corporate income tax.
III. Equilibrium with a tax on capital in X
To derive new after-tax prices for r', w', P' and P', in the case ofx y
a tax on capital in X , the same methodology can be used as in case I, where
the tax was imposed .on all uses of capital. But here only a tax on capital
in X is imposed.
r, w, P , P . 1 (before tax)
x y
After tax: w = w' - 1, because no tax is imposed on labor.
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If a tax is imposed on industry X , the effect of the tax is to
reduce the net income received by owners of capital in industry X and to
raise tax revenues by the same amount. With the initial sectoral allocation
of capital, the net (after-tax) price of capital declines in industry X , but
remains at 1.00 in industry Y . Over time, however, capital will flow from
the taxed sector X to the untaxed sector Y until the net earnings of
capital are the same in each sector. This is the long-run shifting mechanism
by which a tax on only one factor affects the real incomes earned by that
factor throughout the economy. Thus, on the side of sources of income,
capital bears the entire burden of the tax on capital in one industry (X) and
labor none of it. On the other hand, the allocation and price of labor are
unaffected by the tax. Because labor continues to receive the same fraction
of an unchanged national income after the tax is imposed, labor income escapes
from the tax. But the mobility of capital insures that the tax on X or
corporate income tax is borne on the side of sources of income by all owners
of capital, not just those in the corporate sector.
This can be demonstrated analytically in the same way as before:
L + L
w=w' = 1 since X L 1
r= 1
(1-t)K + K(1-t)(1a)a + (1-6)(l-a) or x y
r = (1-a)a + (1-0)(1-a) or
V 1-ax 1-t 1-ax
P a(-) + (1-a)(-) = 1
x P P
x x
P' - w' w' 1-a
x 1-t
, r' 1-a
x 1-t
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P'V: (w)1ay + (1 -_)(---l 037 = 1
y P Py7 y
P' =
y
w' 
1-
P' = r'
, r' 1-a
x -1- t
P,
y r
x r' 1 r ) 1-a
y
ges in income:
(a) Sources of income:
(1) Workers:
(2) Capitalists:
(3) Government:
(b) Uses of income:
Pf
, r-1 r' 1-a
y = r ( ) )
y
w'L = (1) L
K = (1-t)(1-a)a + (1-a)(1-a)r'.K = (1-a)a + (-)1a
tax
depends on factor intensity and
consumption patterns
On the side of sources of income, capital bears the entire burden of
the capital tax on X and labor none of it. On the side of uses of income,
consumers who spend a relatively large proportion of their income on the good
Chan
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that becomes more expensive (i.e., X ) are made worse off, and those who
purchase relatively large amounts of Y (which becomes less expensive) are
better off.
.'. if a-
P'
x ,8-1 r' 1-a
- r ( )
P '
x 1
y (1-t)
1-aPPp
P'l = ; P' (1-t)1- P'.
x 1-a y x
When factor proportions are the same in both sectors, capital will
still bear the entire burden of the tax on the side of sources of income,
while on the side of uses of income consumers of good X are worse off, and
consumers of good Y are better off (if the average propensity to consume
X and Y is 0.5, then the sum of losses and gains on the uses side is zero).
The result obtained above, that a tax on capital in one industry is
borne by all capital in both industries, has implications for empirical tax
incidence studies. In short, the problem in these studies is to calculate
pretax or counterfactual incomes and then to subtract taxes from these
incomes.
In the case presented above, where a tax is imposed on capital in
one sector, it is obvious that under competitive assumptionsi the tax falls
1/ Most of the traditional tax incidence studies make competitive assumptions
about the economies investigated.
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on capital in both sectors, which means that the amount of the capital tax on
X should be imputed to all owners of capital in order to obtain pretax
incomes. However, as noted by Meerman and Shome (1980), in most empirical tax
incidence studies, no attempt is made to adjust counterfactual income to be
consistent with incidence assumptions. For example, Musgrave et al. (1974, p. 301)
whose methodology has been followed by most other authors state that "proper
treatment of the corporation tax calls for imputation of total corporate
source income to shareholders." This means that total corporate income tax
would have to be added back to the income of corporate shareholders to
determine their counterfactual incomes. Another error of the traditional tax
incidence studies, overlooked by Meerman and Shome (1980), is that they
totally overlook the distributional implications of the selective capital tax
on the uses side of income. As discussed above, selective factor taxes change
relative prices of goods, which in turn affects relative incomes of consumers.
IV. Equilibrium with tax on both goods or income
In this section, a general tax on consumption or income will be
evaluated. Aftertax incomes and prices are obtained in the same way as in
previous examples.
r , w , P ,P 1
x y
An equal tax is imposed on both labor and capital income in both
sectors:
, (1-t)(1-a)a + (1-t)(1-6)(1-a) or x y
r- (1-a)a + (1-6)(1-a) orK
, (-t)aa + (1-t)S(1-a) or y
aa + 8(1-a) L
r - 1-t
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V - 1-t
w' -r
1-t 1-ax 1-t 1-ax
P': a(-) + (1-a)(-)
x P P
x x
Substituting for w' = r' = 1-t, then
P 1-t
x 1-t
= 1
1
~tE 1-ay ~Tt 1-ay
P': (-,) + (1-)(-)
y P Py y
= 1
P'
y
Substituting
P'
y
-( )( r' 1-
- t 1-t)(j
for w' = r' =
1-t
=-= 11-t
1-t,
P'
x
-F= 1
y
Changes in income:
(a) Sources side:
(1) Workers:
(2) Capitalists:
w'L = (1-t)L
r'K = (1-t)K
(3) Government: tax
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(b) Uses of income: = 1 => no relative price charges
y
A general tax on expenditures has the same incidence as a
proportional income tax levied on all sources of income. A broad-based income
or expenditure tax would be borne in proportion to initial shares of national
income (or consumption). This result does not depend upon the particular
specifications of production and demand relations used in this model; it is
independent of factor mobility assumptions and neutral with respect to
resource allocation decisions.
This result confirms that the treatment of general sales or income
taxes in traditional empirical tax incidence is correct for these particular
taxes, because their incidence falls either only on the sources or only on the
uses side of income. However, the same is not true for selective commodity or
factor taxes as demonstrated above in Sections II and III.
The next section will present an empirical exposition of the above
methodology using hypothetical SAM numbers. The purpose of the exposition is
to test the methodology and to evaluate the empirical results in comparison
with the results of the traditional empirical tax incidence studies.
V. Empirical Exposition of the Methodology
This section presents empirical examples for calculating the tax
incidence of (1) selective commodity taxes, (2) selective factor taxes, (3)
general factor taxes, and (4) general commodity (expenditure) taxes using the
previously discussed methodology.
Certain national income concepts are assumed in the following
demonstration for a consistent empirical model of a two sector-economy. One
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assumption is that the value of output in each sector equals the sum of factor
payments and that the sum of sectoral production (or value added) equals
national income. These statements about where and how earnings occur refer to
the sources of income. An additional assumption is that the total income
received by owners of labor and capital is exhausted in the expenditures made
on the two commodities and that the sum of expenditures on either good equals
the total value of production of that good. These statements on how income is
spent refer to the uses of income.
In this hypothetical two-sector economy, the sources of income are
as shown in Table 3.4. This table is a SAM of the same form as Table 3.1
presented above. National income is $2800, one half of which is earned in
each sector. Labor earns sixty percent of total income and capital receives
the remainder. The production of X , compared to Y , is relatively capital
intensive, because the share of capital is larger in that sector, i.e., a
is 0.6, but 8 is only 0.2. A description of consumer behaviour is presented
by the intersection of rows 8 and 9 by columns 1 to 3 of the SAM (Table
3.4).- Each income group has different consumption patterns, which are held
constant for the purpose of this analysis. Workers spend 30 percent of their
income on good X and 70 percent of their income on good Y . The same
ratios are 0.8 versus 0.2 and 0.6 versus 0.4 for capitalists and government,
respectively. On the sources side of income, workers receive all of the labor
income, capitalists receive only capital income, and government receives the
tax. Given the assumed data of Table 3.4, the example for the analysis of
incidence of selective commodity tax will be presented first.
1. Tax Incidence of Selective Commodity Taxes
In this example, a tax on the expenditure of income is imposed.
This can be done in either a selective or general manner. Suppose that an
Table 3.4
A Base SAM for Empirical Analysis
Expenditures
Receipts
IISTITUTIC:4s TAXES FACTORS ACTIVITIES' TOlTAL.
orkersi Cpital Govt. ILabor Capital 
_ _ _
i 2 1 3 4 1 5 6 8 1 9 iU
Wcrhers 1 Y- 1680 Y - 1680
d0.
I apitalist,2 Y - 1120
overmen 3 y ty- 0 -g
x 4 t - 0 Y 
-0 .
..l TAXES
Y 5 ty Y -y y 0 tya0
aY1Px " Y P "
(0.4)1400 - (0.81400 - - 1680
LABOR 6 560 1120
1-a)Y P - (1-0)Y P
II CAPITAL 7 0.6)1400 - (0.2)1400 - k -1120
840 280
x - x - x -
1 8 (0.3)Y, (0.8)Yk (0.6)Y Y P - 1400
-504 -896 -0
IV c - GHv y 9 w ~ J~
(0.7)Y (0.2)Yk (0.4)Y Y P - 1400
-1176 -224 -0
TOTAL 1C Y -168( Yk-1120Y - 0 Y - 0 Y - 0 Y x Pm 1400 yp -yy
1400
V
I
I
Yg 1680 Yk -12
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excise tax of thirty percent is applied against the gross price of good X ,
i.e., a sales tax of 42.86 percent applies to the net price of good X . This
tax is most easily treated as an equal tax rate on total capital and labor used
in producing good X , because payments to these factori completely exhaust
the value of the product. As the tax reduces the net return of both factors
involved in producing X by 0.3, capital and labor will flow out of sector X
until their net returns are the same in both sectors. The operation of this
competitive principle can be calculated in the same way as expressed in
section II of this chapter.
Table 3.4 gives initial values of the economy, where: a = 0.4;
(1- a) = 0.6; a = 0.8; (1- a) = 0.2; L = 1680; K = 1120; X = 1400;
Y - 1400. Initially all prices: w , r , P , and P - 1 , and there is no
tax.
Then a tax, t = 0.3, is imposed on good X . This tax can be
calculated by imposing the same rate of tax on labor and capital producing
X , i.e., tLx = t = t . In order to calculate the burden of taxes on the
sources and uses of income, new prices are calculated for r', w', P ', and
P '. For this purpose, analytical expressions derived in section II of this
y
chapter are used. Substituting numerical values for a , 0 , a, and t
obtained from the SAM, the following new prices are obtained:
r' (1-t)(1-a)a + (1-a)(1-a) (from section II)(1l-a)a + (1-0)(-a)
r'- (1-0.3)(0.6) + 0.2 = 0.62 = 0.775 a = (1-a) = 0.5, since X = Y = 1400(0.6) + 0.2 0.80
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, (1-t)aa + 0(1-a)
wa + 0(1-a)
(1-0.3)(0.4) + 0.8 1.08
0.4 + 0.8 - 1.20 0.9
w a r,1-a (0.99' (0.775- . 0.822
x 1-t 0.70 0.70
1- 08 02
= w O (0.9) (0.775) = 0.873
y 1
The above calculations give net prices for labor (w') and capital
(r') and after-tax prices for X(P') and Y(P'). The after-tax net wage rate
x y
equals 0.9. Note that the net price of labor (0.9) does not fall by as much
as the net price of capital, i.e., r' = 0.775. Capital's return declines by
22.5 percent, compared with a decline of ten percent in the net price of
labor. Capital bears a relatively greater burden of the tax, because sector
X is relatively capital intensive compared with sector Y . If the factor
intensities were opposite and sector X was relatively labor intensive, labor
would bear proportionately more of the tax. If there were no differences in
factor intensities, both factor prices would diminish by the same percentage
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amount, and the tax would be borne in proportion to initial shares of national
income on the sources side. Comparing after-tax prices for X(P') and
x
Y(P'), it is clear that the price of X rises relative to the price of Y ,
y
because the tax was imposed on good X . Therefore, it can be expected that
consumers of X will lose more of their income on the uses side than
consumers of Y
Changes in income on the sources side can be calculated by comparing
after-tax factor incomes with before-tax factor incomes:
Changes in sources of incomes:
(1) Workers: Y - Y' = wL -w'L = (1)1680 - (0.9)1680 = 1680-1512 = -168
(2) Capitalists: Yk - Y= (1)1120 - (0.775)1120 = -252k k
(3) Government: Tax = tY = 0.3(1400) = +420
Changes in incomes on the sources side are presented in Table 3.5.
While Table 3.4 represents a SAM where no taxes are imposed, Table 3.5
presents an after-tax economy, where primes define new prices and incomes.
Y' is after-tax income of workers, Y' is after-tax income of capitalists, and
L, k
Y' is revenue of the government acquired from the tax receipts. The SAM of
g
Table 3.5 also shows that institutions spend all of their after-tax income on
good X and Y . This is indicated in the first three columns of the SAM,
where X' and Y' are quantities of good X and Y consumed by workers
w w
after taxes are imposed. As demonstrated above, changes in incomes of
institutions on the sources side can be calculated by subtracting after-tax
factor incomes from before-tax factor incomes.
Changes of incomes on the uses side can, on the other hand, be
calculated through the use of the following equation for any income group:
Table 3.5
Tax Incidence of Selective Commodity Taxes
Expenditures
Receipts
INSTITMiICS TAXES FACTORS ACTIVITIES TOTAL
.?oker CpiZ IGvt Labor Capital yIvI -1--X I _
.. .I 3
~4 5 6 7 a y
Workers 1 Y- 1512 Y - 1512
I Capitalist 2 Y -868 Y -868
Y' - Y' - 420
;overnment 3 40
t YP'- 0 Y' - 420
X 4 (0.3)1400-42 tx
II TAXES _____
Y 0 t - 0 Y' - 0Yy ty
(1-t )aY'P' BY'P' -
w w'L - L Y' a w'L -(0.9)1680
6 (0.9)1120- -1512(0.9)560-504 (0.9)1120-
Y' - r'K
I ID CAPITAL 7 I'P - r'K r'K - kIn CAPTAL 7x X x7 y (07512-86
(0.775)840- (0.775)280- (0.775)1120 - 868
651 217
X'- V'- X I
Vf XC XC 
II 10(0.3) . (0.8) (0.6) * 1400
X 8 1512- 868 - 420 -
453.6 694.4 252
(.4 1Y-4- Y
> y V
IV (0.7) (0.2) (0.4) * 1400
1512 - 868 - 420 -
1058.4 173.6 168
1 I
TOTAL ic Y1 -t
'1512
Y' -
k
868
Y' -
g
420
Y't2
420
Y'ty
0
Y' - 1512 Y - 868 .Y'P' -X X
1400
YoP' -
y- y
1400--
0000
V
1n
- -a
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AY = -(X'APx + Y'APy) i - L,k,g
j - w,c,G
where AY is change in real income, and AP or AP measures the percentage
x y
change in relative prices of good X and Y , respectively. The equation
defines a change in consumer's real income on the uses side as the sum of the
products of the quantity of each commodity purchased in the new after-tax
situation and the percentage change in the price of the commodity.
Changes in uses of income:
X' Y'
(1) Workers: AY. -+( APx+ APy)
x y
X' is quantity of good X consumed by workers after taxes are imposed.
If the workers average propensity to consume X is 0.3 and their after-
tax factor income is w'L , then the expression for X' and Y' is:
w w
X'= (0.3)(w'L) = (0.3)1512 = 453.6.
w
Y- (0.7)(w'L) = (0.7)1512 = 1058.4
w
= 453.6 1058.4
Y(0.174) 0.3 (0.127))
AY = -67.23 + 153.97 = +86.74
(2) Capitalists:
X 'Y'
AY = -( + c APyAYk P 10P
x y
X- (0.8)(r'K) = (0.8)868 - 694.4
C
Y - (0.2)(r'K) = (0.2)868 = 173.6C
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694.4 173.6
AYk 1.174 (0174) - 0.873 (0.127))
"Y = -102.92 + 25.25 - -77.67k
(3) Government:
AYg = P x + O AP y
x y
X- (0.6)420 = 252
Y- (0.4)420 = 168G
252 168
AY =-( (0.174) - 0.873 (0.127))
g p1.1740.7
AY = -37.35 + 24.44 = -12.91
g
Both capitalists and the government are burdened by the rise in the
relative price of X , because they are heavy consumers of those goods.
Labor, on the other hand, benefits from the fall in the price of Y , the good
that labor consumes in larger proportions. A reversal in these preference
patterns would, on the other hand, reverse these particular results.
Real income changes on both the sources and uses sides of income for
the different factor owners and goverment can be combined into one table to
give the pattern of income redistribution as shown below:
Total changes in income:
Sources Uses Total
(1) Workers: -168 +87 -81
(2) Capitalists: -252 -78 -330
(3) Government: +420 -13 +407
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With an original income of $1680, workers lose $81.26 (or about 5
percent) of their initial income, while capital owners suffer a reduction of
$320.67 from their initial income of $1120 (or about 30 percent). Capitalists
are made relatively worse off by the tax on good X , because this commodity
is capital intensive and because capitalists spend more of their income on
good X (which became more expensive).
As discussed in section II of this chapter in the traditional
approach of empirical incidence of excise taxes, followed by Musgrave and
others, it is assumed that these taxes affect consumers from the uses side of
their income only. In these studies, the burden is distributed in line with
the distribution of consumer expenditures. The redistributive pattern, as
obtained above, can thus be compared with the traditional assumptions that tax
on a single commodity is shifted forward and borne in proportion to the
consumption of the good. In such a case, the burden of government receipts
from taxes, i.e., $420 would be allocated according to the share of each
factor group in the total consumption of good X . Consumption expenditures
on good X by workers and capitalists can be obtained from Table 3.4, where
T - X = 504 and T - X = 896. This means that workers consume 368.1 w T8 .2  c
percent and capitalists 64 percent of good X . Multiplying these percentages
by total value of taxes ($420) would result in a tax burden of $151 for
workers, $269 for capitalists, and no burden for government. Comparing the
two results, it is apparent that the traditional procedure attributes too much
of the burden to workers, too little to capitalists, and ignores the tax
incidence that is a consequence of government consumption. As demonstrated in
section II of this chapter, the assumption used in the traditional approach is
a special case. It holds only when factor intensities are the same in the two
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sectors, because in such a case, the price of X rises by exactly the tax
percent. In that case, the tax would be neutral on the side of sources of
income and would be borne exclusively by consumers of good X, because equal
factor intensities produce constant opportunity costs, i.e., a completely
elastic supply of good X at initial prices.
2. A Tax on Capttal in One Sector
This example will demonstrate the case of a tax levied on the income
of capital earned in sector X of the economy. This tax corresponds to the
corporate income tax in which income earned by capital is taxed more heavily
in one sector than in the other (noncorporate) sector, which is usually
comprised mainly of housing and agriculture.
A tax on capital income earned in sector X is introduced at the
rate of 50 percent of the gross price of capital paid by the enterpreneurs.
This tax would generate government receipts of $420 (on a base of $840) and
keep tax revenues the same as they were when a tax of thirty percent was
applied against the gross price of good X . However, it should be noted that
government income is not exactly the same in real terms in both cases.
Revenues of the government are $420 in both cases on the sources side, but on
the uses side, gains and loses result from tax-induced shifts in relative
prices, which may either increase or decrease the government real incomes.
This minor complication that arises from the government expenditures of its
revenues is ignored here.L! The effect of the tax reduces the net income
received by the corporate sector in industry X by $420 and raises the tax
revenues by the same amount. Because of the dual Cobb-Douglas assumptions,
This complication can be avoided by allocating the value of government
expenditures directly to households in the form of transfer income; this
will be demonstrated in the next chapter.
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capital in X receives a gross return of exactly $840, as long as the nominal
value of net national product is unchanged at $2800.
To calculate the tax incidence of corporate tax on the sources and
uses of income, the same procedure as in the example above can be used.
First, from the equations obtained in section III of this chapter, after-tax
prices for wages, capital, P and P can be obtained:
x y
(1-t) (1-a) a + (1-e) (1-a) (rmscinII(1-a)a + (1-) (1-a)
- (1-0.5)(0.6) + 0.2 0.5
r (0.6) + 0.2 0.8 0.625
w - w'; because no tax is imposed on labor.
P' w' ( r'O 1 -a
x1-
0.06
P' . (0.625) = 1.143
x -0.50
,,8 ,1-8
=w r
y
P' (0.625)0.2 = 0.910
These calculations determine who bears the burden of the tax on the
side of the sources of income. Tax receipts are $420, and the net price of
1120 units of capital falls by 0.375 or a total of $420; therefore, the
increase in tax receipts is exactly matched by a reduction in the net income
available to owners of capital factor income. Thus, on the side of sources of
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income, capital bears the entire burden of the corporate income tax and labor
none of it. Because labor is not taxed, it avoids the tax on the sources side
of income. On the other hand, mobility of capital from the corporate to the
noncorporate sector causes that in the Cobb-Douglas case, where substitution
is reasonably easy between factors in production, both corporate and
noncorporate sectors pay the taxes on the side of sources of income, and not
just those in the corporate sector.
Changes in sources of income:
1. Workers: Y - Y = wL -w'L = (1)1680 - (1)1680 = 0
2. Capitalists: Yk -Y = (1)1120 - (0.625)1120 = -420
3. Government: tax = t(1-a)Y = (0.5)(0.6)1400 = +420
After-tax incomes (sources side) for workers, capitalists, and
government are presented in Table 3.6. The data in this table can be compared
with those in Table 3.5. In the latter case, there is no change in labor
income,- i.e., Y - Y' = wL = w'L . On the other hand, capital income is
reduced for the tax amount, i.e., Yk > Y', where Y' = (1-t)K, and where
government receives tax revenue paid only by capitalists on the sources side
of income. It is also apparent from the first three columns of Table 3.6 that
workers income left for consumption stays the same, and that capitalists
income is reduced for the tax which is, in turn, spent on goods X and Y by
the government.
The incidence of the tax on the side of the uses of income depends
on consumption patterns and how relative product prices are altered by the
tax. Because the model assumes that national income is fixed at its original
level in the after-tax situation, if one commodity increases in price the
other must decrease in price. Consumers who spend a relatively large
proportion of their income on the good that becomes more expensive are worse
Table 3.6
A Tax on Capital in One Sector
Expenditures
Receipts
INSTITUTIC4S5 TAXLS FACTORS ACTIVITIES TOTAL
'orkers Crpital Govt. I iIy Lebor capital
--- 1 2 . 4 7 A I Q 10
Werers 1 Y -1680 Y' - 1680
-apitalist 32 k
tx *Y- 0 Yj - 420
z :overnment 3 420 420-42
- - -t, (1-a)YxP' 2
X 4 tx0- 420
II ' AXES -_____
Y 5 0 t -0 Y -0
y ty
cgY'P' - 67,P -
xx y Y - wL 1680
(0.4)1400 (0.8)1400 -
560 1120
r'K - r'K - Y-r'K-CPTL7x Y- (06512k0(0.625)840 -(0.625)280 - (0.625)1120 - 700
525 175
X' - X' XG-
(0.3) (0.8) (0.6) x'P' - 1400
x 8 1680 700- 420- Xx
504 560 252
Y' -w Y -
y 9 (0.7) (0.2; (0.4) Y'P'- 1400
1680.1 700 420 - YY
1176 140 168
TOTAL LO
Y,
A
1680
0- I
700
yea-
420
4 tX
420
-,0 Yj -1680 Y a 700 Y'P' -X x
1400
y1y
1400
~'4~ ~-1~ ~ ~
ULn
V
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off and vice versa. The tax incidence on the uses side of the income can be
calculated in the same way as in the above example:
Changes in uses of income:
1. Workers:
X-V
Y-
w
X' Y'
AY - -( AP + - AP )
x y
(0.3)(w'L) = (0.3)(1680) = 504
(0.7)(w'L) = (0.7)(1680) - 1176
504.6 1176
AY - - 1 (0.143) - 0 (0.09))
AY = -63.1 + 115.3 = +53.2
2. Capitalists:
X'
AYk c AP7
x
X' - (0.8)(r'K)
C
Y = (0.2)(r'K)
C
Y'
c * PY)
P'
y
= (0.8)700 = 560
= (0.2)700 = 140
560 140
AYk = -(1.143 (0.143) - 0.910 (0'
-70.0 + 13.8 = -56.2&Y k -
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3. Government:
X' Y'
AY - - , APy)
x y
X- (0.6)420 = 252G
Y' (0.4)420 = 168G
= 252 168 (09)
Y 1.143 (0.143) 0.910 .09))
AY = -31.5 + 16.6 = -14.9
g
Forming the relative price ratio P'/P' = 1.143/0.910 = 1.256, shows
x y
that the price of good X has risen with respect to the price of Y by 25.6
percent. Similarly as in the case above (tax on commodity X ), labor
benefits from the fall in the price of Y, and capitalists and government
lose. This is because both government and capitalists consume more of good X
and workers more of good Y . The combined tax incidence from the sources and
uses of income side gives the following result:
Total Changes in incomes:
Sources Uses Total
(1) Workers 0 +53 +53
(2) Capitalists: -420 -56 -476
(3) Government: +420 -15 +405
From the above results, it is clear that labor, which is not
affected by the corporate tax, suffers no loss on the sources side and gains
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$53.2 on the uses side. On the other hand, capitalists who lose $420 on the
side of sources of income, incur an additional loss of $56.2 on the uses side
of income. The government's loss on the side of the uses of income happens
because $420 of tax revenue is in real terms worth $14.9 less than if the
revenue had been raised in a way that did not raise the price of good X
However, if the government preferred to consume more of good Y in proportion
to good X , then it would actually benefit twice, from the sources and uses
side of income.
This example again confirms the criticism of traditional tax
incidence studies, discussed in the section three of this chapter, that treat
corporate income tax as a tax which falls on recipients of dividends only. In
other words, corporate taxes are subtracted from gross capital income of
shareholders only. Other recipients of capital income (owners of
unincorporate enterprises) are assumed to be unaffected by the corporate
taxes, and no account is taken of the effects of these taxes on the uses side
due to-changes in relative prices. As demonstrated above, a proper treatment
of corporate taxes would be to subtract these taxes from all recipients of
factor capital income and to take into account also changes in relative prices
which affect after-tax incomes from the uses side of income. A treatment that
takes these recommendations into account will be applied to a SAM for Egypt in
Chapter V.
3. Tax Incidence of General Factor Taxes
In this example, a tax on all uses of one factor will be analyzed.
A tax rate of 25 percent is imposed on the gross income earned by labor
services everywhere in the economy. This tax would generate government
revenues of $420 (on a base of 1680, 420/1680 = 0.25) and keep tax proceeds
the same as they were in the previous example where only a tax on the
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corporate source of capital income was imposed. When the tax is imposed, the
net return to labor falls to $0.75 per unit. Because the same rate of tax on
labor is levied in both sectors, this will be the equilibrium net price of
labor, with the gross price or cost of labor unchanged. . New prices for labor,
capital, and X and Y can be calculated by using analytical expressions
obtained in section I of this chapter:
r r =1; because no tax is imposed on capital
, (1-t)aa + (1-t)a(1-a)
aa + S(1-a)
w' 1-t
w= 1-(0,25) = 0.75
1-t 1-ax r 1-ax
1": a-) + (1-c0C--) =1
x p'
x x
'a 1-a
1-t r'
Substituting for w' = (1-t), and r' = 1,
p'x (y- ) (1)1- 1
I 1-ay r' 1-ay
P (-P,) + (1-F)(g) = 1
x y
P, w' ,-P = ( ) r
y 1-t
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P' - 1
P'
- 1
Py
Changes in sources
(1) Workers:
(2) Capitalists:
(3) Government:
of income:
Y - Y' = wL - w'L = (1) 1968 - (0.75)1680 = -420
Yk k
t(L) = (0.25) 1680 = +420
As is apparent from the above calculations, product prices
experience no change, because neither the cost of labor nor the cost of
capital is affected by the tax. Thus, no competitive pressure emerges for an
intersectoral reallocation of factors, and output is unchanged in both
industries. The after-tax situation can be summarized in a table that shows
total changes in incomes:
Workers
Capitalists
Government
Total Changes in Incomes
Sources
-420
0
+420
This table shows that a general tax on labor is neutral and that the
resulting effect of the tax is that labor bears the entire burden of the
tax. Compared to selective factor taxes presented above, both taxes have
identical effects on the sources side. However, the selective factor tax
induces capital (or labor) flows and causes additional redistribution on the
side of the use of income, while the general tax on labor causes no relative
price changes.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Uses
0
0
0
Total
-420
0
+420
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The redistributive effects of general factor taxes can again be
presented in a SAM framework. Table 3.7 presents the after-tax situation.
The tax on labor is subtracted from the gross price of labor in columns 8 and
9 and added to the tax account in rows 4 and 5 of the SAM. Because an equal
tax is imposed on all labor employed in X and Y , the tax reduces the gross
income of labor proportionally in both sectors and does not change the gross
price of X and Y (P' = P' = P = P = 1). Thus, all that happens is that
x Y x y
capital income stays the same, while labor income - Y' , which is received by
workers, is reduced by the tax amount (Y = (1-t)L). However, if a selective
labor tax were introduced, then the tax would induce labor to move from the
taxed to the untaxed industry, it would raise the relative price of the taxed
good, and cause the amount purchased of the taxed sector's product to fall and
that of the untaxed sector to rise. Consequently, incomes would be affected
twice, from the sources and uses side.
In summary, under competitive assumptions, a general tax that is
levied on all sources of labor income would be borne entirely by labor. By
the same logic, a tax on capital income earned in all of capital's employments
would have neutral effects on product prices and would be borne entirely by
capital owners. Taxes that can be considered close to general factor taxes in
the real world are payroll taxes, social security taxes imposed on labor, and
property taxes imposed on capital.
The general rule established in the theory of tax incidence, and
followed in this study, is that tax incidence analysis should always consider
effects on both the sources and uses side of incomes. However, conventional
analysis (Musgrave et al. 1974) discussed at the beginning of this chapter
implies that taxes are borne solely by "producers" or only by "consumers" in
proportion to their income or consumption. As demonstrated above, this rule
Table 3.7
Tax Incidence of General Factor Taxes
Expenditures
Recepits
I ISTITAYIc S TAXES FACTORS
dorkers Capital Govt. Labor Capital
I I 3 4 J U0 I-l
I ACTIVITIES TOYTAL
Werkers 1 J Y - 1260 Y' - 1260
Capitalist Y- 1120 Yk - 1120
Y i Y -Y' - 420
o rncent 3 140 2 8
t Wv'" -?
X 4 (0.25)0.4) 0Y' - 140
STAXES 1400 - 140 tY
t BY'Y' -
50 (0 255(6.8 y - 2801400 - 28
(1-tx ) aY'XY'X (1-t y)aY';Py, Y
a Y' - w'L -
LAB 6 -- (0. (0.75)1680 - 1260
- (0. 75)56C -075)112(
- 420 - 840
(.1-)Y'P' - (1-0)Y'P' -
CAPITAL 7 (0.6)1400 - (0.2)1400 - Y(- - 1120
840 280
X' X- X
(0.3) (0.8) (0.6) Y'P' =1400
.8 1260 *1120 -420 - x
378 896 252
IV 1260 - 12Y'- 420 -
w G
y 9 (0.7) (0.2) (0.4) Y'P' 1400
1260- 1120 -420 - Y
882 224 168
TOTAL U1
Y',-
I
1260
y1- 1
1120
Y'
8
420
T1x
140
Y1
ty
280
Y w 1260 Y' a 1120k Y'P'- 1400 Y'P'm 1400X X y y
I-
V
6 8 9 10
-a
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holds only in special cases and one of them is the example of general factor
taxes.
4. Tax Incidence of General Commodity Taxes (sales tax).
To raise the same government revenue from taxes as in the previous
three cases ($420), a tax of 15 percent on the gross income would have to be
imposed (0.15 x 2800 = 240). This tax can be -treated in a similar way as a
tax on one commodity (see Section II), which was calculated by imposing the
same rate of tax on labor and capital in producing X . Here a tax on X and
Y is introduced, which means that imposition of a uniform tax rate on both
commodities is the same as a value-added tax on income. In other words, a
general tax on expenditures has the same incidence as a proportional income tax
imposed on all sources of income. To calculate new prices for w', r', P',x
and P' , equations from section IV of this chapter are used:
y
o (1-t)aa + (1-t)a(1-a)
aa + (1-a)
w'= 1-t
,t (1-t)(1-a)a +(1t1-)-a
r - (1-a)a + (1-0)(-a)
r' - 1-t
1 1-ax 1-t 1-ax
:a(--) + (1-a)(--,) = 1
x P
x x
P' = ( a 1-a
x 1- 1-
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Substituting for w' = r' = 1-t, then
P - =
x 1-t
1
w' r'P
1-t 1-ay 1-t 1-ay
P': 0(- _) +
y y
P' - () (jc)1-yO 1 -t 1 -t
Substituting for w' - r' = 1-t,
PI 1-tP' == 1y 1-t
P'
x
y
Changes in income:
Sources side
(1) Workers:
(2) Capitalists:
(3) Government:
Y - = wL - w'L - 1680 - (1-0.15)1680 = -252X~ X
Y - = rK - r'K = 1120-(1-0.15)1120 = -168k k
tY+ Y 0. 15(2800) = +420
Workers:
Capitalists:
Government:
Total Changes in Income
Sources
-252
-168
+420
In the after-tax situation, the prices of both labor and capital
declined from unity to 0.85. Thus, in the after-tax equilibrium, the returns
1
(1)
(2)
(3)
Uses
0
0
0
Total
-252
-168
+420
F
- 105 -
to all factors decline by the same percentage rate. There is no change in
relative output prices of goods X and Y , and therefore there is no
distributional impact of these taxes on the uses side of income.
The same result is presented in the SAM context in Table 3.8. This
table shows the origin of taxes, i.e., taxes affect all four cells of the
value-added matrix (intersection of rows 6 and 7 with columns 8 and 9). Taxes
are subtracted proportionally from the value-added matrix and added to the tax
matrix (T4.8 = tY , and T5.9 = tY ). This reduces labor and capital factor
incomes, where Y" = (1-t)L - T 6 8 + T6 9 , and Y (1-t)K =T 7 8 + T7 g
After-tax factor incomes are, in turn, received by institutions, thus reducing
their before-tax incomes from the sources side. These new incomes of
institutions are then spent on goods X and Y . Because there is no
relative price changes, there is no further effect of taxes from the uses side
of income. The result of the general equilibrium effect of general commodity
taxes is that the general expenditure tax is neutral with respect to resource-
allocation decisions and is borne in proportion to initial shares in national
income. This also means that the partial equilibrium static analysis assumed
in the traditional empirical studies of tax incidence is sufficient for an
analysis of the distributive effects of these particular taxes.
The above approach and analytical and numerical examples demonstrate
the usefulness of the SAM framework for the tax incidence analysis. The
approach also shows the importance of considering general equilibrium effects
of taxes on both the sources and uses side of income. The results of the
general equilibrium effects differ substantially for selective factor and
commodity taxes compared to partial static analysis of taxes, the approach
used in the conventional empirical studies of tax incidence.
Table 3.8
Tax Incidence of General Commodity Taxes
' Expenditures
Receipts
Y.orker~s Capital Govt.
.~ -
- I ..I.~ ____________ _____________ ~j j LU
TAXUS
X I Y
FACTORS
Lobor Capital
ACTIVITIES
XI Y
TOTS
Workers 1 I - 1428 Y - 1428
t 2 Y- 952 Y' - 952C-. apitalists2
Y'L -'Y420
z ocvertvn en 3 x ty Y' - 420
210 210 8 'P
X 4 (0.5O.140O 0 Y' 210
II T'AXES - 210___
I 5 20 t YP' Y' 210Y 5 0 (351400 y-
-)aYX'P (1-t)BY 'P
w'L - - w'L - L
LABOR 6 (08)60 12(0.85)560 - (0.85)1120 (0.85)1680 - 1428
476 952
(1-t )(1-) (1-t )(1-0)
CAPITAL 7 Y'P' - r'K Y'P' - r'K Y' - r'K -
xx x yy y k.
- (0.85)8401- (0.85)280 (0.85)1120 - 952
714 -_238
X' - X' - X -
(0.3) (0.8) (0.6) YP' 1400
X 8 1428 - 952 - 420-
428.4 761.6 252
Y' -Y- Y -IV Yin JY
P4 Y 9 (0.7) (0.2) (0.4) Y'P' 1400
tr 1428- 952 - 420 -
999.6 190.4 168
L ________________________ _____________________ __________________ __________________
TOTAL
' -
S1428
Y' 
-k
952
cx
210
Y'
ty
210
Y' - 1428 Y' 952
xx
1400
Y'P' -
y y
1400
H
0
0%
TOT
UNS CUT ~
AL
V
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In the next chapters the SAM framework and the approach developed
above will be applied to an analysis of tax incidence. For this purpose, a
SAM for Egypt will be used in Chapter V. Actual SAMs built for different
countries contain much more information, including preexisting taxes and an
input-output table, than the simplified SAM example presented above. For this
reason, several additional assumptions and modification of the methodology
presented will be made in Chapters IV and V.
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF MODIFIED HARBERGER MODELS IN A SAM FRAMEWORK --
INCLUSION OF INTERINDUSTRY TRANSACTIONS AND PREEXISTING TAXES
As discussed in Chapter II, one major shortcoming of the Harberger
(1962) model, criticized by several authors (Break 1974, McLure 1975), is that
the model implicitly assumes the absence of any preexisting taxes. For this
reason the mode' can, strictly speaking, be applied only to the analysis of
taxes in a zero-tax situation. Another shortcoming of the standard Harberger
model is that it does not include interindustry transactions as part of its
accounting framework. Absence of interindustry flows from the model means
that distributional effects arising from changes in relative prices due to
taxes levied on intermediate commodities (purchased by activities) are not
part of the incidence analysis as shown in Chapter III. As indicated in
Chapter II, absence of preexisting taxes in the Harberger model has been
studied initially by Feldstein (1974), Shoven and Whalley (1972), and
Fullerton et al. (1978). However, their work is not explicitly related to the
extensive work undertaken by the analysts using the above-reviewed
conventional approach to empirical analysis of tax incidence. Theoretical
treatment of the importance of interindustry transactions within the Harberger
model has been analyzed in terms of differentials in a similar way as the
original Harberger model., and a general derivation of this analysis is
presented in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), pp. 217-219. On the other hand,
the importance of taxation in a pure input-output context, without a full
general equilibrium model, has been pointed out by the early work of Metzler
(1951), and recently by Atsumi (1981).
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The analysis presented in this chapter attempts to extend the
standard Harberger model presented in Chapter III: (1) to include
intermediate demand for commodities by activities (input-output table), and
(2) to allow for tax incidence analysis of an economy characterized by an
existing tax structure. This means that a modified tax incidence model will
be formulated so as to deal explicitly with the possible differences in tax
incidence patterns created by specific tax changes in a zero-tax situation
compared to a situation with existing taxes. The model presented below is
written in a SAM framework and applied to the SAM data base, thus extending
the analysis presented in Chapter III.
The Analytical Model
The model presented below is based on a modified Harberger model
written in a SAM framework as developed in Chapter III. The model is
additionally modified for this analysis to take into account the allocation of
tax burdens between two types of households (in this case, urban households
and rural households); it is structured to investigate the impact of a tax
allowing for all general equilibrium effects,!/ including interindustry
transactions (intermediate demand). The model is also extended to allow
comparison of the incidence of taxes in an economy with preexisting taxes and
an economy with no taxes. The purpose of the model is to identify differences
in tax burdens arising from relative price changes of factors and commodities
due to taxes imposed on either value added, activities (fees and licences), or
commodities. Two versions of the extended Harberger model are presented. The
first version of the model uses the Cobb-Douglas production function for both
I/ The definition of "general equilibrium analysis" means here that prices
and quantities adjust simultaneously in the model.
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value added and intermediate inputs. In the second version, the production
process is disaggregated into two parts. The net output is represented by the
Cobb-Douglas production function, while the gross output is represented by the
input-output production function.
Two versions of the model are presented in order to show the
flexibility of the model, i.e., that the model allows for different
specifications of production functions and consumption patterns. Any type of
production specification, the Cobb-Douglas (CD), the input-output (1O), or the
constant elasticIty of substitution (CES) production function could be used
alternatively in this model. However, as it appears in the development
literature, the evidence on differences in the specification of the
elasticities of substitution is inconclusive (Nicholson 1978). Different
authors use various production specifications, depending primarily on data
availability and economic issues explored. For example, the CD production
function is very often used because its simple functional form is
computationally economical and yields statistically significant estimates of
the coefficients without imposing excessive demands upon data accuracy. For
these reasons, the CD production function is most often used in econometric
research (Yotopoulos and Nugent 1976). The properties of 10 functions are
generally considered to be less realistic than those of the neoclassical
functions, because of the fixed technology assumptions of the static model.
On the other hand, the 10 production function is an especially useful tool for
empirical analysis of general equilibrium systems. The 10 function provides
answers to questions referring to the effect of a change in the final demand
for industry j on the output of industry i . The neoclassical tools, as
such, do not provide answers to these questions, and are thus primarily
applicable to partial equilibrium analysis. The CES specification is the most
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flexible of the three, in the sense that it allows use of any value for the
elasticity of substitution (I > a > 0) . However, accordingly it makes
additional demands upon data availability. Although the CES specification
restricts a to constancy, it permits a much wider choice among alternative
values. The CD and 10 production functions are special limiting cases of the
CES, i.e., if a = 0 , then the production function takes on the Leontief 10
form with fixed proportions, and if a = 1 , then the production function is
of the CD type.
Basic assumptions of two versions of the extended Harberger model
include the following:
(1) perfect competition in factor and product markets (no market
imperfections);
(2) fixed aggregate factor supplies (L , K);
(3) no accumulation (savings); consequently, incomes equal expenditures;
(4) fixed technology (in the second version of the model);
(5) closed economic system (no trade), thus allowing for evaluation of
domestic taxes only.
(6) full employment of factors (no unemployment);
(7) perfect factor mobility (in the CD version of the model);
(8) fixed stock of capital (or land) is assumed in each sector in the
second version of the model. Consequently, in this model, a single
variable input for all sectors is labor;
(9) as regards consumption behavior, the same budget shares are assumed
before and after tax changes. In other words, consumers income of
urban and rural households is spent on different goods in constant
proportions.
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Some of the basic assumptions presented above, i.e., perfectly
competitive economy. fixed supply of factors, perfect mobility of factors,
closed economic system, and no accumulation are the same as of the standard
Harberger model. Therefore, the limitations of this model with respect to
these assumptions are the same as discussed in detail in Chapter II. Among
the assumptions, the most critical ones, which need to be modified in the
future, are the assumptions on consumption response, intrasectoral
distribution of income, foreign trade, and income measurement. Suggestions
for the modifications of some of the assumptions will be given in Chapter VI.
An especially critical assumption when working with an economy
represented by a SAM is the assumption about a closed economic system, because
foreign trade is a consistent part of the SAM data base. Because foreign
trade is excluded from the model, income distribution implications of import
tariffs and export taxes, which may be substantial especially in developing
countries, are not part of the analysis. Consequently, the model allows for
evaluation of redistributional effects of fiscal policy for domestic taxes
only. The classification of the population (urban and rural households) in
this model is also restrictive, because the model does not allow measurements
of intrasectoral distribution of income. However, this classification should
be looked upon as a convenient expositional device, which can be easily
improved simply by a more detailed disaggregation of the SAM data. On the
other hand, this classification is nevertheless useful, because even in more
disaggregated SAMs, it is still necessary to have urban and rural sectors. It
should be also noted that this model does not take into account internal
migration, which also influences income distribution patterns. Although the
list of the restrictive assumptions is rather extensive, some of them can be
easily modified in the future research. The justification for these
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restrictive assumptions is that this simple formulation of the model allows
the previous work to be extended and lays the groundwork for further possible
extensions.
The main purpose of this study is to develop a methodology for tax
incidence analysis in a SAM framework and to show its feasibility for
numerical applications. Consequently, the primary emphasis of the model
presented in this chapter is to develop a general framework for tax incidence
analysis that eventually can be extended further and applied to the actual SAM
data. Because of the data constraints, and for the purpose of illustration,
the model is formulated at first in the simplest CD form. This specification
is then extended in the second version of the model by using a combination of
CD and 10 specifications.
This chapter is organized into two major sections. In the first
section, the CD version of the model is presented analytically in a SAM
framework. The solution of this model is then tested by using hypothetical
SAM numbers. In the next section, the second version of the model is
presented in analytical form, and an analysis of its numerical results is
conducted. The second version of the model extended for nine sectors is then
applied to the actual SAM for Egypt, 1979 in Chapter V.
Description of the Model
1. Cobb-Douglas Production Function-
The extended Harberger model used for this analysis is a two-sector
model. For the first version of the model, CD assumptions are made. An
economy with two goods (X , Y) is considered. Each good is produced by a CD
1/ I am indebted to R. Sah for useful suggestions in formulating this model.
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production function, using capital and labor, which are available in fixed
total supply (K , L), and intermediate inputs X , X , Y , and Y :
X - A(Lx) () 2 (X ) 3 (y X 4  al + a2 + a 3 + a4  1 (1)
Y - B(L ) I (K ) 2 (Xy 3 (y ) 4  1 + 2 + 3 + 6 1 (2)
In this model, variables aI to a , and 8 to a are obtained
from the base SAM and are assumed to stay constant. In principle, these
variables are determined in exactly the same way as in the model presented in
Chapter III above. The only difference between the two models is that the CD
production function is specified in this model by combining four inputs
(a to a ) instead of two inputs, labor and capital (a and (1-a) ) used
in the model in Chapter III.
The model assumes fixed aggregate factor supplies, so that
L = L + L (3)
x y
K = K + K (4)
x y
Major equations of the model are presented in a SAM framework in
Table 4.la below. Equations (3) and (4) are presented in rows 4 and 5 in the
SAM in Table 4.la.
There are three consumers: (1) urban households (uh), (2) rural
households (rh), and (3) government (g). Households derive their income from
their endowments of capital and labor, while government income is equal to tax
Table 4.la
Analytical Presentation of the CD Model in a SAM Framework
INSTITUTIONS FACTORS ACTIVITIES I COIMODITIES
URBAN RURAL GTAS TOTAL
HOUSE- HOUSE- M LABOR CAPITAL . I Y Y
HOLDS IHOLDS ENT
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 7 8 9 10 11
URBAN 1 a(wL) b(rK) YthH
IUH 2 (1-a)(wL) (1-b)rK Yth
GOVERN- 3Y
MNT y g
LABOR 4 V
II wL
CAPITAL 5 rK rK rK
X 6 (px-tx)x (P,-tx)X
III - - - - - - - - - -
tY 7 ' t )y (P -t )Y
4y y y
x 8 cY dY lP P XV 8 uh rh 9 x x x 7
S y 9 (1-c)Y (1-d)Y (1-e)Y P y PTPY
8 uh rh 9 7 x y 7 y
V- TAXES 10 t I t Y Y
V 9 x y t
VI TOTAL 11 y uh y r y 9 L rK (P -t) p -t y)y P X PY y I
I
0%4
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revenue. In the same way as in the model presented in Chapter III, the
government spends the tax revenue exactly to replace the loss in private
demand in each sector from tax-induced income loss. This procedure ignores
the excess burden of the tax, so that the sum of net gains and losses for
consumers equals the yield of the tax. Government and each household spend
all of their income either on good X or Y . Because no accumulation
(savings) is assumed in this model, income equals expenditures. Each consumer
makes his/her purchasing decision by maximizing his/her utility, subject to a
budget constraint derived from his/her income. If Yuh is income of urban
households, Yrh is income of rural households, and y is income of the
government, 1/ then consumption expenditures are defined as:
cY + dY + eY = P (X - X - X ) (5)
uh rh g x x y
(1-c)Y + (1-d)Yh + (1-e)Y = P (Y - Y - Y ) (6)uh rhg y x y
The above two equations, (5) and (6), simply mean that the sum of
incomes of urban and rural households and the government is spent either on
good X or Y in constant proportions. Variables c , (1-c) , d , (1-d), e
and (1-e) are obtained from the base SAM and are assumed to stay constant.
These variables mean, for example, that a proportion c of urban household
income (Yuh) is spent on good X and a proportion (1-c) is spent on
good Y . The definition for variables d and e is the same as for
variable c . P and P represent market prices of commodities, because
x y
1/ In the second version of the model, tax revenues are allocated directly to
households in the form of transfer incomes, thus allowing for "budget
incidence" analysis.
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commodities are bought by all consumers at market prices. Equations (5) and
(6) are presented and explained in a SAM framework in Table 4.la below in rows
8 and 9 of the SAM.
In this model, urban and rural households derfve their incomes from
their endowments of factors, i.e., labor and capital. Total labor income in
the model is equal to wL and rK , where w = wage, r - price of capital,
and L and K are quantities of labor and capital, respectively. If urban
households own a proportion (a) of total labor and a proportion of (b) of
total capital, then total income of urban households (Yu) is equal,
uh
Yu a(wL) + b(rK)
Because there are only two households, it follows that total income
of rural households is equal to:
Yrh - (1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)
These two equations are presented in rows 1 and 2 in the SAM in Table
4.la.
Government income (Y ) is derived from commodity taxes tx and ty ,
and is equal to the total tax revenue (row 3 of Table 4.la),
Y = (t X + t Y) = Y- tax revenue
g x yt
Using equations (5) and (6) and substituting for Yuh Yrh and
Y gives demand equations for X and Y
g
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c[a(wL) + b(rK)] + d[(1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] + (7)
+ e(t X + t Y) P (X - X - X)
x y x x y
(1-c)[a(wL) + b(rK)] + (1-d)[(1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] + (8)
+ (1-e)(t X + t Y)] P (Y - Y - Y )
x y y x y
On the supply side, prices and quantities for expenditures by
activities are determined by the following equations,
(P - t )X = P X + P Y + wL + rK (9)
x x x x y x x x
(P - t )Y = P X + P Y + wL + rK (10)
y y xy y y y y
In this model P and Py represent commodity prices (market
xy
prices), while (P - t ) and (Py - t ) represent factory gate prices
x xy y
(without wholesale or retail margins or taxes) for X and Y . Equations (9)
and (10) are presented in columns 6 and 7. in the SAM in Table 4.la. They
represent gross production expenditures for activity X and Y , i.e., cost
of labor, capital, and intermediate inputs.
The equations from (1) through (10) represent the basic accounting
structure of this model. Unknowns or endogenous variables of this model are:
P , P , w , r , X and Y. Exogenous variables of the model are tax rates
x y
t and t - Because the model contains six unknowns, it needs six
x y
simultaneous equations for its solution. These equations are the following:1_
1/ For a derivation of equations (11) to (16), see Appendix 1.
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L 
- L + L
SKx + K
(P' - t,)aX +( - t ) 1 Y
w w
(P - t )a2 + y 2
r r
(12)
c[a(wL) + b(rK)] + d[(1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] + e(t X + t Y)
x y
- P X - (P - t ) 3X -(P - t ) a X
x x x 3 x x
(1-c)[a(wL) + b(rK)] + (1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] + (1-e)(t + t Y)
x y
(13)
(14)
- P Y - (P - t )a X - (P - t ) 4 Y
y x x 4 y y 4
(P -t )a 3 X (P -t )a X
(P -t )X = P ] + P [ ]p- - + (P -t )a1YX + (P -t )a2X
x y
(P Y-t y)103 Y ( t 4
(P -t y)y = P [I ] + P [ ]- py- + (P -t )S Y + (P -t y)02 Y
(15)
(16)
As indicated above, in this model, variables a, b, c, d, e,
a1 to a 4 , and 1 to 4 are obtained from the base SAM and are assumed
to stay constant, while t and ty can vary. By normalizing w - 1 and
solving the above system of six equations, six unknowns (endogenous
variables): P , P , w , r , X , and Y can be determined. Values of the
x y
endogenous variables will vary with commodity taxes t and t , which are
x y
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exogenously determined. Because t and ty can vary, the impact of taxes
on factor prices, commodity prices, and level of output can be determined by
solving the model.
The above model can be written in a SAM framework as shown in Table
4.1a. There are five major accounts in the SAM presented in Table 4.la.
These accounts and the structure of this SAM are in principle the same as of
the SAM presented in Chapter III (Table 3.1). The major difference is that
two production accounts are distinguished in Table 4.la, one for activities
and another for commodities. Two other differences are that the account for
activities includes an input-output table and that commodity taxes are
introduced as a wedge between final output prices and factor costs, thus
reducing factor payments by the amount of the tax which becomes government
resources (tax revenue).
It should be noted that the input-output table in the SAM shown in
Table 4.la is at market prices, and therefore it appears at the intersection
of the activity account columns and the commodity account rows. In columns 6
and 7, activities buy labor inputs (T4.6 and T 4 7 ), pay rents on capital
(T5.6 and T5. 7 ), and purchase intermediate inputs at market prices. The sum
of these elements gives the gross output vector (T1 1 .6 and T 1 1 ). In rows 6
and 7, gross outputs are bought by the commodity account, which also pays
taxes levied on commodities (T1 0 .8 and T1 0 .9). All commodity purchases (rows
8 and 9) are recorded at market prices. These derive in columns 8 and 9 from
commodity taxes and the gross outputs of activities at producer (ex-factory)
prices (T6.8 and T6.9). Value added is distributed from the factor account to
households in the same way as in Table 3.1 (Chapter III). The tax revenue is
distributed to the government at the intersection of row 3 with column 10
(T3.1 0 ). Household and government incomes, the sum of rows 1, 2, and 3, are
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then spent on commodities in columns 1, 2, and 3. This short description of
the SAM presents the accounting structure underlying its accounts and the
accounting structure of the CD version of the extended Harberger model.
In addition to the accounting structure of the model, Table 4.la
presents the analytical expressions of the model written in the cells of the
SAM. The supply equations can be read straight from the activity and
commodity columns (6, 7 and 8, 9) in Table 4.la and are equal to equations (9)
and (10) of the model presented above. Demand equations, on the other hand,
can be read from commodity rows 8 and 9 of the SAM and are equal to equations
(5) and (6) of the model. Finally equations (3) and (4) can be read from
rows 4 and 5 in the SAM of Table 4.la. In the same way as in the SAM
presented in Table 3.1 (Chapter III), columns of this SAM present price
equations, while rows present quantity equations of the underlying model.
Consequently, the basic solution to this model can be obtained in a similar
way as demonstrated in Chapter III above.
Empirical results of the CD Version of the Model
In Table 4.1b, a hypothetical SAM, numbers are entered in order to
test and analyze the solution of the model with respect to different rates for
commodity taxes t and t . The SAM in Table 4.lb gives initial values of
x y
a hypothetical two-sector economy, where gross output in sector X equals 493
and in sector Y , 428 units. Labor as a factor of production earns 66
percent of total factor income and capital receives the remainder. This
factor income is distributed to households in fixed proportions which are
assumed to remain constant in the model. Urban households receive 60 percent
of total labor income and 70 percent of total capital income. On the other
hand, rural households receive the remainder, i.e., 40 percent of total labor
income and 30 percent of total capital income (a = 0.6, (1-a) - 0.4,
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b - 0.7, and (1-b) = 0.3). 1 The production of X and Y is relatively
labor intensive since a1 = 0.47 , and 8 = 0.35 , while a2 = 0.23 , and
82 - 0.18 . A description of consumer expenditures is presented at the
intersection of rows 8 and 9 with columns 1 to 3. In this hypothetical
economy, each income group has the same consumption patterns, which are held
constant for the purpose of this analysis. Urban and rural households and
government spend 57 percent of their income on good X and 43 percent on
good Y (c = d = e = 0.57). The main data parameters are summarized in Table
4.1b.
Existing commodity taxes are introduced at the intersection of the
tax account row 10 with commodity columns 8 and 9. The initial commodity tax
levied on X (t ) is 7 percent of the gross output of X , while the tax
x
levied on commodity Y (t ) is equal to 15 percent. The SAM in Table 4.1b
represents a base SAM, where initial taxes t and t exist, and all prices
x y
for w , r , P , and P are equal to unity.
Then new tax rates for commodities X and Y are introduced. The
tax rate for commodity X is increased from 7 percent to 12 percent, while
the tax rate levied on commodity Y is decreased from 15 percent to 5
percent. The solution of the model gives new results for endogenous variables
of the model as presented in Table 4.1c. Because the price of labor has been
normalized in this model to unity, i.e., w = 1 , all relative price changes
have to be evaluated in relation to the labor price. Table 4.lc gives new
prices for P' , P' , w' , r' , and new values for X' and Y' . Because of
x y
changes in the tax rates, gross output in X declines from 493 to 464 units,
a decrease of 6 percent; and gross output in Y increases from 428 to 466
1/ These ratios are presented in Table 4.1b in parentheses.
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units, an increase of 9 percent. Total tax revenues (and consequently the
government revenue) decline from 101 to 79 units, a decrease of 21.7
percent. The new price of labor (w') Is equal to one and the new price of
capital (r') is also approximately equal to one. This means that in this
solution of the model, sources of household incomes are unaffected in nominal
(absolute) terms. However, as discussed above, this is because the price of
labor was normalized to one. Consequently, real incomes have to be evaluated
with respect to changes in relative prices in relation to the price of
labor. The effect of the change in commodity taxes on relative prices is
reflected in new prices for the activity and commodity accounts columns.
Because new commodity prices affect the purchasing power of consumers (cost of
consumption basket), they in turn, affect real incomes of households and the
government from the uses side of income.
Changes in real incomes for urban households, rural households, and
the government, after new taxes are imposed, can be calculated by taking into
account changes in commodity prices for X and Y . Because the tax rate has
been increased substantially for commodity X and decreased for commodity Y,
it can be expected that the price of commodity X will rise relative to the
price of commodity Y in the new tax situation. This is demonstrated by the
solution of the model presented in Table 4.lc, where P' = 1.025 , andx
P' - 0.885. This means that the price of commodity X increased by 2.5
y
percent and the price of commodity Y decreased by 11.5 percent of the
initial price (P = P = 1).
x y
Changes in real incomes for urban and rural households and the
government, on the uses side, can be calculated by using the same equations as
in Chapter III, section V above.
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Changes in uses of income:
(1) Urban households:
X' Y'-
AYh uh uh AP )Auh 
-p Ax P' y
x y
X'
uh
Y'P
uh
= 206 (obtained from the SAM, Table 4.1c)
= 155
206 155
auh 1.025 (0.025) - 0.885 (0.115)1
AYuh - - 5.02 + 20.14 = + 15.12
i
(2) Rural households:
rh rh
rh
x y
AYrh
AYrh
X'
rh
Y' I
rh
= 121
= 89
S~ 1.025 (0.025) - 0.885 (0.115)]
= - 2.95 + 11.56 = + 8.61
(3) Government:
X'
P x
x
Y'0
+ - AP )
P yy
= 45
= 34
AY
g
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A'45__ 34AY - - 1.025 (0.025) + 0.885 (0.115)]
AY - -1.09 + 4.42 + 3.33
g
The combined taK incidence from the sources and uses of income side
is shown in the table below.
Total changes in incomes:
Sources: Uses: Total:
(1) Urban households: 0 +15 +15
(2) Rural households 0 + 9 + 9
(3) GoGernment: -22 + 3 -19
It should be noted that the above particular results depend on the
basic assumptions of the model, as well as on the values of coefficients for
a - a4 , - 4 , and values for the a, b, c, d, and e 
variables
given in the base SAM. In a similar way as in the model presented in Chapter
III, the results of this model depend on differences in factor intensities
between the two sectors, as well as on the pattern of consumption expenditures
for a particular household group. For example, if the consumption patterns of
one of the consumer groups were reversed, i.e., if the group would consume
more of a good Y , which became cheaper relative to X , then accordingly
real income of this group would change in a positive direction. Therefore,
with a different base SAM, different results would be obtained. These issues
will be explored further in the next section, where additional examples and
different assumptions of the model will be analyzed.
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As demonstrated above, the CD version of the extended Harberger model
gives similar results for selective commodity taxes as the model presented in
Chapter III. However, the advantage of this model over the standard Harberger
model is that this extended model takes into account all of the general
equilibrium effects in an economy, including consequences of the intermediate
demand (interindustry transactions) for tax incidence analysis. Another
advantage of the model is that it allows evaluation of the distributional
implications that would arise if an existing tax structure is altered.
Depending on policy issues, the model allows examination and comparison of the
effects of different tax rates on income distribution. It also allows
examination of the effects that would occur if one type of a tax is
substituted for another type of a tax. These issues will be examined in more
detail in the next section. In general, the primary usefulness of the model
is to give some insights into tax incidence analysis, i.e., given the assump-
tions, the model allows examination of the magnitude and direction of change
in real incomes of institutions due to changes in a given tax structure.
The obvious advantage of this model over the model presented in
Chapter III is that this model allows for analysis of tax incidence of an
economy characterized by an existing tax structure. Such an analysis is not
possible with the standard Harberger model, as demonstrated in Chapter III.
However, the second advantage of this model for tax incidence analysis, i.e.,
inclusion of interindustry transactions and their effects on the relative
prices and income distribution, is not shown explicitly from the above
experiment and its results. Although it is intuitively clear that the model
that includes intermediate transactions is a better simplification of an
economy than the model that includes only value added (net output), it is not
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clear immediately what is the difference in the magnitude and the direction of
changes in relative prices and real incomes of institutions between the two
models. For this reason, an additional experiment is performed below, as an
attempt to analyze possible differences between the results of the two models.
Comparison of the CD Model Results -- Ecclusion of the Input-Output Table
A second experiment with the CD version of the model is performed to
test the difference between the empirical results obtained above, and the
results that would be obtained if interindustry transactions are excluded from
the same model. The base SAM for the first experiment is presented in Table
4.lb, while the base SAM for the second experiment is presented in Table
4.ld. The only difference between the two SAMs is that in the second SAM, the
input-output entries (T8.6, T9. 6, T8.7 and T 9 7) were eliminated by setting
each entry to be equal to one. Then the SAM was rebalanced by adding new
entries in columns and rows 6 and 7. The SAM obtained this way has the same
structure as the SAM in Table 4.1b, including the values for its coefficients
(a , b , c , d , and e). In this way, consumption patterns stay the same,
as well as factor intensities, and proportions between labor and capital in
sectors X and Y (a , (1-a) , 8 , and (1-0)) . Next, to derive a SAM that
resembles the SAM in Table 4.lb in all respects, except the input-output
table, existing tax rates in Table 4.ld were calculated to be exactly the same
as in the SAM in Table 4.1b. The resulting values for this SAM, and the base
run, where all prices are equal to unity, are presented in Table 4.ld. This
table also presents a summary of main data parameters.
Then the existing commodity tax rates were changed in exactly the
same way as in the first experiment. The tax rate for commodity X was
Table 4.ld
A Base SAM Without the 10 Table
PRINI OF MATRIE
S I . 1. 2 3 4. 5 6 7 8 9 10 I
I I I INST.1RR -INST-RLR INATTTUT FACTARS FACTnHs ACTIVITY ACTIVITY COMMODIT CUMMODIT TAXLS I
I I I HiOUSEHt. mnuSEHOL 'PnyERNME ILABUR CAPITA. x Y x Y .
I I I t NIIUSf ntL 1 228' 133I
I 2 1 IPS-WUw MLiSEtnL I 152. 58, II I'16!1101 G0VLRNME I 5.I
I 4 IFACuS LAMJOR I 230, 150, I
S I f ACiTIe' CAPITAE I li. 76 WI 1 I ACTIVlYI X 1 346. I
I 7 1 ACTIvjiY Y I 229.
I 8 I Cli-LIf1T X I 206, 121. 41, 1.
I 9 1 CoIImDIT' Y I -155, 89, 17. 1.
I 1 I TAXL. I 24, 34.
i 11 I TOTAL . 361., 210. .8. 380. 191. 346. 229. 370s 263. 58. 1
ACCfUNT PRICE VALUE QUANTITY
1 INST-IB H4USEL 3'1.0
2 !'ST-UR HOUSEHOL 21i.0
3 ISTI TU GUV.RNME fi. t
4 fACTJRS LABUR 1%0000 380.0 3A0 05 FACTORS CAPITAL 1,0000 191,o' 191t06 ACTIVITY X 1,uf00 346,3 346.3
7 ACTIVTY Y 110000 2?5.8 228 8
8 CUO100IT X 1,0000 370,2 370.29 CUMmOIT Y 1.0000 262,9 262.910 TAXES 58.1
0-11, 41
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increased from 7 to 12 percent, while the tax rate levied on commodity Y was
decreased from 15 to 5 percent of the gross output. The solution of the model
gives new results for endogenous variables of the model, as presented in Table
4.le. In the same way as in the first experiment, the new price of labor
(w') is equal to one, and the new price of capital (r') is also
approximately equal to one. However, there are differences between the two
results for commodity prices. New prices for commodities were P' = 1.025 ,x
and P' = 0.885 in the first experiment. In the second experiment, without
y
the input-output table, new prices for commodities are P' = 1.041 , andX
P' = 0.931 . While new prices in both experiments move in the same direction,
y
there are differences in the magnitude of change which have income
distribution implications. In the first experiment (case), the price of
commodity X increases by 2.5 percent of the initial price, while the same
price increases by 4.1 percent in the second case. On the other hand, the
after-tax price of Y decreases by 11.5 percent of the initial price in the
first case, and by 6.9 percent in the second case. These differences arise
primarily from the secondary effects caused by intermediate consumption.
Because activity X 'consumes a relatively large amount of the good Y , which
price decreased due to its tax decrease, this creates a lower price increase
for good X in the first case compared to the second case. In the same way,
activity Y consumes more from itself than from X , and the final result of
the secondary price effects due to intermediate consumption is a more equal
increase or decrease in both commodity prices. It can be expected that, with
a more disaggregated input-output table, the interindustry feedback effect
will create even more price differentials.
Table 4.le
Change in Commodity Taxes II (results)
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Income distribution implications of these two results depend
primarily on the pattern of consumption expenditures. In the two experiments
presented above, there would be no difference in changes in real incomes from
the uses side for urban and rural households. This is'because in both SAMS,
in Tables 4.1b and 4.ld, urban and rural households spend equal proportions of
their incomes on good X and Y ; in other words, their consumption patterns
are the same. For this reason, they would be affected equally from the
increase in price of X and decrease in price of Y in both cases. However,
the results would be substantially different if, for example, urban households
consumed only good X , and rural households consumed only good Y . In such
a situation, urban households would lose more of their income on the uses side
in the second case, where the price of good X increases more than in the
first case. On the other hand, rural households would be better off in the
first case, where the price of good Y decreased more than in the second
case. This is an extreme example, however, these differentials will arise
each time as long as there are differences in consumption patterns between the
two household groups.
As demonstrated above, the inclusion of interindustry transactions in
the model causes commodity prices to move in the same direction (due to tax
changes), as these would move in the absence of an input-output table.
However, the inclusion of an input-output table causes secondary effects,
which have implications on both the magnitude of price changes as well as on
the magnitude of real income changes of institutions. Therefore, more
accurate results can be obtained for tax incidence analysis when the model
includes interindustry transactions.
In the next section the model is written by combining CD and 10 '
specifications of production functions. The model is also extended further in
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order to evaluate simultaneously tax and "benefit" incidence ("budget
incidence") and to evaluate the distributional effects of value added,
activity, and commodity taxes.
2. Cobb-Douglas and Input-Output Production Functions 1/
Description of the Model
The second version of the model is similar to the first version
presented above in its basic assumptions, with the exception that the
production process is split into two parts. The net output is represented by
the CD production function, while the gross output is specified by usiig the
10 production function. An additional assumption is that (in the short run)
capital is immobile between the two sectors, i.e, fixed stock of capital (or
land) is assumed in each sector. Consequently, a single variable input for
all sectors in this model is labor.
In summary, the following basic assumptions are used in this model:
(1) perfect competition in factor and in product markets;
(2) fixed aggregate factor supplies;
(3) full employment of factors;
(4) no accumulation;
(5) fixed technology;
(6) closed economic system;
(7) fixed stock of capital (or land) in each sector;
(8) income is spent on two goods in constant proportions.
The model is specified to analyze tax incidence for three types of
taxes: value added taxes, activity taxes, and commodity taxes. These taxes
1/ I am indebted to G. Pyatt for useful suggestions in formulating this model
and its SAM.
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can be imposed all at the same time or some of them can be set to zero in
order to compare differences in their distributional effects.
To incorporate the above modifications of the model, it was necessary
to change the base SAM, which represents the basic accounting framework of the
model. This modified SAM is presented in Table 4.2a. In this SAM, activities
are separated into net and gross accounts. Activities shown in columns 6 and
7 (Table 4.2a) buy labor inputs (T16 and T pay rents on fixed assets
(T2. 6 and T2 7 ), and pay taxes on value added (T3 .6 and T3.7) The sum of
these columns gives the net output of activities. The net outputs shown in
rows 6 and 7, are bought by the gross output account of activities which, in
addition, buys intermediate goods from the commodity account (T1 0 .8 T1 0 .9
T and T ) and pays taxes levied on activities (T3 8 and T3 9  In11.81, 11.9 adT.
rows 8 and 9, gross outputs are shown to be purchased by the commodity account
columns. Commodity taxes (T3.1 0 and T 3.11) are levied on commodities X
and Y in columns 10 and 11. Column sums of the commodity account give
market prices of commodities. These commodities are then bought by households
at the intersection of rows 10 and 11 by columns 4 and 5, and by the gross
account of activities, intersection of rows 10 and 11,with columns 8 and 9.
All commodities, including intermediate demand, are purchased at market
prices.
Another difference between the first and the second version of the
model and its underlying SAM is that the second model allows evaluation of
both tax and "benefit" incidence simultaneously, i.e., an analysis of budget
incidence. In an accounting sense, this has been achieved by dropping the
government account of the SAM and redistributing tax revenues directly to
households in the form of transfer incomes. This is shown in the SAM (Table
Table 4.2a
Schematic SAM
ACrIVITIES
HOUSEHOLDS NET - GROSS WMODITIES
TOTAL
URBAN RURAL I Y x y x y
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
11.6 11.7 T112
T 2.6 12.7 
T2.12
T3.6 3.7 T3.8 3.9 T3.10 T3.11 3.12
4.12
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4.2a) at the intersection of the tax account column with the household account
rows, where tax incomes are received directly from the tax account in cells
T4.3 and T . To calculate the value of these two cells from an actual SAM,
it is necessary to add government transfers received by households and
benefits from public expenditures. Income transfers from the government to
households are a constituent part of any SAM, while benefits received by
households from public expenditures can be calculated from a household budget
survey. These benefits can then be allocated to households as transfer
incomes. On the other hand, if available data are insufficient to determine
shares of benefits from public expenditures (government consumption) for each
household group, then shares can be determined exogenously in the model.
Consequently, by varying these shares (distribution of benefits on a per
capita basis, in proportion to income, etc.), income distribution implications
of alternative allocation of government spending can be determined.
The rest of the accounts, with the exception of this treatment of the
activity account and government spending , correspond exactly to the SAM and
the model presented in Table 4.1. Therefore, the above description of the SAM
presents the accounting structure of the second version of the model as well
as the accounting framework of the data base for the model.
Analytical Structure of the Model
The model based on the SAM outlined in Table 4.2a is presented in a
SAM framework in Table 4.2b. In this table, the SAM is written in the form of
equations, where columns of the SAM determine price equations and rows of this
SAM determine quantity equations, in the same way as in Table 4.la. The
analytical structure of this model is similar to the CD version of the model
Table 4.2b
Analytical Presentation of the Second Version of the Model in a SAM
ACTIVITIES
FACTORS HOUSEHOLDS NET GROSS OMMODITIES
TAXES 
-ii TOTAL
LABOR CAPITAL URBAN RURAL X Y X y x
21 3 4 1 5 6 8 9 10 11 12
LABOR 1 wL wLy wL
I FACTORS
CAPITAL 2 rK1  rKx rK
II TAXES .3 t6X6  t7y7  Y % 0io ti 1  i t 'Yi Yt
URBAN 4 a(wL) b(rK) cYt 
Yuh
III HOUSEHOLDS
RURAL 5 (1-a)(wL) (1-b)(rK) (1-c)Yt Trh
X 6 P6x6  6X6
IV - - - - -- - - - -
I77 7 77 7
S 888
V4 m
Y 999 9 9 9 9
I 10 dY.uh Twh P10!10  P10 Xy 10X
VI 0
y 11 (1-d)Yuh rh ti x 11 y 1111
VII TOTAL 12 VL rK Yt uh rh 66 77 P8 8 P9Y9 P 10 P 111
I
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with some modifications presented below. The full analytical structure and
derivation of the model's equations are presented in Appendix 2, while only
the basic equations in a SAM framework are presented here. It should be noted
that, although the SAM accounts have been disaggregated into more accounts for
the second version of the model, the basic mathematical solution of this model
remains the same as that of the CD version of the model. Thus, disaggregation
or aggregation does not change the basic structure of the model.
On the supply side of the model and the SAM accounts, the net output
of activities is represented by the equations shown in columns 6 and 7 in
Table 4.2b. The CD production specification is used in these two columns.
The gross output of activities is indicated by the equations in columns 8 and
9, where diagonal entries of net outputs are combined with the input-output
table (intersection of columns 8 and 9 with rows 10 and 11), and activity
taxes (T3.8 and T3.9), by using the 10 production function. The supply of
commodities X and Y is shown in columns 10 and 11, where commodity taxes
are levied on the gross output. Input-output specifications are used for the
equations in columns 10 and 11.
Demand equations of the model are presented in rows 10 and 11 of the
commodity account. These equations mean that the final demand is equal to the
intermediate demand (intersection of rows 10 and 11 with columns 8 and 9),
plus consumption demand for commodities X and Y by urban and rural
households (intersection of commodity rows with columns 4 and 5). Because
there is no accumulation in this model, incomes of institutions equal
expenditures by institutions. Urban and rural households spend proportions
d and e of their income on commodity X , and (1-d) and (1-e) on good Y
These ratios are presented in the SAM in Table 4.2b. Factor incomes are
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received by institutions from the factor account in this SAM in exactly the
same way as in the previous SAMs, described in Chapter III and section 1 of
this chapter. In addition to factor incomes, urban and rural households also
receive incomes from tax revenues as discussed above. This description of the
SAM in Table 4.2b presents both the accounting structure of the model and its
basic equations. The equations of the model are described in more detail in
Appendix 2.
As evident from the above description of the SAM model and from the
specifications derived in Appendix 2, the basic structure of this model is
essentially the same as that of the CD version of the model discussed in
section 1 of this chapter. By normalizing the wage rate to one and using the
above specifications, the model can be solved in the same way as the CD
version of the model. In this model, variables a , b , c , d , e , 1 ,
2 ' 1 , and 2 are obtained from the base SAM as in the previous
model. While prices for labor, capital, and commodities are endogenously
determined by the model, tax rates and the allocation of the tax revenue to
households, i.e., c , and (1-c) , are exogenous variables. By changing
these exogenous variables, the tax and benefit incidence can be determined
from the results of the model. This is demonstrated below numerically, first
for a hypothetical SAM and then in the next chapter for a SAM for Egypt, 1979.
Empirical Analysis of the Second Version of the Model
Numerical values for the second version of the model are presented in
the SAM in Table 4.2c. In this hypothetical two-sector economy, gross output
in sector X equals 533 and in sector Y 478 units. Value added in sector
X is equal to 345 and in sector Y 226 units. Factor intensity is
Table 4.2c
A Base SAM for the Second Version of the Model
PeINT ()F MATPIX
I 7. 1 2 34 5 .6 7 8. 9 10
I T FACTORS FACTORS TAXES HfUSEHLO H0IJS HID ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY CMOH'4DIT I
I I AROR CAPI Y GROSS.Y
I I I F AC TijS LAAOUR I (cx) 230.0 (8) 150,0
1 2 1 FACTUPS CAPITVAL II
1 2 ? TLFRS I (t 6) 12.0 (t7) 20.0 (t8 )28.0 (t ) 30.0 (t10 )3s5o I
I Hr i vMLO URRAN I (a)1152.0 (b) 134,0 (C) j11 01
I 5 1 W.SE1t0 RURAL (1-a)228.0(1-b) 51.0 (1-c) 70.0
1 6 I Ar.TTVITY NLT-X I 26,0
I 7 1 ACTIVITY 1JT-Y T 233 0I A I ACTIVITY GROSSwX I *
q I 1 ACTIvITY GRoS'io 1 25,0 1
1 10 I Cn""fln IT X (d) 22S.o (e) ?00,9 81.0 87,0 I
1 i t ! CfMu!JIT Y I (1-d) 17 6 . 0(1-e) '55 .0  67.0 1150
I 12 I CAtPITAL x I (1-a) 115,0
I i3 I CAPITAL. Y I (1-8) 76,0 I
j a I TOTAL I 38 .0 )9J,0 g85.0 401.9 355,p 357,0 246,0 5330. 478.0 S93,0 I
PRI1I4 OF MATQI
1 11 12 . 13 . i . I
I COM'OCIT CAPITAL CAPITAL TATAL I
IY x 1 .1
.... ................. :..~W~..-'-.- 
--
I 115,0 76,0 0lo I
(t )60,0 1 I
I 37 0 I
Ip 111. %6
I 453,0 0TA0 I
I . 59% 0 I
I ~513'0 I
S115, 0 1
76.0 I
1 513,0 115,0 76,0 I
a-
(1-a) -
b -
(1-b) -
(1-c) -
e -
(1-e) -
0.40
0.60
0.70
0.30
0.62
0.38
0.56
0.44
a - 0.66
(1-a) - 0.34
8 - 0.66
(1-0) - 0.34
-
.'
t - 0.04
t - 0.09
t
t8
t 9
t1
0
11
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.13
-
-
-
-
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the same in both sectors, since a = 0.66 and $ - 0.66. Urban households
receive 40 percent of total labor income and 70 percent of total capital
income, i.e., a - 0.4 and b = 0.7; and rural households receive the
remainder. In addition to factor incomes, urban households receive 62 percent
of total tax revenues in the form of transfer income, and rural households
receive 38 percent of total transfer income (c = 0.62, and (1-c) = 0.38). The
sum of factor and transfer incomes represents total income of households,
shown as receipts in rows 4 and 5 of the SAM and as expenditures on
commodities X and Y in columns 4 and 5. Consumption patterns are the
same for urban and rural households, i.e., d = e = 0.56, and (1 - d) =
(1 - e) = 0.44. The main data parameters are summarized in Table 4.2c.
Three types of existing taxes are introduced in this hypothetical
economy: (1) value added taxes, (2) activity taxes, and (3) commodity taxes.
Value added taxes are introduced at the intersection of the tax account row
with the columns of the net activity account. Activity and commodity taxes,
on the other hand, appear at the intersection of the gross activity account
and commodity account columns with the tax account row. Initial value added
taxes for t6 equal 4 and for t7 equal 5 percent of value added in X
and Y , respectively. Activity taxes for t 8 equal 5 and for t9 equal 7
percent of gross output, and commodity taxes for t10 equal 6 and for
t 11equal 7 percent for X and Y , respectively. Total tax revenue is equal
to 185 units.
These existing tax rates are purely hypothetical, however, the tax
structure may reflect a real policy situation. Usually, policymakers are
faced with a question concerning how to raise taxes or change an existing tax
structure, and want to know the distributional implications with respect to
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tam changes. These are the questions that can also be addressed by this
model, taking into account its assumptions. Several different experiments of
this nature can be performed with this model. For example, an experiment,
analyzed below, might be to compare the tax incidence of value added taxes,
activity taxes, or commodity taxes when each of these taxes is increased or
decreased for some equal percentage rate. By increasing or decreasing each
tax separately by an equal rate, the percentage increase or decrease in
output, commodity prices, factor prices, tax revenues, and change in real
incomes for different household groups can be determined by the model.
Table 4.2d shows the results of the model where value added taxes
were increased by 10 percent in both sectors, i.e., t 6 = 0.04 and
ti - 0.14, t7 = 0.09, and t' = 0.19 ; while other taxes were kept
constant. Because of the change in value added taxes, gross output in X
increased from 533 to 584 units, an increase of 9.5 percent; and gross output
in Y increased from 478 to 523 units, an increase of 9.5 percent. Total tax
revenues increased from 185 to 257 units, an increase of 39 percent or 72
units. The new price of labor is equal to one, and the new price of capital
is also equal to one.' Commodity prices for X and Y increased for both
goods, where P = 1.096 and P = 1.093 . These results are presented in
x y
Table 4.2d.
Changes in real incomes for urban and rural households, on the uses
side, can be calculated by using the same equations as in the example above.
Changes in uses of income:
(1) Urban Households:
uh Px + uh P
xuh T~ )
x y
Table 4.2d
Change in Value Added Taxes (results)
PPINY OF MATRIW
I I I S 6 7 .. 8. . 9 10 1
.............-..........................................---.-...--........-.............
I t FACTnRS FACTARS TAKEs HMUSEHLD HOUSEHLD ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTTVITY ACTIVITY COMMODIT I
I I I LAHUIR. CAPITAL URBAN PUJRAI NET-X NET-Y GRnSS.x GRfSS.Y X I
.....-..-- ...-.................................................... U.. U.---P-----.---.----------"*---
I I I FACTUPS LA0.1W 1 229,8 150,2
I I FACTOPS CAPITAL
I I I TAXES4 427 30,7 32,8 38,3 1
I i I 1.'JSE1LO URBAN 1 15?,0 134%0 s59.5
I 5 1 '."U'-LD RUPAL 1 228.0 59,0 97,1
I 6 1 ACTIVITY NET-W 391,1 '
1 7 1 ACTTvITY NET-.Y 269,0
I A I ArTTVITY GROSS-y i 583,7 I
I 9 I ACTivIrY GROSS-v 1 27,3 I
1 10 1 CrG'UDIT X 1 250.0 ?1s,3 88,7 95.4
I i: I c'ArvoIT Y I 195.5 166,8 73,2 125,8
I 12 I CAPITAL X 1 114,9
1 13 1 CAPITAL Y 1 76,1
I 14 I TnTAL I 380.0 jq,0 ,506 44.5 39),1 269,0 583.7 523, 649,3 I
POINT .F ..ATt.
.------. -... ..
1 11 1? 13 lii I
I CO"PODIT CAPITAL CApITAL TOTAl I
I v A Y
114,9 76,1 tot n I
*AIJ II IQA? ,1 I
64q 0 
7 495,7 ~23 1 I
I 6LA9 3 7
I'61-4 I
14% 9 
76.1 I
I 561,4 114,9 76,1 I
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
1
3
4
5.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
ACCAIUNtJ I
FACTORS
r AC TORS
TAXI S
HtnOSEf LD
HillISEfHLO 1
ACTTVITY
ACTIVITY
ACTIVITY
COMMOOIT
CAPITAL
CAPITAL-
LARR FI
CAPITAL
URHAN
RURAL
NET-.
NET-Y
GROSS- K
GROSS-Y
Y
X
Y
PPICF
1 .090Qnn
1 %0Q21011
1, O23%
1,095801.043?5
1*:09568
1,043p5
'999AA
1:.00140
VAI "F OIANTITY
ptsh, 6
It01:0t
3O9 .1
301.1t
?69;0
SAS.7
5P3,1
649.3
561 ;4
114,9
6.1
3L6.'?24h;2
53?,7
4785
592.6
S13.5
115.076.0
'-a
.I~.
I-n
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' - 250
uh
(obtained from Table 4.2d)
Y'.
uh - 195.5
- 250 195.5
Euh 1.096 (0.096) - 1.093 (0.093)]
AYuh - -21.90 - 16.63= - 38
(2) Rural Households:
X'.
AY - rh
rh P x
x
Y'r
+ h AP )
y
X' - 215.3
rh
Y - 166.8
rh
215.3 166.8
EYrh = ~ 1.096 (0.096) = 1.093 (0.093)]
AYrh 
=
- 18.86 - 14.19 = - 33
Changes in income on the sources side can be calculated by comparing
after-tax household incomes with before-tac incomes:
Changes in sources of income:
(1) Urban Households:
Yuh = a(wL) + b(rK) + cYt
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Yu -152 + 134 + 159
Y' -152 + 134 + cY'
uh t
Y' - 256
t
cY' - (0.62)256 -
t
(from Table 4.2c)
(from Table 4.2d)
159
- 152 + 134 + 159.5 = 445
AY - Y' - y
uh uh uh
= 445.5 - 401.0 = + 44
(2) Rural Households:
Yrh
- 228 + 57 + 70 = 355
Y - =228 + 57 + 97.1 = 382
rh
AY =Y - y
rh rh rh
(from row 5 in Table 4.2d)
= 382.1 - 355 = + 27
The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
gives the following result:
Total changes in incomes:
Sources
(1) Urban households:
(2) Rural households:
+44
+27
Uses
-38
-33
Total
+6
-6
+71 -71
Y'
uh
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The results of the model show that the distributional effects of
increasing value added taxes by an equal rate in both sectors are minimal for
this hypothetical economy. Urban households gain 6 units in real incomes,
while rural households lose the same amount. The distributional effects are,
in this case, minimal because factor intensity is the same in both sectors and
because consumption patterns are also the same for both households. Urban
households gain after new taxes are imposed primarily because they receive a
higher proportion of transfer incomes (c = 0.62). In a similar way, as shown
with the model presented in Chapter III, the results of this model would,
however, change substantially if factor intensities were different in the two
sectors and if consumption patterns were different for the two household
groups. The purpose of the above example is primarily to demonstrate how the
model can be used for tax incidence analysis.
This model is applied to the actual SAM for Egypt in the next
chapter. Basic specifications, the assumptions, and the analytical structure
of the model applied to the Egypt SAM are the same as in the model presented
above. The purpose of the analysis presented in the next chapter is to
demonstrate how the methodology developed above can be applied to the actual
social accounting data framework and what steps are necessary for an analysis
of tax incidence by using the above model.
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CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED HARBERGER MODEL
TO THE SAM FOR EGYPT, 1979
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the redistributive impact
of indirect taxes and subsidies in Egypt on urban and rural households. One
of the important policy issues motivating this study has been a concern with
the effects of specific commodity taxes and subsidies on the living standards
of various household groups. This policy issue is particularly relevant for
Egypt where government subsidies and indirect taxation play a large role in
the economy. There are production subsidies and consumption subsidies that
are direct expenditures from the government budget, and there are two parallel
systems of indirect taxation, i.e., government trade, and nongovernment trade
subsidies/taxes. The two systems of indirect taxation are explained in detail
below.. The present structure of commodity subsidies and taxes in Egypt has a
significant impact on consumer welfare, and the government budget. For
example, consumption subsidies amounted to 11 percent of GDP in 1979 (Dervis
et al. 1980). On the other hand, indirect taxation of commodities affects
real incomes of households because of relative price changes, both from the
sources and uses of income side. To analyze these fiscal policy issues, the
methodology developed in Chapter IV is used.
This chapter is organized into two main parts. In the first part, the
SAM2 for Egypt is described briefly, presenting the basic structure of the
original and modified (aggregated) SAM which fits the accounting structure of
the above-discussed model. In the next part, the second version of the model
(developed in Chapter IV) is applied to the SAM for Egypt to analyze a
distribution of tax burdens among urban and rural households. Three types of
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experiments are analyzed with the model: (1) distributional implications of
removing government subsidies; (2) distributional implications of selective
commodity taxes; and (3) distributional implications of alternative allocation
patterns of tax revenues to households.
Description of the SAM2 for Egypt
SAM2 for Egypt is presented in Appendix 3, Table 5.A1.1/ This SAM
gives the most disaggregated picture of direct and indirect taxation,
including subsidies, provided so far in the SAM literature. This SAM also
provides, for the first time for Egypt, relatively detailed information about
the structure of direct and indirect taxation. The basic accounting structure
of SAM2 for Egypt is the same as for any SAM. Because major differences
between this SAM and the conventional SAMs (Pyatt et al., 1977) lie in the
treatment of the tax account, and because the focus of this study is on fiscal
incidence, only the tax account of SAM2 will be presented in more detail here.
SAM2 identifies the major channels and institutions through which
government fiscal policies are carried out in Egypt. Six categories of taxes
are identified in the tax account of SAM2: (1) indirect taxes; (2) sales
taxes; (3) subsidies; (4) direct taxes: (5) import tariffs; and (6) export
taxes. These taxes are presented in rows and columns from 91 to 95 in Table
5.Al. Direct taxes are treated conceptually in this SAM as part of the
institutions expenditures account, while indirect taxes and subsidies are a
part of the commodity account (the columns). Direct taxes on households,
1/ For a detailed documentation of SAM2, see: Working Paper No. 7, "SAM2 and
Documentation," DRTPC, Cairo University, 1982; and for a detailed
description of the conceptual framework of SAM2, see: B. Pleskovic and M.
Crosswell (1981), "Social Accounting Matrices for Egypt: Outlines and
Suggestions for Disaggregation of Individual Accounts," Working Paper
No. 1, World Bank, mimeographed.
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public and private companies' incomes can be found at the intersection of the
row (93) indicating direct taxes with columns indicating particular
institutions. The columns of all six categories of taxes represent
"expenditures" of the tax account, or uses of funds. In fact, each of these
columns has one entry, which represents revenue received by the government
from taxes. This treatment follows the general rule established in the
conventional SAM literature (Pyatt et al., 1977).
Indirect taxes are, on the other hand, disaggregated through the
commodity accounts. One of the major criteria for the disaggregation of the
commodity account in SAM2 has been to distinguish commodities both with
respect to different markets and to varying prices. The latter are a
consequence of different tax rates and subsidies levied on these
commodities. There are two major subdivisions of the commodity account that
indicate different markets and prices of commodities due to indirect taxes and
subsidies. In the first instance, the commodity account of SAM2 is subdivided
into: (1) domestic commodities, (2) imported commodities, and (3) exported
commodities. This disaggregation takes care of three different markets and
three types of taxes: indirect taxes levied on domestic goods produced by
private and public activities, import tariffs, and export taxes, including
subsidies which may differ according to each distributional channel.
The second subdivision of commodities indicated in Table 5.Al is with
respect to government-traded and nongovernment-traded commodities. Commodity
taxes and subsidies in Egypt are not uniform with respect to the same
commodity under the two trading systems. The primary reason for this is the
"government trade" institution, which is the mechanism for implementing
commodity subsidies and indirect taxes. Government trade (principally, the
General Supply Authority), first identified in the earlier SAM for Egypt,
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1976, built by DRTPC (Eckaus et al., 1979), is a special institution created
by the Egyptian Government. The major role of this institution is to buy
domestic or imported goods and to deliver them to the distribution companies
(wholesale trade), directly to consumers and producers'or to the rest of the
world (exports). The government tradel/ also finances the difference between
purchasing prices and selling prices at which the goods are delivered to
consumers. The difference represents either subsidies to consumers or
producers who buy government-traded goods; or export taxes in cases of
government-traded exports, since these are bought at a lower price on the
domestic market and sold at world prices to the rest of the world. Thus, the
distribution of commodities through government-trade channels is the main
vehicle for implementing subsidies and indirect taxes in Egypt.
In Table 5.A1, commodities are distinguished as domestic, imported,
or exported for each of the two major commodity distribution channels
(government trade and nongovernment trade). The major difference between
these two channels arises from the subsidies component implemented through
government trade. The government trade institution is treated as a separate
row and column in the SAM2. Government trade "receipts" (positive in the case
of commodity taxes and negative in the case of subsidies) are recorded at the
intersection of its row (9) with the columns corresponding to government trade
commodities (Table 5.Al). These receipts are then transferred to the
conventional government account at the intersection of the government row (12)
and the government-trade column. Each time there is an entry in the
government-trade row, it changes the price of the respective commodity
1/ For a detailed description of government trade, see Working Paper No. 7,
"SAM2 and Documentation, Government Trade Sector," DRTPC, Cairo
University 1982.
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indicated in the columns of this intersection. For example, domestically
produced private agricultural goods have the same price at "farm gate".
However, half of these goods can be assumed to be sold at subsidized prices
through the government-trade apparatus and the remainder at prices not
affected by indirect taxes. In this case, the subsidy would show as a
negative element at the intersection of the government-trade row with
government-trade agricultural private commodity column (-T9. 3 7 ), while there
would be no entry in that same row intersecting with nongovernment-traded
commodities (T9.6 4 - 0). Because of the subsidy entry added in the
government-trade column, this commodity becomes cheaper in comparison to the
same commodity found in the nongovernment commodity column. This is the basic
principle through which government-traded subsidies are identified
conceptually in SAM2. Actual government-traded subsidies can be read from
Table 5.Al. However, in addition to the price difference between government-
traded and nongovernment-traded commodities arising as a consequence of
subsidies imposed on government-traded commodities, there are other sources of
price differences between those two types of commodities. These additional
differences arise from different rates of indirect taxes imposed on both
commodities. Actual rates of indirect taxes are indicated in row 91 in Table
5.A1.
This description of SAM2 and its tax account gives the basic
information about the organization of the tax data needed for implementing the
general equilibrium model developed above. Because SAM 2 has been constructed
for several other purposes, its basic disaggregation is much larger than
needed for the model's application. The model used in this section has the
same basic specifications, assumptions, and accounting framework as the second
version of the model presented above. The only difference is that instead of
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a hypothetical two-sector SAM, a nine-sector SAM for Egypt is used. However,
because the SAM2 includes several additional accounts (rest of the world,
capital account, companies, government, etc.), several modifications of the
original SAM2 had to be made to derive a version of SAM2 that can fit the
accounting structure of the model as presented in Table 4.2a (Chapter IV).
These modifications include a two-stage aggregation of the accounts, which are
not needed in disaggregated form for the model application. These steps are
described in Appendix 3, including presentation of intermediate versions of
the aggregated SAM2 (Table 5.A2, and Table 5.A3).
Empirical Analysis of Tax Incidence in Egypt
Table 5.la presents a base SAM for the application of the general
equilibrium model to the Egyptian data. The basic accounting structure of
this SAM corresponds exactly to the accounting structure of the SAM presented
in Table 4.2c (Chapter IV). Both SAMs include one factor account, including
labor and capital; one institution account, including urban and rural
households; two accounts for activities--net and gross; the commodity account;
and the tax account. The only difference between the two SAMs is that the SAM
presented in Table 5.la includes nine sectors for activities and commodities
instead of two sectors. Another difference between these two SAMs is that the
SAM in Table 5.la includes an additional account--consolidated government--
which is not part of the SAM presented in Table 5.1a. This consolidated
government account, row and column 33 (Table 5.la), includes aggregation of
rows and columns of the SAM2 capital account, government account, and the rest
of the world account. A procedure for derivation of this account is described
in detail in Appendix 3.
Table 5.1n
Aggregated SAM2 for Egypt (A Base SAM)
PRINT OF NATRIV
I I 1 1 2 1 4 5 6 7a 9 I
-.......- ....................... .......-.....-....-------.-----..--- *--*--*------
I I I FACTnRS FACTORS INST, INST, NETPAC NETwAC NETAC NETYAC NET.AC I
I I I LAROR CAPITAL URRAN RURAL. AGRICULT FOODPROS TEXTILES OTwINDU ELECTRIC I
I I I FACTURS LAROR I
I 2 I FACTURS CAPITAL I
1 3 I INST, URRAN 1 4072230' 157A742' 21000.
4 AINST, RUP L I 1506175 2314360., 28700.
I 5 1 NET-AC AGRICIJI T I
I 6 1 NET-AC FUrnDPRnS II 7 I NFT-AC TLXTII.FS I
A I NE T-AC OTH-4TnU I
I 9 1 N4 T-AC ELFCTRyC I
I 10 1 NE T-AC CUNSTHRIC II 1 I NE T-AC UItPRIUr, I 
-
I 12 I NE T-AC TRANjSl~n, II 13 1 NF T-AC SERVICFS I
I 14 I GPUSS-AC AGRICUt T I
15 1 GpUsS-AC FUnnPPnS I
I 16 I GPUSS-AC TEf.TTLFS I
1 17 1 GPRSS-AC UTH-INnU I
i18 I GPUSS-AC ELFCTrTC I *
t 9 I GP-JSS,-AC CONSTRiiC I
I 20 1 GPIJSS-AC UILPRui, I
I 21 I GwiSS-AC TkANS N, I I
122 1 GPUSS-AC SEPVICFS I -
I 23 I C(MHUDIT AGRICUI T I 715930, fi9651I
I 24 I C rimuu)I T FunoP riS 1 1090596, 9?3647t
I 25 1 CfoMuDIT TEXTILFS I 501445, 373679II 26 I COMMUDIT UTH-INnU I 493007, 2421681I 27 1 CfnMltUDIT ELFCTR4TC I p3R83, 14391,
1 28 I C01O'UDIT CONSTRC I
I 29 1 C rOMMUDIT (ILPRin, I - 137424, 82806I
1 30 ! CtMmUDIT TRANSO, I 153955, 29107.
1 31 1 CrinT SERVICFS I 783488, 301675.I 32 I IND, TAXLS 2 00, 4 9,, I
1 33 1 CONS, GUvFmJMT 1 86500: 4101100. 2744134, 1436493. 100980, 448990, 129270, 524037, 14300. 1
I 34 I CAPITAL AGRICIJIT I 2049300,
I 35 I CAPITAL FlJOPRnS 111736
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The reason for the inclusion of this account into the SAM in Table
5.la is that the original SAM2 for Egypt (or any SAM) includes rest of the
world, capital, and government accounts. Because actual SAMs are balanced by
representing all of the interactions in an economy, including foreign trade
and capital accumulation, it is impossible to derive a SAM for the domestic
economy only without unbalancing the basic accounting structure and
consistency of the SAM framework. Thus, in order to keep the accounts of the
Egypt SAM balanced, and to derive an accounting structure of the Egypt SAM
which is consistent with the accounting structure of the model, the rest of
the world, capital, and government accounts were aggregated into a single
"consolidated government" account. However, because the basic assumptions of
the extended Harberger model presented in Chapter IV exclude foreign- trade and
capital accumulation, an additional assumption was made to apply the model to
the Egypt SAM data. This additional assumption of the model is that the SAM
entries for the rest of the world, capital, and government accounts
(consolidated government) are treated as constant shares of the column
accounts of the SAM.
This is the only additional assumption of the model that was
necessary'to apply the extended Harberger model to an actual SAM data
framework. In all other respects, the analytical and accounting structure of
the model applied below to the Egyptian SAM data, stays the same as that of
the model applied to a hypothetical SAM in section 2 of Chapter IV. As
discussed in Chapter IV, a disaggregation of the SAM accounts does not change
the basic structure or the mathematical solution of the model. Therefore, the
basic equations of the model presented in Chapter IV apply also to the model
presented here.
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For the clarity of presentation, the basic assumptionsL/ of the
second version of the model are summarized as follows:
(1) perfect competition in factor and product markets;
(2) fixed aggregate factor supplies;
(3) full employment of factors;
(4) no accumulation;
(5) fixed technology;
(6) closed economic system;
(7) fixed stock of capital (or land) is assumed in each sector;
(8) household incomes are spent on commodities in constant proportions;
and
(9) entries of the consolidated government account are treated as
constant shares of the economic activity.
This model is applied to the SAM for Egypt, 1979 (Table 5.la) in
order to analyze some aspects of indirect taxation in Egypt. These aspects
and empirical analysis of the results are presented in detail in the next part
of this chapter.
Analysis of the Distributional Effects of Indirect Taxes and Subsidies in
Egypt
Four experiments are performed with the model. In the first
experiment, the existing indirect taxes are increased by removing the existing
commodity subsidies. The existing indirect taxes are replaced with the
existing subsidies in the second experiment. In the third experiment,
selective commodity taxes are levied on necessities. Finally, in the last
experiment, distributional implications of alternative allocation patterns of
1/ The major limitations of these assumptions are discussed in Chapter IV.
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tax revenues to households are analyzed. These experiments are chosen for two
main reasons. One of these is to test the sensitivity of the model's results
(a direction of changes in relative prices and incomes) with respect to
different indirect tax and subsidy rates. The other reason for choosing these
particular experiments is a concern with the impact of domestic subsidies and
indirect taxes on income distribution. However, as shown in the following
sections, domestic subsidies in Egypt have an approximately neutral effect on
real incomes of urban and rural households. As demonstrated by the third
experiment, this is so primarily because domestic subsidies in Egypt are not
concentrated on necessities, which are consumed more heavily by rural
households. These issues are explained in more detail for each experiment in
the following sections.
(a) Increase in Indirect Taxes by Removing Existing Commodity Subsidies
This section presents an analysis of the distributional effects of
subsidies levied on domestic commodities in Egypt. In the first experiment
with the model, existing commodity subsidies are removed. This is achieved by
subtracting the existing commodity subsidies from the existing net indirect
commodity taxes. Values for both, net indirect taxes and commodity subsidies
were obtained from SAM2. Table 5.lb below presents the existing and changed
tax structure for the purpose of this analysis. Column 1 of Table 5.lb was
obtained from Table 5.la, the intersection of row 32 (indirect taxes) with
commodity columns 23 to 31 of the SAM. Column 2 of Table 5.lb below presents
percentage rates of the existing net indirect taxes. As this table shows, the
structure of commodity taxes in Egypt is very diverse, ranging from very high
tax rates levied on oil products (0.34) to negative tax rates levied on
textiles, other industries, and the construction sector.
Table 5.lb
Structure of Commodity Taxes and Subsidies in Egypt
1 23 4 5 6
Existing Commodity Taxes New Commodity Taxes
Net indirect taxes Subsidies (Elimination of subsidies)
COMMODITIES Absolute % of gross Absolute Z Absolute Z
value output 1/ value value
23 Agriculture 14,085 0.32 -8,236 -0.19 22,323 0.51
24 Food proc. 111,282 4.23 -3,319 -0.13 114,601 4.35
25 Textiles -40,266 -2.37 -50,600 -2.91 10,334 0.61
26 Other ind. -6,178 -0.24 -59,848 -2.26 53,670 2.07
27 Electricity 1,135 0.82 - - 1,135 0.82
28 Construction -14,988 -0.88 -35,041 -2.01 20,053 1.17
29 Oil products 206,300 34.41 -40,000 -6.25 246,300 41.01
30 Transport. 55,480 8.74 -27,500 -3.83 82,980 13.08
31 Services 39,434 1.34 -41,235 -1.37 80,669 2.71
Percentage rates are rounded for the purpose of this table. To achieve an exact
solution of the model, as demonstrated in Table 5.la (where all prices are equal
to unity in the base run), tax rates are calculated to ten decimal points.
Source: SAM2.
1/
I
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Commodity subsidies are presented in row 3 of the same table. These
were obtained from the original SAM2 (Table 5.A1), cells T T9.37' 9.38
(government-trade subsidies), and cells T to T9 1 .7 2  (nongovernment-
traded subsidies). The existing subsidy rates are presented in column 4 of
Table 5.1b. These differ substantially with respect to each commodity in a
similar way as the net indirect tax rates.
New indirect tax rates are entered in column 5 in Table 5.lb These
indirect taxes were obtained by subtracting values in column 3 from values in
column 1. The removal of existing subsidies, as calculated in Table 5.1b,
means an increase of the net indirect taxes for the amount of subsidy levied
on a particular commodity. New tax rates, which are a basis for this
experiment, are presented in column 6 in Table 5.1b. These new tax rates are
then used as exogenous variables to solve the model.
Main data parameters (exogenous variables) for this experiment are
summarized as follows.
(i) existing net indirect taxes levied on the nine commodities are:
0.32, 4.23, -2.37, -0.24, 0.82, -0.88, 34.41, 8.74, 1.34 %;
(ii) new commodity tax rates for the nine commodities are:
0.51, 4.35, 0.61, 2.07, 0.82, 1.17, 41.01, 13.08, 2.17 % of gross
output; and
(iii) c - 0.61, (1-c) = 0.39: this means that tax revenues are allocated to
households in proportion to income. Urban households receive a
proportion (c), and rural households a proportion (1-c) of total tax
revenues, respectively.
The solution of the model for new commodity prices, factor prices,
and the level of output is presented in Appendix 4, Table 5.B1 (page 1), rows
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23 through 31. These values are also presented in a summary form in Table
5.lc below. As this table shows, all commodity prices increased due to the
increase in indirect tax rates. For example, the new price of oil products is
equal to 1.059, which is an increase of 5.9 percent on the initial price. The
price of oil products increased more than that of other commodities because of
the high subsidy rate (-6.25) previously levied on oil products. New prices
for capital are presented in rows 34 to 42 in the same table. The return to
capital increased in agriculture, food products, and electricity, in relation
to the return to labor and capital in other sectors, because tax rates for
these commodities increased at a lower rate compared to other commodities. On
the other hand, the return to capital decreased in relative terms for
commodities that were previously subsidized at a higher rate; for example, in
transportation, textiles, other industries, etc. All price changes are
relatively small, since indirect taxes were not changed drastically.
The immediate impact of the reduction of subsidies, by raising
indirect taxes and, consequently prices of commodities, can be expected to
drive up the cost of living for all consumers. The heaviest burden will fall
on consumers who devote a larger share of their budget to products whose
prices increased more in relation to other commodities. Changes in real
incomes, due to a tax increase on the uses side for urban and rural
households, are calculated using the same equations as in Chapter III, and
sections 1 and 2 of this chapter. These calculations are presented in Table
5.lc below.
As indicated in this table, with an original income of LE 6673,462,
urban households lose LE 107,804, or about 1.6 percent of their initial
income. On the other hand, rural households with an original income of LE
4321,487 lose LE 75,224, or about 1.7 percent of their initial income on the
- 168 -
Table 5.lc
Changes in Uses of Incomes for Urban and Rural Households
Urban households Rural households
A/ A1 ?X XT
, I h AP
COMODITY uh 1 rh i- x
0.01855
23 Agriculture 1.01855 737,668 -13,434 922,931 -16,808
1-- 0.01749
24 Food proc. 1.01749 1123,710 -19,316 950,856 -16,345
j25 Textiles 0.04644 516,670 -22,929 384,687 -17,072
_ .... 1_04644
i26 Other ind. 0.03217 508,904 -17,072 249,302 -11,064
L 1.03217
0.01211 24,608 -294 14,815 -17727 Electricity 1. 01211 _____________ ______________
' nstruction 0.01856 -28 Const 1.01856 _____________ ______________
29 Oil Products 0.05895 141,597 -7,876 85,245 -4,741
1.05895 9741
30 Transport. 0.04453 158,630 -6,763 29,964 -1,2771.04453
31 Services 0.02556 807,277 -20,120 310,562 -7,740
1.02556
ITotal AYuh " -107,804 AYrh -75,224
for commodities 23 to 31 were obtained from Table 5.B2 (Appendix IV),
p. 2, intersection of rows
X' (s) are obtained in therh
23-31 with colunmns 3 and 4.
same way as Xuh
1/ I'
- uh
i
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uses side. This means that a reduction of subsidies levied on domestic
commodities (an increase in indirect taxes for the amount of subsidies) has a
neutral effect on the uses side of income for urban and rural households.
In this model, the sources of income for urban and rural households
are affected by changes in factor prices and by the increase in tax revenues,
in the same way as demonstrated in section 2 of Chapter IV. The new incomes
for urban and rural households can be found in Table 5.Bl (Appendix 4) as the
sum of rows or columns 3 and 4. The incomes of urban households on the
sources side increased from the original LE 6673,461 to LE 6876,089, an
increase of LE 202,626, or 3 percent of their initial income. On the other
hand, the incomes of rural households increased from LE 4321,487 to LE
4448,788, an increase of LE 127,301, or 2.9 percent of their original
income. In this experiment, the values for the exogenous coefficients c and
(1-c) equal 0.61 and 0.39, respectively- This means that tax revenues are
distributed to households as direct transfers in proportion to their income;
in the Egypt SAM2, this also coincides with the values of actual government
transfers to these two household groups. Because of relatively small changes
in factor prices, especially the returns to capital in a new tax situation,
changes in incomes from the sources side are dominated by the the tax revenues
received. Consequently the sources-side effects are approximately neutral in
this case (3.0 and 2.9 percent).
The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
gives the following results.
Total changes in incomes:
Sources Uses Total
(1) Urban Households +202,626 (3.0%) -107,804 (1.6%) +94,822 (1.4%)
(2) Rural Households +127,301 (2.9%) -75,224 (1.7%) +52,077 (1.2%)
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The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
results in a slight gain for urban households whose real income increases by
1.4 percent, while the real income of rural households increases by 1.2
percent of their initial income. Taking into account the assumptions of the
model, the above result indicates that the removal of domestic commodity
subsidies in Egypt has an approximately neutral distributional effect with
respect to urban and rural households. However, in order to evaluate the
above result in light of different policy options, alternative tax changes
will be evaluated using the same model and the same basic assumptions.
Alternative tax changes are presented in the following sections, where the
distributional impact of the existing subsidies, selective commodity taxes,
and sales taxes are evaluated with the model.
(b) Decrease in Indirect Taxes by Replacing the Existing Indirect Taxes with
existing subsidies
In the second experiment with the model, the existing indirect taxes
are replaced with the existing subsidies. The subsidy rates are indicated in
columns 3 and 4 in Table 5.1b above. These subsidy rates were entered into
the SAM presented in Table 5.1a.
Main data parameters (exogenous variables) for this experiment are
summarized as follows.
(i) existing net indirect tax rates:
0.32, 4.23, -2.37, -0.24, 0.82, -0.88, 34.41, 8.74, 1.34 %;
(ii) new tax rates (existing subsidies):
-0.19, -0.13, -2.91, -2.26, - , -2.01, -6.25, -3.83, -1.37 %; and
(iii) c = 0.61, (1-c) = 0.39.
The results of the model for new commodity prices, factor prices, and
the level of output are presented in Table 5.2a below and in Table 5.B2
(Appendix 4). In contrast to the solution of the model for the first
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Table 5.2a
Changes in Uses of Incomes for Urban and Rural Households
Urban households Rural households
AP x' 1/h &P x rh &P
COMMODITY . uh Prh 1
0.03182
23 Agriculture 0.96818 671,960 22,084 846,708 27,828
0.06229
24 Food proc. 0.93771 1023,615 67,996 872,327 57,947
25 Textiles 0.03511 470,648 17,126 352,917 12,842
___________ 
0. 96489 ______ _____
26 Other ind. 0.04597 463,573 22,337 228,713 10210. 95403 ______ _____
27 Electricity 0.03778 22,416 880 13-,591 534
0.96622
28 Construction 0.01 _ _____
29 Oil Products 0.29199 128,984 53,194 78,205 32,252
0.70801
30 Transport. 0.11379 144,500 18,553 27,490 3,530
0.88621
31 Services 0.05416 735,369 42,108 284,913 16,314
0.94584
Total Ayuh +244,278 
-Yrh +162,268
X' for commodities 23 to 31 were obtained from Table 5.B2
uh p. 2, intersection of rows 23-31 with columns 3 and 4.
Xrh(s) are obtained in the same way as X' .r uli
(Appendix IV),
i
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experiment, where all commodity prices increased, all commodity prices
decrease when the existing indirect taxes are replaced by pure subsidies. The
largest price decrease occurs in the oil sector, i.e., P = 0.708, a29
decrease in oil prices of 29 percent of the initial price. This happens
because relatively high indirect taxes levied on the oil sector (0.34) were
replaced with a relatively high subsidy rate (-6.25%). The next largest price
decrease occurs in the transportation sector, because this sector has the
second largest existing tax and subsidy rate. While commodity prices decrease
in a new tax situation, prices for capital increase in relation to wage
rate. This could be expected, as subsidies cause an increase in the return to
capital in the same way as taxes decrease the return to capital, as
demonstrated in Chapter III.
Changes in real incomes due to subsidies (decrease in commodity
taxes) for urban and rural households on the uses side of income are presented
in Table 5.2a below. With an original income of LE 6673,462, urban households
gain LE 244,278, or about 3.6 percent of their initial income on the uses
side. This result shows that if the existing net indirect taxes were replaced
with the existing commodity subsidies, the distributional effects would be
minimal from the uses side of income. This is so primarily because the
subsidies levied on domestic commodities in Egypt are not concentrated on
necessities, but are spread more equally on goods for which the consumption
patterns between urban and rural households do not differ substantially. For
example, the lowest rate of domestic subsidies is levied on the agriculture
and the food processing sector, the commodities for which consumption patterns
differ the most. On the other hand, the highest level of subsidy is levied on
oil products, for which consumption patterns between the two household groups
do not differ according to the SAM data (Table 5.1a). To test the sensitivity
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of the model's results with respect to consumption patterns, the next
experiment evaluates the distributional effects of a selective increase in
taxes for agriculture and food processing.
On the sources side, incomes of urban and rural households are
affected in the opposite direction from the previous experiment, because of
the decline in the tax revenues. Incomes of urban households decrease from
the original LE 6673,461 to LE 6263,598, a decrease of LE 409,863, or 6.1
percent, and rural incomes decline from the initial LE 4321,487 to LE
4081,376, a decrease of LE 240,111, or 5.5 percent. The combined tax
incidence is presented in the table below.
Total changes in incomes:
Sources Uses Total
(1) Urban Households -409,863 (6.1%) +244,278 (3.6%) -165,585 (2.5%)
(2) Rural Households -240,111 (5.5%) +162,268 (3.8%) -77,843 (1.8%)
The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
results in a larger loss for urban households, whose real income decreases by
2.5 percent, while real income of rural households decreases by 1.8 percent of
their initial income.
(c) Selective Increase of Commodity Taxes Levied on Necessities
In the third experiment with the model, the existing indirect taxes
are kept the same in all sectors except in agriculture and food processing,
where 6 percent tax rates are levied on these two commodities. This
experiment is performed for the purpose of evaluating the distributional
effects which would arise from taxing necessities. Both agricultural and
food-processing products are consumed more heavily by rural households than by
urban households. For example, the average consumption propensity for
agricultural products is 0.207 for rural households and 0.107 for urban
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households: and for food processing products, the respective coefficients are
0.224 and 0.163. By raising commodity taxes for these two products, it can be
expected that the heaviest burden of the increase in the cost of living (price
increase) will fall on the poorer people (rural households), who devote a
larger share of their budget to these subsistence items.
Main data parameters (exogenous variables) for this experiment are
summarized as follows.
(1) existing net indirect tax rates:
0.32, 4.23, -2.37, -0.24, 0.82, -0.88, 34.41, 8.74, 1.34 %;
(ii) new tax rates:
6.'00, 6.00, -2.37, -0.24, 0.82, -0.88, 34.41, 8.74, 1.34 %; and
(iii) c = 0.61, (1-c) = 0.39.
The results of the model are presented in Appendix 4, Table 5.B3 and
in a summary form in Table 5.3a. Because of the tax changes, all commodity
prices increased. The largest increases can be observed for agriculture, a 5
percent increase in the initial price, and for food processing, a 4.1 percent
increase in the initial price. Price increases for other sectors are
relatively small (1 percent), with negligible intersectoral differences.
While the commodity prices increased for the two sectors, the return to
capital decreased for these two sectors due to the tax increase. The price of
capital for other sectors remained approximately the same as that in effect
before the tax change. These results are presented in Table 5.3a.
Changes in real incomes for urban and rural households, on the uses
side, are presented in Table 5.3a below. With their original income of LE
6673,462, urban households lose LE 109,470, or about 1.6 percent of the
initial income. Rural households, who consume a larger proportion of the
products for which taxes were increased, lose LE 106,116, or about 2.5 percent
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Table 5.3a
Changes in Uses of Incomes for Urban and Rural Households
for commodities 23 to 31 were obtained from Table 5.B3 (Appendix IV),
p. 2, intersection of rows 23-31 with columns 3 and 4.
Vr(s) are obtained in the same way as Xu
rh uh
Rural householdsUrban households
1 uhP VX' X1h~x I uh API rh, APCOMMODITY uh F rh X
23 Agriculture 0.05046 739,320 -35,514 923,710 -44,371
1 0.0542
24 Food proc. 1.04124 1126,227 -44,606 951,659 -37,692
25 Textiles 0.01608 517,828 -8,194 385,012 -6,093
1.01608 _____________________________
26 Other ind. 0.01345 510,044 -6,768 249,512 -3,311
1.01345
27 Electricity 0.01371 24,663 -333 14,827 -201
1. 1_3_7 1 1
28 Construction 0.00905 - -1.00905
29 Oil Products 0.01439 141,919 -2,013 85,317 -1,210
1 1.01439
30 Transport. 0.01289 158,985 -1,991 29,990 -376
1.01289
31 Services 0.01258 809,086 -10,051 310,824 -3,862
_ 1.01258
Total uh - -109,470 AY rh -106,116
uh
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of their initial income. This result shows that, in this case, the
distributional e*fects of selective commodity taxes are not neutral because
the taxes were increased for subsistence commodities. As could be expected, a
larger burden of taxes falls on rural households who devote a larger share of
their income to the taxed commodities.
On the sources side, the incomes of urban households increase by 3.2
percent and that of rural households by 3.0 percent of their initial income,
due to an increase in tax revenues.
The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
is presented in the following table.
Total changes in incomes
Sources Uses Total
(1) Urban Households +218,031 (3.2%) -109,470 (1.6%) +108,561 (1.6%)
(2) Rural Households +131,060 (3.0%) -106,116 (2.5%) +24,944 (0.5%)
The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
results in a larger gain for urban households. The income of urban households
increases by 1.6 percent of their initial income, while rural households gain
only 0.5 percent of their initial income.
(d) Distributional Implications of Alternative Allocation Patterns of Tax
Revenues to Households
In this experiment with the model, tax revenues are allocated to
urban and rural households in the first case in proportion to income, and in
the second case in proportion to population (per capita allocation). In both
cases, the existing commodity taxes are replaced by a uniform sales tax of 5
percent. In the same way as discussed in section 2 of this Chapter IV, in
order to change the allocation of tax revenues to households, coefficients
c and (1-c) of the model have to be changed exogenously. The tax revenues are
received by households in the SAM (Table 5.la) from column 32, rows 4 and 5.
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In all of the above experiments, tax revenues were allocated to households in
proportion to income, i.e., c = 0.61, and (1-c) = 0.39. When tax revenues are
allocated on a per capita basis, these coefficients are c = 0.558 and (1-c) =
0.442 for urban and rural households, respectively-l/
Main data parameters (exogenous variables) for this experiment are
summarized as follows:
(1) existing net indirect tax rates:
0.32, 4.23, -2.37, -0.24, 0.82, -0.88, 34.41, 8.74, 1.34 %:
(11) new tax rates are the same in both cases, i.e.:
5.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0 %;
(iii) in the first case,
c - 0.61, and (1-c) - 0.39 and
(iv) in the second case,
c = 0.558, and (1-c) = 0.442.
The distributional effects for the first case (allocation of tax
revenues in proportion to income) are presented in Table 5.4a below and in
Table 5.B4 in Appendix 4. The results for the second case (per capita
allocation) are presented in Table 5.4b below and in Table 5.B5 in Appendix 4.
The combined tax incidence from the sources and uses of income side
is summarized for both cases in the two following tables.
Total changes in incomes
(first case)
Sources Uses Total
(1) Urban households +452,422 (6.7%) -201,567 (2.9%) +250,855 (3.7%)
(2) Rural households +299,157 (6.4%) -162,075 (3.7%) +137,082 (3.2%)
1/ The source for the per capita coefficients: K. Ikram (1980).
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Changes in Uses
Table 5.4a
of Incomes for Urban and Rural Households
Urban households Rural households
x I h AP X' h APCOMMODITY uh P1 X rh "i x
23 Aricuture 0.0669123 Agriculture 1.06691 764,466 -47,943 958,583 -60,116
24 Food proc. 0.05050 1164,532 -55,973 987,587 -47,475
____________ 1. 05050 ______
25 Textiles 0.11244 535,440 -54,120 399,547 -40,3841. 11244 __ _ _ _ _ _ _______ ________ _____ ___
26 Other ind. 0.06661 527,391 -32,936 258,932 -16,170
1.06661
27 Electricity 1.03939 25,502 -966 15,387 -583
0 .05919
28 Construction 1.05091 - -
29 Oil Products 0.17201 146,741 +30,485 88,538 +18,3930. 82799 9
30 Transport. 0.00085 164,392 +1,398 31,122 +265
0.99915
31 Services 0.05221 836,604 -41,512 322,559 -16,005
1.05221
Total ' uh -201,567 AYrh " -162,075
for commdities 23 to 31 were obtained from Table 5.B4 (Appendix IV),
p. 2, intersection of rows
Xh(s) are obtained in the
23-31 with columns 3 and 4.
same way as X .
1/ uh
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Table 5.4b
Changes in Uses of Incomes for Urban and Rural Households
Urban households Rural households
A P Xt
AP X' uh AP I rh AP
COMOeDITY uh Ts-X rh F-- X
0.06823
23 Agriculture 068237974 -48,413 970,866 -62,011
0.05122
24 Food proc. 1.05122 1154,642 -56,259 1000,242 -48,736
'25 Textiles 0.11250 530,893 -53,685 404,667 -40,921
126 Other ind. 0.06615 522,912 -32,444 262,250 -16,271
1.06615 ._..-- --_- - --- - ------
127 Electricity 0.03897 25,286 -948 15,584 -461
1.03897. -- - - - -1- 0.05056--
28 Construction -- _-_ -
29 Oil Products 0.17243 145,494 +30,315 89,673 +18,6840.82757
30 Transport. 0.00184 162,996 +300 31,521 +58
0.99816
31 Services 0.05178 829,499 -40,837 326,692 -16,083
1.05178
Total Ah " -201,971 AYrh -165,741
1/ X' for commodities 23 to 31
p. 2, intersection of rows
X'h (s) are obtained in the
were obtained from Table 5.B5
23-31 with columns 3 and 4.
same way as Xuh
(Appendix IV),
i
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Total changes in incomes
(second case)
Sources Uses Total
(1) Urban households +391,905 (5.8%) -201,971 (3.0%) +189,934 (2.9%)
(2) Rural households +358,365 (8.3%) -165,741 (3.8%) +192,624 (4.5%)
As these tables show, the differences in price changes due to the
change in coefficients c and (1-c), which in turn affect the real incomes of
households from the uses side, are minimal. For that reason, tax burdens for
urban and rural households are similar on the uses side of income in both
cases, i.e., urban households lose 2.9 percent of their initial income in the
first case, and 3.0 percent in the second case. However, differences in the
effects from the sources side are substantial, i.e., rural households receive
proportionally more income in the second case (6.4 percent vs. 8.4 percent) at
the expense of urban households. This means that the results of the model on
the sources side of income are dominated by the allocation pattern of the tax
income. Consequently, total effects for different experiments have to be
evaluated under the same assumptions for the allocation of tax revenues to
households.
Analysis of the Results
The above experiments show, in the first instance, that domestic
commodity subsidies in Egypt play a minimal redistributive role with respect
to urban and rural households. The results of the model show that in both
cases, when the subsidies are removed or replaced with net indirect taxes, the
distributional effects of these two exercises are close to neutral. The
results would probably differ if more household groups were identified, thus
allowing for better intrasectoral income distribution data. However, as it
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appears from the third experiment, the distributional implications are
different when necessities (agriculture and food processing sectors) are taxed
(or subsidized) more heavily, relative to other sectors. In this experiment,
the real income of rural households declines to a larger extent than that of
urban households, due to the selective taxes levied on necessities. Taking
into account the fact that the domestic subsidies are not concentrated on
necessities in Egypt, and taking into consideration the results of the third
experiment, it can be concluded that the primary reason for the neutral
distributional effect of the domestic subsidies in Egypt is due to the
existing structure of these subsidies and the structure of indirect taxes
levied on domestic goods.
The fourth experiment with the model, on the other hand, shows the
importance of "who gets the tax revenues". When the tax revenues are
distributed to households on a per capita basis, as opposed to in proportion
to income, rural households benefit substantially on the sources side of
income. This could be expected; on the other hand, the results and the
experiment are rather crude and of a hypothetical nature. The primary reason
for this is due to data constraints, because the ratios in this SAM for the
allocation of tax revenues were assumed. To perform this experiment properly,
better data on the spending patterns of the government would be required.
These data could be obtained from the government accounts and from the
household budget survey, or by conducting special surveys, such as that
demonstrated by Meerman (1979) for Malaysia.
Several other experiments of a similar nature can be performed with
the model. Additional experiments with the model would depend primarily on
policy issues. Alternatively, the distributional effects of replacing value
added taxes, activity taxes, or commodity taxes of a similar or a different
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structure, or of generating similar total tax revenues, can be compared.
However, it should be noted that the results of the model's applications
should be analyzed while taking into consideration all of the restrictive
assumptions and limitations of the model. As discussed above, the model is
comparatively static and does not allow for evaluation of import tariffs and
export taxes. In this model, imports are treated in the same way as
complementary imports in an input-output table. Imports are assumed to be a
constant share either of final or intermediate consumption, a rather
restrictive assumption. Exports, government consumption, and capital
accumulation, including balance of payments deficit, are treated in a similar
way, i.e., as a constant share of the economic activity, thus practically
excluding the influence of these variables on the model's results. Leaving
out foreign taxes may be especially restrictive for Egypt, where relatively
large subsidies are levied on imported food products. Thus, these
restrictions, and the limitations of the assumptions of the model presented in
Chapter IV, should be taken into account when comparing the tax incidence of
domestic commodity taxes as illustrated above.
On the other hand, the above application, in spite of the data
limitations of this particular SAM and the rather restrictive assumptions of
the model, nevertheless shows the usefulness of the approach developed in the
previous chapters for tax incidence analysis. There are two major advantages
of the methodology presented. First, the approach allows for a general
equilibrium analysis of tax incidence as opposed to the partial static
equilibrium analysis used in the conventional empirical studies of fiscal
incidence. Second, by linking the SAM data base with the Harberger-type
models, it is possible, as shown above, to take advantage of a data base that
is readily available, consistent, and of a relatively good quality with
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respect to income distribution, consumption, and production structure, as well
as with respect to taxation. The SAM data base is in general better than any
other one used in the conventional empirical studies, especially for
developing countries and with respect to income distribution. It is possible
that this point has not been demonstrated to its full extent by using a
preliminary SAM2 for Egypt. This SAM was used as an example rather than as
the only possible alternative.
It should be noted that there is an increasing number of SAMs (over
15) that are being built for developing countries. Most of these SAMs contain
additional information on intrasectoral income distribution, regional
classification (Pyatt et. al. 1978: Pleskovic 1980), functional income
distribution, and so on, and could be used for a similar analysis. In this
sense, the methodology developed above is generally applicable to different
countries and is not limited to Egypt or to any country in particular. It is
obvious, however, that the results would differ each time that a different SAM
is used. The approach is also not limited to a particular SAM data base or to
the organization of an existing SAM. SAMs are a flexible tool, the accounts
of which can either be reorganized or their data improved by collecting more
data, or by using techniques for reconciliation and balancing. This pertains
to any SAM, including the SAM for Egypt, which is presently being
disaggregated to a greater extent.
Thus, from this perspective, the approach developed above should be
looked upon primarily as a first attempt to develop a general framework for
tax incidence analysis that could combine a modified Harberger model with the
advantages of a SAM data framework in order to improve both the data base and
the methodology of the conventional empirical fiscal incidence studies.
However, the first priority in the future should be focused towards an effort
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to modify some of the most restricive assumptions of the model, and to take
into account the full advantage of the SAM data base. As always, some of the
limitations will be more difficult to overcome than others. Several
improvements on the data side will be less difficult because of the recent
extensive experience with the SAM data framework in various developing
countries. A summary of the study and the recommendations for future research
are presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Summary and Recommendations for Future Research
In this study, the conventional empirical fiscal incidence studies
have been reviewed from a theoretical perspective, relevant policy
applications have been made, and a methodology for the improvement of these
studies has been proposed. The proposed methodology consists of linking (1) a
SAM data framework and (2) the Harberger (1962) general equilibrium model of
tax incidence.. As demonstrated by the study such an approach, in the first
instance, allows the data base of these studies to be improved considerably,
i.e., more and improved data can be obtained in this way. On the other hand,
some of the important theoretical considerations developed in the theoretical
tax incidence literature (such as general equilibrium analysis), so far
ignored in the conventional empirical studies, can in this way be incorporated
as a consistent part of the methodology of empirical tax incidence studies.
The underlying theory and concepts, the purpose, and the limitations
of the conventional empirical fiscal incidence studies are reviewed in Chapter
II. As discussed in this chapter, there are several limitations of these
studies. One of the major shortcomings of the conventional tax incidence
studies is that they do not take into account changes in relative prices that
are due to changes in taxes. Consequently, these studies evaluate the tax
incidence only from either the sources or uses side of income, thus limiting
the incidence to only partial responses of the economy (Devarjan et al.
1980). On the other hand, the expenditures incidence is largely
underdeveloped in theory and practice (McLure 1974, Meerman 1978). The
empirical studies of the expenditures incidence deal only with benefit
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incidence, leaving unresolved many important issues that affect the income
distribution of household groups from the spending (expenditures) side of the
government budget. The budget incidence studies combine the tax and
expenditures incidence under one concept, thus compounding the limitations,
which are similar for both types of studies in most cases. The second major
shortcoming of these empirical studies is due to the inadequate organization
and presentation of the statistical data used. The data of these studies are
especially inadequate with respect to income distribution. The theory and
concepts of these empirical studies are contrasted to the Harberger general
equilibrium model of the tax incidence. The Harberger model, in spite of its
limiting assumptions, provides a more accurate and a more general framework
within which many of the conceptual limitations of the conventional empirical
studies, such as their partial static equilibrium analysis, can be overcome
analytically as well as empirically.
In Chapter III, the assumptions of the conventional empirical tax
incidence studies are evaluated by usiig the SAM data framework and the
Harberger general equilibrium model. This model is at first written in a SAM,
presenting both the data and the model within the same accounting framework.
The model is then solved analytically and empirically using the SAM concept.
Then, four types of taxes: (1) selective commodity taxes, (2) selective
factor taxes, (3) general factor taxes, and (4) sales taxes are evaluated
analytically and empirically using a hypothetical SAM. As demonstrated by the
results of this approach, the assumptions of the conventional empirical tax
incidence studies are correct only for general factor and general commodity
taxes. On the other hand, the assumptions used in these studies for selective
commodity and factor taxes are incorrect, because they are based on a partial
equilibrium static analysis of the incidence. The approach shows the
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importance of considering the general equilibrium effects on both the sources
and uses side of income. Using a SAM model, the theoretical concepts of the
Harberger model are demonstrated explicitly within a data framework. The
usefulness of the SAM framework for the tax incidence analysis is similarly
demonstrated.
The methodology of combining the SAM framework with the Harberger
model is extended and modified in Chapter IV. There, the standard Harberger
model is modified in order to develop a methodology that can be applied to
actual SAM data. Because actual SAMs include interindustry transactions and
preexisting taxes, the model has been extended to include both of these. Two
versions of the modified Harberger model written in a SAM framework are
presented. The first version of the model uses the CD production function for
both value added and intermediate inputs. In the second version, the
production process is split into two parts. The net output is represented by
the CD production function, while the gross output is specified by using the
10 production function.
These two models are evaluated empirically using hypothetical SAM
numbers. The CD version is evaluated by two experiments. One of these
includes the input-output table, while in the other, interindustry flows are
excluded. The results of these two experiments show the effects of
interindustry flows on changes in relative prices. These change in the same
direction in both experiments. However, the magnitudes of the relative price
changes are different in the two cases, thus affecting real incomes of
institutions primarily from the uses side of income.
The second version of the model is applied to the actual SAM for
Egypt (SAM2) in Chapter V. In order to fit the accounting structure of the
model to the original Egypt SAM, several modifications of the SAM are
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needed. These modifications involve a reorganization and an aggregation of
the SAM accounts, resulting in an aggregate version of the SAM2 (Table
5.1a). This SAM and the model are then used to evaluate the distributional
implications of commodity subsidies and indirect taxes on the incomes of urban
and rural households.
As shown by the results, the domestic commodity subsidies have
approximately neutral effects on income distribution for urban and rural
households in Egypt. There are also minimal distributional effects when the
existing indirect taxes are replaced by a uniform sales tax. On the other
hand, the real income of rural households decreases to a larger extent, in
relative terms, for rural households compared to urban households when
selective taxes are imposed on necessities (agriculture and food
processing). In summary, the results of the model provide some insights into
the distributional implications that would arise from various changes in
domestic commodity taxes in Egypt. However, these results should be
interpreted with care, taking into account the restrictive and simplifying
assumptions of the model, as well as limitations due to data availability for
this particular (preliminary) SAM.
In summary the advantages of the methodology used in this study are
the following. First, the approach allows the analysis of the tax incidence
in a general equilibrium framework, taking into account changes in relative
prices of factors and commodities. In this way, the basic theoretical
principle of the tax incidence, i.e., a distinction between the tax incidence
on the sources and uses of household incomes, can be analyzed. Second, on the
data side, the approach takes into account several features of the SAM
framework. The data of any existing SAM can be used for the tax incidence
analysis, involving only minor modifications of the SAM accounts. An
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important feature of the SAM data framework is that when it is disaggregated
and when adequate data are available, it can include information on income
distribution, consumption patterns, and production structure, all of which are
essential for the tax incidence analysis. Another advantage of the use of the
SAM concept for the tax incidence analysis is that its accounting structure
facilitates compilation, organization, and presentation of the data on
taxation. In addition, the SAM concept facilitates an explicit expression of
the relationship between the accounting structure of the model and the
accounting structure of the data base. This guarantees consistency between
the model and the data base and helps in the analytical formulation of the
model.
The methodology of this study also has general limitations with
respect to some of its basic assumptions which need to be modified. The study
deals only with some aspects of the tax incidence, i.e., the methodology of
the fiscal incidence in empirical studies, and makes many simplifying
assumptions. Some of the basic assumptions, i.e., perfectly competitive
economy, fixed supply of factors, full employment, closed economic system, and
no accumulation are the same as of the standard Harberger model. Therefore,
the limitations of this model with respect to these assumptions are the same
as discussed in detail in Chapter II.
However, because in this study the standard Harberger model has been
modified in order to include interindustry transactions, preexisting taxes,
and accounts for foreign trade and capital, which are a part of the SAM data
base, additional assumptions had to be made. These assumptions are that
shares of foreign trade and capital account (including balance of payments)
are assumed to stay constant during the process of analysis. These
assumptions are restrictive, especially with respect to foreign trade.
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Because of this assumption, the model practically excludes the distributional
implications of import tariffs and export taxes which may be substantial,
especially in developing countries. For this reason, the first priority for
future research on this subject should be to modify this assumption.
The conventional tax incidence literature, including the Harberger-
type general equilibrium models, does not deal explicitly with the problem of
foreign trade. For example, even the most recent applications by tax-
incidence analysts deal only with the evaluation of domestic taxes (Ahmad and
Stern 1982; Ruggles 1980). On the other hand, the literature that deals
explicitly with foreign trade and taxation (export taxes and import tariffs)
is the "effective protection" literature. Ideally, the best approach to the
tax incidence problem would be to synthesize these two different approaches.
This has been outside the scope of this study, but the approach developed
above contains the necessary groundwork to achieve such a synthesis. In this
respect, one of the possible ways for incorporating the foreign trade as part
of the above methodology might be to use the approach developed in the
"effective protection" literature, and the approach suggested by Pyatt
(1982). The implicit model used in some studies on effective protection
(Balassa 1971) is an input-output model, where value added is estimated in the
absence of foreign taxes, i.e., these studies estimate what the value added
would be if foreign taxes were abolished. This approach could alternatively
be combined with the treatment of value added taxes in the SAM framework as
developed by Pyatt (1982). In his note on tax incidence, Pyatt developed a
simple input-output model In a SAM framework where commodity and activity
taxes are translated into value added taxes. Following his procedure, it is
possible to regard changes in value added, as derived in effective protection
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literature, as value added taxes, and to estimate tax incidence of value added
in a way similar to that set out in Chapter IV above.
Another critical assumption of the methodology, as applied in Chapter
V, is the assumption of consumer behavior. In this model, consumption
patterns of the household groups are kept constant during the analysis, thus
excluding the possibility of consumption response to price changes. This
assumption could be relaxed in the future, for example, by using the linear
expenditure system (LES) (Stone 1954, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) in order to
improve the formulation at the demand system.
Several additional improvements of the methodology could be achieved
from the data side. As discussed in Chapter V, a SAM for any country could be
alternatively used for tax incidence analysis usitg the approach developed in
this study. An immediate improvement could be achieved by disaggregating the
factor accounts and the institutional (households) accounts of a SAM. For
example, labor incomes, disaggregated by the educational level of workers,
could be mapped into household types distirguished by the occupational status
of the principal earner. Such disaggregations are possible, as demonstrated
by Pyatt et al. (1978) for Malaysia. An advantage of further disaggregation
of household groups is that better intrasectoral estimates of income
distribution can be obtained. Consequently, tax incidence could be estimated
for these groups, whose different incomes and consumption patterns would
influence the results. Along the same lines, it would also be desirable to
identify household capital incomes received from different sectors, thus
allowing sector-specific tax incidence from the sources side of (capital)
income to be taken into account for different household groups.
Aside from further disaggregtions of factors and households, various
other disaggregations are possible within the SAM framework. For example,
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activities and commodities can be disaggregated to any desirable level,
depending on data availability. Another useful classification of the SAM .data
base might be to use a SAM distinguished by regions. Regional SAMs have been
built for Malaysia, Pyatt et al. (1978) and Thailand, Pleskovic (1980). For
example, the Thailand SAM distinguishes two urban and two rural household and
factor groups, each distinguished by a particular region. By using such a
SAM, it would be possible to estimate tax incidence as it affects the
population (household) groups in different regions, thus allowing for an
explicit regional tax incidence analysis. However, in general, these
disaggregations and modifications of both a particular SAM and of the
assumptions of the model will depend primarily on policy issues and
development obiectives.
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APPENDIX 1
Derivation of the Equations (11) to (16)
To derive X , X , L , L
x y x y
following profit functions are used for X
Y , Y ,
x y
and Y:
K , and K , the
x y
Max: (P - t )X - P X - P Y - wL rK
with respect to
I
X , Y , L , and K
x x x x
Substituting for
(P - t )[A(L )
x x x
ax
ax
x
2 )3 44(K ) (X ) (Y ) ] - PX - PY - wL - rK
x x x x x y x x x
a a a a -1
- a3A(L ) (Ky) 2(Y) (X )
aX
(P - t )
xX
a X3
x
P =0
x
(P - t )a3X
x xP
tL
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agX
(P -t ) -
x x Yx
P =0V
(P - t )a X
xP y
(P - t )
a1X
L
x
w = 0
(P - t )cx X
L x w
aX
(P -t) - r = 0
x
(P 
- t )a2X
K =
x r
Max: (P -t )Y - P X -P Y -wL -rK
y y x y y y y y
with respect to
X , Y , L , K
y y y y
Substituting for Y,
(P - t )[A(L )
y y y
(K y) 2 (X )y
( -4(Y ) ] - PX - PY - wL - rKy xy y y y y
=x 03 B(Ly) (K y)2
y
83
(P - t ) x- P = 0
y X x
(P 
-t )83
y P
x
a 4 y
(P - t ) P = 0
y
( -y t y 4
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y y
SyY
-f -- w =0
L
(P - t )0 Y
wLy
82
(P - t ) -- r = 0
y K
- 198 -
(X ) 3-1 8x
y
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(P - t ) 2Y
K - r y
y r
Substituting for L , L , K , K , X , X , Y , and Y , in
equations (3) and (4), (7) and (8), and (9) and (10) obtained above, gives six
simultaneous equations:
L -L +
x
L
y
K K + K
x y
(P - t )a1 X
w
(P - t )a2X
r
(P - t )y Y
+ y yV
w
+
(P - t ) 2Y
r
cfa(wL) + b(rK)] + d[(1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] +
S (Px - t )a3 x (P - t )a 4 X
P
x
P
e(t X + t Y)
x y
X.
c[a(wL) + b(rK)] + d[(1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] +
=P xX - (P X- t x)a3x -(x - t )aX
e(t X + t Y)
x y
(1-c)[a(wL) + b(rK)] + (1-d)((1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)]
+ (1-e)(t X + t Y) -(P - t )a4x (P - t y 4
= Y - - ]
Py ry
(1-c)[a(wL) + (b(rK)] + (1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK)] + (1-e)(t + t Y)
x y
(14)
= P Y - (P - t )a X - (P - t ) 4y
(11)
(12)
(13)
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(P - t )a X (P - t )a X
(P -t )x - P x 3 ] ] (15)
x y
+ (P - t )a 1X + (P - t )a 2X
(P - t ) 3Y (P -t )04Y
(P - t)Y = PE ['~ 3 ]+ P [' 1 (16)(Pyty )y Ix py p
x y
+ (P - t )0 Y + (P 
- t )a2
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APPENDIX 2
Analytical Structure of the Second Version of the Model
A procedure for derivation of the equations of this model is similar
to the procedure used for the CD version of the model presented in section 1
above.
Consumption expenditures are defined in this model by the following
equations (notations are taken from the SAM in Table 4.2b.):
dY + eY = P (X - X - X) (from row 10 in Table 4.2b) (1)
uh rh 10 10 x y
(1-d)Y + (1-e)Y = P (Y - Y - Y ) (from row 11 in Table 4.2b) (2)
uh rh 11 11 x y
The equations (1) and (2) mean that the final demand is equal to the
intermediate demand plus the consumption demand by urban and rural households
for good X and Y . Values for X , X , Y , and Y indicate intermediate
x y x y
inputs in the same was as in the CD version of the model. Values for
Y and Y define incomes of urban and rural households. Coefficients
uh rh
d and e mean that urban and rural households spend proportions d and e
of their total income on good X , and (1-d) and (1-e) on good Y . Values
for P10 and P are market prices for commodities X and Y , and
X10 and Y1 1  are quantities of the two commodities.
Incomes of urban and rural households are derived from their
endowments of labor and capital in the same way as described in section 1 of
this chapter. Urban households receive a proportion 'a' of total labor
income, and a proportion 'b' of total capital income. Rural households
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receive the remaining shares, i.e., (1-a) and (1-b). In addition to factor
incomes, both households receive income from indirect taxes in the form of
transfer income. Urban households receive a proportion 'c' and rural
households a proportion (1-c) of total indirect tax revenues. Taking into
account these definitions, urban and rural household incomes are defined as
follows:
Yuh = a(wL) + b(rK) + cY t
Y =rh - (1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK) + (1-c)Yt
(from row 4)~L/
(from row 5)
w = wage, r = price of capital,
Yt = (t6 X6 + t7Y7 + t8 X8 + t 9Y9 + t10 10 + t 1 1Y 1 1 ) = tax 
revenue (from row 3)
Substituting for Yuh and Yrh in equations (1) and (2) gives
demand equations for commodities X10 and Y ,
d[a(wL) + b(rK) + c(t6 6 + tY7 + 8 tX+ t Y + t10 10 + t Y )] +
+ e[(1-a)(wL) +(1-b)(rK) +(1-c)(t6 6 + t7Y7 + t8 X 8 + t9Y9 + t 1 0 X1 0 +t Y X =
- P (X -x - X )10 10 x y
Rows and columns in parentheses refer to the SAM in Table 4.2b.
(3)
where: and
1/
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(1-d)[a(wL) + b(rK) + c(t6X 6 + t7Y7 + t8X8 + t9Y9 + t10X 10 + t1 1 Y1 1)] +
+ (1-e)[(1-a)(wL) + (1-b)(rK) +
+ (1-c)(t6 X6 + tY7 + t 8X + t Y + t1 X10 + t Y )] =
= P1 (Y - Y - Y) (4)
On the supply side, prices and quantities for expenditures by
activities and commodities are determined by the following equations:
P6 6 wL + rK + t6 X6 (from column 6) (5)
P Y = wL + rK + t X (from column 7) (6)
7 7 y y 7 7
where P6 and P represent net output prices, and where production
functions for X6 and X7 are equal to
X6 = A(Lx) a (1-a) (7)
a, b > 0
Y7 - B(L ) (K ) (8)
Values for P6 and P7 can be obtained from the SAM in a
generalized form by expressing columns of the SAM as before- and after-tax
price equations and rows of the SAM as quantity equations. Price equations
for P6 and P can therefore be obtained in the same way as demonstrated in
Chapter 3 above.
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Columns 6 and 7 of the net activities account can be written as:
1-a 1-a j $i(..
0P
a ( t)ji 0 a + 1+0)(t) 1
where a is the value of a in the base period, derived from To (inii ij
this case aj = a , (1-a) , and S, (1-s) ;ij
a is a parameter (elasticity of substitution), in this case,
because of Cobb-Douglas assumptions, a = 1 , and lim P ;
a +1
0 (T) is a tax rate in period T
This model assumes fixed aggregate factor supply, so that
L = L + L
x y
K- = K + K
x y
assumed
P are
(from row 1) (9)
(from row 2) (10)
However, as discussed above, in this model fixed stock of capital is
in each sector, which means that the price equations for P6 and
derived in the following way:
Activity
Wages
Capital
Tax
E
X
aV
x
(1-a)V
OV
x
(1+I0)V
aP6X 6
= (1-a)P
6 X 6
S t6 x6
= (1+t6 )P6 X6
I
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aV - wL
x x
X = ALa K1-a
x x
V = XHI
x x
x
where 11
x
is the price of value added net of taxes
= wL
x
wL
x X
V -- L
x a x
Vx
x
a
wL ____
a 1-a - 1-a
aAL K aAK
w La wa x a
1-a
x a 1-a
x
P6 = (1+ t6 6
6H6 x
6
6
. (Const.) w
(Const.) (
a
X)
AK
1
-a
x
a V
x= ( ) (
a H AK
x x
(Const.) wa 1-aX
a V
x
0
x
1-a
V 1-a
V0
x
P
x
aXiH
x
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For' the rest of the columns (8, 9,
equations determine gross output prices and
P88 8 6+ P  + P10 x + P Y
P9Y = t X + P7Y7 + P10 Xy 11 y Y
P10 10 = 10 10 + P 8X8 + P 9X
P11X = t Y + P Y
10, and 11), the following
commodity prices:
(from column 8)
(from column 9)
(from column 10)
(from column 11)
The above equations can be expressed in a generalized form as
1-a
aj ( ) + a (ij )
1-a
+ 1 (T)
+ ( i+ ) (T
The definition of the terms in these equations is the same as for columns 6
and 7. However, for columns 8, 9, 10, and 11, input-output specifications are
assumed. Consequently, a = 0, and the above equation can be expressed as
P 0 P 9 (T)
a (a) + ) +(
By normalizing the wage rate to one and using the above specifications, the
model can be solved in the same way as the CD version of the model. In this
model, variables a , b , c , d , e , a , a2 * 01 and a2 are obtained
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
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from the base SAM as in the previous model. While prices for labor, capital,
and commodities are endogenously determined by the model, tax rates and the
allocation of the tax revenue to households, i.e., c , and (1-c) , are
exogenous variables. By changing these exogenous variables, the tax and
benefit incidence can be determined from the results of the model. This is
demonstrated numerically, first for a hypothetical SAM in section 2 of Chapter
4, and then in the next section for a SAM for Egypt, 1979.
t: H
0
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APPENDIX III
DERIVATION OF TABLE 5.la
AN AGGREGATION OF SAM2 ACCOUNTS
As discussed in the first part of Chapter V, 'everal modifications of
the original SAM2 (Table 5.A1) were necessary to derive a version of SAM2 that
fits the accounting structure of the model and of the aggregate SAM presented
in Table 5.1-a. These modifications consist of an aggregation of the capital
account, the rest of the world account, and the institutions account into one
consolidated account, "consolidated government". Table 5.la, a base SAM which
is used for the model's application, was derived from two major steps. The
first step is summarized in Table 5.A2, and the second step is presented in
Table 5.A3. Both steps are described in detail below.
The following accounts were aggregated to derive Table 5.A2. Rows
and columns 2 and 3 of the original SAM2 (Table 5.Al) were added to derive two
factors: one factor for capital and another for labor. Direct taxes, T93.4
to T9 3 8 , were added to "other government", row 12, and netted out in colum
93. These taxes were incorporated into the government account because the
model is designed for the analysis of indirect taxes only. The government
trade subsidies were removed from row 9 to row 92; at the same time, row 92
and column 92 (government trade) were eliminated in order to keep all
subsidies in one account. The companies account, rows and columns 6, 7, and
8, were aggregated into one row and one column in order to derive one account
for companies. The government accounts, rows and columns 10 to 13, were
aggregated to derive one row and one column for the government account. The
capital account, rows and columns 14 to 17, were aggregated to derive a
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consolidated capital account. Public and private activities, rows and columns
18 to 36 of SAM2, were aggregated to derive one account for activities
comprising nine sectors. Government-traded commodities were aggregated with
nongovernment-traded commodities to derive a one-to-one correspondence between
activities and domestic commodities. Imported and exported commodities were
aggregated into one row and one column for each of the two types of
commodities. The rows and columns of the tax' account, 91, 92, 94, and 95,
were aggregated into one row and one column to derive one account for indirect
taxes. Rows and columns 96 and 97 were aggregated into one row and one column
to derive one account for the rest of the world.
The result of these aggregations is presented in Table 5.A2. The
accounting structure of Table 5.A2 is one step closer to the accounting
structure of the model than the original SAM2. However, several additional
accounts exist in Table 5.A2 which are not part of the model's accounting
structure, i.e., the consolidated capital account, companies, rest of the
world, imported and exported commodities, and the government account. These
accounts are consolidated into one single account in Table 5.A3 by using the
same elimination procedure as above. This means that the rows and columns of
these accounts were added together into one row and one column. The resulting
SAM (Table 5.A3) consists of: two factors of production, labor and capital;
two institutions, urban and rural households; nine activities; nine
commodities: an indirect tax account: and a consolidated government account.
It should be noted that an additional modification distinguishes the SAM in
Table 5.A3 from the SAM in Table 5.A2. This modification involves the
distribution of indirect tax revenues to urban and rural households, instead
of allocating these revenues to the government account. This was achieved by
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subtracting the tax revenues from the government row, adding these revenues to
households in proportion to their income, and then rebalancing the SAM. The
end result is a balanced SAM, as presented in Table 5.A3. This SAM was then
used as a basis to derive the SAM presented in Table 5.la.
The SAM presented in Table 5.la is essentially the same as the SAM in
Table 5.A3. The only difference between the two SAMs is that the former is a
reorganized version of the latter. The SAM in Table 5.la was derived by the
simple procedure of dividing the activities account into two accounts, net and
gross activity accounts. This procedure requires the formation of block
diagonal matrices (make up matrix for activities). The same procedure was
used in section two of Chapter IV in order to derive Tables 4.2a and 4.2c.
Table 5.la coincides with the accounting structure of the model, whose
applications are developed in Chapter V.
Table 5.Al
PRINT OF MATRIr SAM 2 for Egypt
I I I 1 2 3 4
... ........... 
-
I FCT.PRO FCT.PROD FCT.PRnn 1usT.CIIA INST.CUA INST.CUA INST*CUA INST-CUA INSTeCUA I
z 1 C LAROUR tAPITAL LAND MtII3EHnL IOUSEOL PRIVATE PURCOMPA PUBCOMPA GOVERNMT I
.I URBAN RURAL COMPANY E*G,P,C, OTHERS TRADE I
S CJ FCT.uROD LAROUR C
2 I FCT.PRUD CAPITA I 3
1 3 t FCT-PRUD LAND I
C 4 1 INST.CUA M'JoSEHnL tIIRAN 14072230; 1542242. 36500;, 21000. 10900, 9600. 162000.
I 5 1 INST-CUA HOOSEHnt RURAL 11506175. 20oa360% 270000. 28700% 4600,
I 6 C IN4ST-CUA PRIVAIr COmPANY I 417800, 1000, 99800
1 7 C PI.S.CUA PUHCOMA E..P.C. I 16370099800,
I 8 I 1jST-CUA PoliCoMpA fTHERS 1 2013700. 10200 29200 3200 58000.
C 9 I IST.uLA GUVrINwT THADF IL.IJ ILLkIV hihhATT10 I CNS T.CIu
11 1 INST.LUA
t2 i 1iSt.C'JA
[ 13 1 1.ST-CUA
II 14 I I S T--C A A
C 15 1 IvST.CAA
[ t6 1 N .C A A &
[ 17 I CNST-CAA
C in I R, .s
t 19 i ACTIVITY
1 20 C ACT!vClY
1 21 1 ACTIVITY
22 I ACTIVITY
1 23 C AtiTvIlY
C 24 1 ArTIvITY
C 25 C ACTIvCTY
1 26 1 ACTIVITY
1 27 C ArTIvIIY
C 28 1 AcTIVIIY
I 29 1 ACTIvITY
1 30 1 ACTIIVITY
I t 3 I AClivITY
1 32 1 ACTIVITY
I 33 1 ACTIVITY
I 34 C ACTIVIY
C 35 C ACTivily
36 I ArTIVItY
1 37 1 CU m#uoIT
I 39 C C04'UDI I
40 1 CM 14UD IT
1 et I CGrOl TI
I a2 I Ch.umD1T
C 3 1 Cn o l (6 fI
I 49 C C(Iou~Ii
I 45 1 C~ w li T
I 16 I COM-001 T
I 47 C CImM j oIT
1 48 C C0)0r ) 1T
s a9 1 CoMuk IT
...-... .... ... .
GO)V T COIv(.UvlClV
Gov I Co V
Stir IAL
HOuSE HnL
PikIVATr
ORALIC
C UVi R14MT
PRIVATF
PkIvATF!
PRIVATF
PRIV'lF
PRIVA Yr
PWIvATp
PR~v'Tr
PUALIC C
PU'BLIC
PURLICPUBLIC
PUrGL C
PURLIC
PU4LIC
P(1#L I CPostU VT~GuvT E 710
CL' V T P IM C
GOV ITD(wE
GUv T OIE
GOv I00ME
Cov T'0)E[
GOVTt) tm
Guv TLUoE
GUviIm60ov t I mE
GUVTIM p)
GvT4.(J
Ert A T TO
HEALTH
OTHERS
SEURITY
COuPANY
COMPANY
27000.II
I
I
I
AGRICULT I
FL0n0PRnS I
TExTILES I
DYiNOIIS I
ELrCTRTC I
ni PR)rIU I
CONSTRUlC I
THAUSCOM I
SEPvICFS I
ACRIC01LT I
FOTPROS I
ELECTRIC I
CUNSTRIEC I
nilPRonU I
THAIISCOM I
STvCCES I
A GQICliLT I
Fin.'PPOS I
t x T T.FS I
0TWINOI I
ELrCTRIC I
CiSTRiC I
(IL F'Rlfl I
TRANSlCOM I
SE PV I F.S I
AG.ICULT I
F0ipr0PRns I
TEXTILES I
OTRCNDus I
1000,
441100%
327707.
255162.
500,
718006
253316,
197245,
2823??.
672239
729000, 7207004
161400,
109000. 975100a
I
*ezsesa. I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
2s05' 29609.
77624. 661260
4 74
1R163,
t272'58.
10 ,
17735.
l04l46.
311. 163.
...............---- ------.--------------- 
we- ------------ W*---e
t--,
.............
.. ....... ...- ... .fl~t w " .......- w o a - w~
I
*~O6*OOO~*O@e6O* *b**bS600000U
*0013l3 :009105 00191l
090609 :16tlbO~i**O
e@@iq ;We1t
.go1bqz
IL616Z
'991?t
860L
OfuSqqg
tbefLi
Sbtlui105
!Sil?69
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
....~.OmUOO.66OOU**Oe
AlajhWN in INIQ6d
2dxsa lo0; z Rvs
£ IOLL~ 1g~qqs viUL I 9b
I IVNVM~x N140 .o"'li I LbI
0S1I 39JNY*1OE t 5Iuni w0%g I 9b
ILd3e11O t3Yv 1 S6I
I ~ 3Ul4iy slyVu I bb
I ~ ~ 1t 1USVS UdxA %]OII~ 1 16
I fl331Al3U QiJEJAbmd Ijjn,)M 3 I uS
£ U(d3,NYUJ ODX JA Ild LlfmU 1 6 tI
£ nUIiC iE'dd 11TUfl..ju~ I QU14W2 W
I IS N I J Vi 3lXA I d Ol-.4u) ItS
£ 3I13JlJ fldjI~d Ilr,,4 I 9V
I f 0 r I d C U i 01 J Xi A I l d I ' O I J -41 I S O
I' LlI dJY U
3
(3XNId I i1f.s.loi evI
2.3 9)ACIIC 04.IA1?ud I IGl.,1ti) 191
H U)t;Nfdi 05. 1A l~d I 1Irl..j3 09
I 1f1J~dd IIU Ui A141 I A1jnl.tA1 I 6LI
311 eii 4'0 (10.4 1 A 1?4 1 IUf..v )3 I tJL I
I 3lujl)Al li -tI J I Md I IcO.".U) I LL
S(41 a 1(JNIO () UdI j4j%14 I I 7CjCIla.,U) 1 91
I' I lIJA3L DOW I ?.Iufd II1}flo..U3 I st
1 Udost]U(I 0fl".I1A I ta Ia .I Onb--0
1 *1031091Y Ql~ IA I~ "d iuno.LJ I EL
ISflAdii6 3'A(,i.j A I d 1T1O.."1 I ZL
I UJV4 d f"l~jAl~d Ij *I.,,)3 I %I I lue~d ilL) 34flUIbd I I on,'u3 I OL
3H£ SUdfSNLJ) 3 " I t,18d I11 (111-03IJ 1 69
0 1110313 3"OtUA IHd I1VI'-,..U) I Vi
9
I
i cnflbU 3"flUAlbid L 1(I[)-P-t;3 1 L9
I 631I1AJL 3"'fl~?d 1100"1,(13 1 99
llCuud~n 3"rsuAIud LOIT~ ~Uj3 1 "9 1 SJfl~tl3S D 11flA~III IO 'Ji 1 f,9
H 6~s!,vbl oAX31ArV3ltil.. I LT I .,31Z
f) fU WjdI10O~j (i31 AI I! ITrh I I cr ,u31j
I3rlti Jli 04XJlA0!) I1(Jfl,...u o g
I I1NIHIU OduiIAflD £itflnvid) 9S
I iJlILXJL OuXJIAOS jbU()WU3 I ISI
I 11fl21] U'J IAfl!) II(hn.NUL I 55 I
I Silao3v O i.ILAno AJU I 05 on-- si
833A63 OdHILAnsl I iO~ir.u) £y ( 1
NUU;bi 06A2 I I A09 I £?O*t.U~ I JS I
i nuubdtuii OdNIIACIS llnwu3 Z$ 0 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
;-_ , Y
C14
1
Table 5.Al
PRINT Of MATRIj
SAM 2 for Egypt
I 10 11 , 12 , 1) . 4 15 16 IlT 18 19 20 21 22
.*- -- e-.e-e-.-.....-..--...... ----........-..-............................ 
-..........I INST-CUA INST.CUA INjT.CUA INST.CIPA INST.CAA TNST.CAA INST-CAA INST.CAA R.O.w ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY I
I GOVTCUNV GUVTCONV GrvTCONV SOCIAL wOUsEHnL PRTVATE PUBLTC GOVERNMT PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE PRIVATE I
I EDUCATIn HEALTH OTwERS SECuRjTY pOMPANY COMPANY AGRICULT FOODPROS TEXTILES OTRINOUS I
I 36900, 9b600, 775900,' 10400. 46880. 77611, 180810. 262117, I
23100, 104071, 70337, 3503409 1
10200 1
3;600; 22900i I4a0soo 119900,
I
7j500;48 5 0 0 . 2500.
43,560I
I I5Is b9o1l
2 7000
I 21 300* 
-I
I ,2191,
14;542. 4228870
I 
-
-I-I 
-
I 
-. I
I !
I 
-
! 790 369: jts%$ 8g, 36I 941
I I
,7. 174. .. . 9
*Sl I937
9S4 e4I
I 
I :oo~s; I
I 
I
I 
I
I 
I
I OLI5I '(Sit 9,t@I '.311 
2
I 
I
I 
I
i a .I
I 
I
I 
I
I 
I
II
*1351*-
'boll '959 '991
qti7LI
'9L9
'5,35
'9
691~
I'sit:
9669 g9jjq fg9 (gw
os I 19
00029 oAS? 000 LuvS01
aIStLOL Ism(
090tI '6?UT
UrO? OlL?
o,7yi~ 669L?
bOlq&9 1wO
*09P'9 ISVL'S
41S I
*ots1
Oslo~
Itig I
ISL I
RIUJYW Ao AIU 33M A01 zO K ys
r-4
C14
'60ue
'bolt
0699?
6110911
I *OLL"St
I aVotly
I'Lit
I L1ewo
I '069ey
Wv'S gTqv
0t,90AS
I
Table S.A1
PRINT Of MATR*i SAM 2 for Egypt
.1 23 24 ,25 , 2 27..28 29, 30, 31 32 33 34 35 I
I ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACi1VITY ACTIVITY AVTIVITY AtTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY ACTIVITY I
I PRIVATE PRIVATE P4TVATE PRIVATE PRIVATf PURLIC PURLIC PURLIC PUBLIC PUBLIC PIOOLIC PUBLIC PUBLIC I
ELECTRIC UILPRUDU C~STRUC. TRANSCOM sERVICES AGPICULT FOUDPRrS TfXTYLVS OTRINDUS ELECTRIC CONSTRUC DILPROOU TRANSCOM I
-35700. 295700. 009006 915 Q, 373600* Sq003, 52419* 53190; 67131, 3b100, 28200, 1
I 66582, 417539, 186s67. 566467. 434920. 1700S00 107665. 194833. 107125. 54661. 112836. 1
106500.
!t
I
!
t
I I
I- I
! !
I I
I !
I -
I I
, , . . . . .4A686.-
....
I *Lt stte Sg Sg SnItol, OI4 10
I 01L sfsllto coo 01tIS1 
soe -vq 006 Osa *e
klft VV 0 A£s b
I 2L 09SIe y %621 s *v Z ~ ~ ,bo 10, Iot Ote I
I let ~ a 00 iz ff %L9 026 oui 0,9 lzf sel I
I 
1ILlOt$ it i l il l w i s4 At ioe bf i lO L
I InIovc 
qels %00 a 949 o e10 lOSOS *1
f) IIge 
qz
I ISR evlet IL % LOV qvllj ~ ebit ULU
I 191S O~ob VILE V99A Labu tsot: l bbw
2da LOLI zIy- vvw1 ~
IVq alqul
:Vogt? 060901
06LILS
I
OIA
jtw o 09tese OtW169to 6991fose OS9
I
obstv 'IV I I
0 newLig I
OdwILADD OdwtlAOO OdWILAOS 3wOOLA09 3NOCIA09 JWOULAOU 34001A09 3WUGIAOU 30()UIAUU 3NUOLAO9 3onQl 00 3WOOLA09 Dllvnd I
I 11GOWWO3 11COWWO3 11COWWO3 110ONW03 110OWWO3 LIOUWNU3 11CONW03 Lloowwu3 IIOUWNU3 1190WHO3 110ow"03 110OWWO3 AJIA113v I
V IV 29 IV 01 61 99
2da3 ioj Z jjVS
IVATW 40 IN164
lyoq
Table 5,Al
PRINT Of NATRIr
- 119 14
!156744
I27579.
A 0047.,
! 17169.
I 31387o.
I
2,9
I
I364 744 900;
723649 56911.
625468. 580501.
.-. 0... 0. 0, C
- 0.
I
I.
!
!
I
!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
0.
r~3
0
-
Table 5,,Al
PRINT OF "ARIi SAM 2 for Egypt
.. * e .. .. .. .
.. .............
I so 50 51 5355 5578590
I CMMJO? CMMODIT C04~MODIT Cr3m$OriT commnroiT cflt4MOOT CummnoYT CU~mInDTT COMMODIT COMMODIT COMMODIT COMHOORT COMMODIT I
I Gov?!mpn GuvTIMPJ GOVT!MPU GOVTmP) C)VTImpo GnvYImP0 GnVTFXPO GoVTfXPO GOVTEXPO COVTEXPO GOVTExPO GOVTEXPO GOVTEXPO I
...:... LLCRI CuiTUC. OILPRnDU yp#NsenH. SERVICES AGRICUI.T ForIopkn$ TEXTILES OTHINDU ELECTRIC CONSTRUC OILPRODU I
II
I
II
I
I
I I
Table 5,Al
PRINT OF MATRIi SAM 2 for Egypt
I
!
!
I
1 l?9
I
!
0;, 0. . .. o.
u..u.wau........0PSUUSUSS@~@UU@@3@U.@e9@SW*9*9P@O@UUU9W@WWU
0. . o .4 . 4i'.. . o'. .. o' a s s
I
Table 5.A1
P0141 OF MATPIj
SAM 2 for Egypt
7m ~
I 62 *3 -64 65. 66 67 68 6970 ?71 72 73 74 I.
I CUM:;D;; O;MDIT cfJmmnOTYO COMMOn? f~fnIT mnC nmmfntT CU~mMDIT Commnly CORMU(DIT CnMCOCMMODIT ot COmMODIT COMMODIT II G(JvyfxPn GOYTEXPO PRiVnUME PIIvnME PYVOmE PnivonmfMERvDonE PPIVDnmE PRIVDUmE PRIVOUME PRIVOOME PRIVI'4P0 PRIVIMPO I
I TRANSCom SENVICES AGiICULT FflnoPpfl tEXTILF3. MtRIND(13 ELECTR7C CONSPJC OILPHUDU TRANSCO" SERVICES ACRICULT FOODPI405 I
. ..............------ o.......... 
. . . . . . .6 . .
644148:
I 3793S..
I
1 lA3 6 Sq I6SISii.
I
325q160*
£ 112128o.
I
I
I
I
I *4g3OI~ 143014
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1164SS55 311536.'
152281.'
417684,
0 IG592.'
1607110;
I
I
I
OCsseoe
545090
49361
1381620.
N
N
L~.
1860?0: j09421;
Table ').Al
PRZNY or NAyR~j Ski 2 for Egypt
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I a~as II4b.;;
I
I
I
I
I
* *uwe*eSeuw*OSm@@@U*o*ewmee@wSUSembmeewaeeu@OueeinuUeeeeWbeu
16334; , t O
OS8600. 568
1,&bassa
t
I
t
I
113S 2003 24300. 82980 60040
03SO1* w0009 WIS4I
'16oss, 626 I
127956 4746 I
10866 94270
13903" 69404.1 IC893  689600 2960S96 199300 654s, I
199330, 1b5'~b~. I
I
Table 5,Al
PRINT OF MATR~I
SAM 2 for Eg~ypt
1 75 76 TT Tp 79 80 RI. 62 63 85 63 86 6
I COMMfOI T C0OMMODI T C~iaMODI T COMMnDI T CoMMODI T enMMODI T COMMO(D TT CO'Mr'DI T COMMODI T COMMODI T Cn''ODI T COMM4fDI T COMNqfDI T I
I PRIVIMPO PRIVIMPO PRiVIMPO PRIVYIMPU PRIVIMPO PRI1MPO PRIVIMPO PR4IVEXPO PRIVFxPO PRVCxPO PRIVEXPO PRIVExPO PRIVEXPO I
TIETILES OTNINDUS ELFCTR1C~ CflNSTRUC ntPRfODU. TRANSCOMN SERV!Crs AGRICULT F000PROS TEXTILES OTRINDUS ELECTRIC CONSTRUC I
.5!
I I
I!
!I
3990.I
I
-
I
I !
I I-
! .. .,......I
Table J.Al
SAM 2 for Egypt
PRINT OF HATRIW
37046.
55007.
17258,
109311.
4338160.
2197092.
760850,
3391758.
3w09.eem0uwmewwweumeeW
29274.
i44364' T741.;
*.*@~U0Oew.S~e~*U.UO.203 mU
7S4201.1
728 .. 79700@, 4730 214000.' . j3300.'
!
!
!
!
!
!
I
!
I
!
I
I
I
!
!
I
!
I
I
0, 0,
N
1411b I S. Al
PRINT Oif MATtIV'
go 0$ 0 Q 2 93 94. 45. 96 97 98
I Ctl'pmnlIT CU$"')UIT Caum UfTT TAKES TAXE-4 TAXES UwfXES TAKES R,n~w, ROws TOITAL II PuIvf*pfl PpivLApu PR-vVEXPfJ INDIRECT &.OUSSDY nIRECT TARIFFS FXPORT FOREIGNr OWNI
I OILPR(JDII TRAP'SCUMP SE;VYCFS XCHANGE XCMANGEI
I 666p00, 883300, Sb,'JO5,
I 1*1600, 767 7 5 0',I
127100, b2SU372,I
I ~~~31800. *s~0S
I 3800, 2607100,
I~ l SaA6 0,I
I 246ai: -i424 O5170.; 99..:e 866600 104*600. 32s22J,3
K 10618000 28(n7U43,I
IA I
1577196.I
I 53~S9600, 9j~j
£ 20366 207. 1
ljoli.- 5,Al
PRINT Or MATRIV SAM 2 for Egypt
t
I
I
286600. 286600, 1
60 .I
I9 3 I
I I
4346970 I
835 93. I
689.,60,
29,8259,I
399310. I
1749,41.
77841. 1
3 16e7O82F5. I
79700I 79700. I47300 417300, 1
214000, 214000. 1
133600 113300. 1
2009502 2009502, 3
617800 607800, 3
375100. 375100, I
q1700, I
959700,
A6600.
5760202. I
833300, I100950 617800. 371100.' .24640' .21240 . 1700. 959400' 66664,. M7800, 673300.
Source: "SAM2 and Documentation," Working Paper No. 7, DRTPC, Cairo University.
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Table 5. 112
Decrease in Indirect Taxes by Replacing Existing Indirect Taxes with Subsidies'
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Table 5.B3 (continued)
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I 11166, 56bod9, 259615. 160364: .4138. .6306 1159. .1516, 210573, 560593 4021, 1
K1 I
K I
K!
K K
K 222, 5160' 4454 834. 7655' 6357 40% 763. 628. 7392 3307 I
Table 5.B3 (continued)
PRIN11 l1f MAIRly
I 32 33 35 1. 37 39 0 41 42 I
I Ihnel', Cu'.S, CAPITAl Ca0iTAL CAPITAl CAPITAl CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL CAPITAL I
I TAAES GuvhV41*T AGRICULT FflnrIPRlIS TEXTILFS OTM-INCU fLECTRIC CONSTRUC OILPROD, TRANSPO, SERVICES I
I 242 I
I -A?1S3 1971290. 207165. 270590, 46527b. 67492, 477914, 1691880, 689889. 1904534, 1
I 603158, S90148 
-
I 390676, 203471"
2633421
I .I7 2
- I 8
I I ? 01
1h,017
9ftS17.
133407.
t
S993834. 30194850,' j9712?90. 2071AS. 270)op.. 46527S., 67992,.- 4779t4, 1891880. 6898890 190434. I
Table 5.13 (continued)
PRINT Of MATRIx
1 03 40
I co'ss* TAt
I LARNO I
1 2672605, 5i&92S52,
I 6 1493, 1
So012J. I
I 133S3927. I
I 1797b1, I
I 135St85,' I
I 2I9183I, I
I ti9'3.54. I
I ~ 23012i3, I
30 1u420. I
I ?~275554Q. I
1 o31 9 o, I
I 23I75 I
I I'I1)$'.b, I
I ' o 0 .
I 2'833448, I
11)h i,* I
2o37 507. I
I 17Itj33. I
I 7034QQ9,
3I3?n-37* I
I 993 .4 , *
30194950, I
I ~ 207185, I
2 7 (39 0,
I 427, I
0 b799 2. I
S7791, II 159P1O.0,
I o0898A9, I
I 1943,I
I 2G72o05, I
I 2872005. I
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-
251 
-
x
'o
 W
 o
 
a
 
a
, 
4 F
_ 
0 
O
l 
-
410 
0 
a
 
A
 01P
I 
L 
1 
aC
D
0 
o
V
%
 I. 
6D
 
T
4
 
00 
'L
 
U
P
 
0c0f 
o%
 
%
o
r~
.0 
=
 
0 
c
 
c
c
 
C 
P
I M
 
C @
 
P
. 
-C 
-
C
5 U
r 
-C
 
P
. 
z
=
 
C 
e
' 
to 
P. 
b 
I
I
1
 
4
z 
e 
-
~
P
O
 
C
C
M
~
t
M
 M
v#X
vc 
.
l 
a
 
tr 
~
 
O
P
.
*
 
C
P
M
%
. 
C
>
c
 
.
-
W
 
-
"
,
 C
~0C
JC
 
f 
P 
# 
£
,
t
 
C
,
 
-
U
.
p0
-c4ftW
f 
4
~
 
.
C
 
A
 
C
 
C
 
-
-
C 
-
.
 C
 
-
r&
 
c
 
f 
ftA.C 
a
 
C4 
49
a
 
6
-j 
-
F
O
 0P-% 
l
.
;
 
P
 
0 
C
 
-O
 
t 
1%
. 
F
^
 
~'M 
I- 
L
L
I
 
r- 
Z
Y
V
 
P
 
M
 
C
A
 
0 
L
 
0 
C
A
%
 ;C
7
 
C
 
0 
4)C
 
M
 0 
0
o
 
l 
ru
 N
A
-P
M
~~l 
P
I
N
-
a
l
 
l- 
M
 
-
~
A
 
rA
. 
%
4 rN
 
0
0 
C
-
.0-MC 
v
 7 
M
 a
*
-
C
O
 
£- 
4 
W
=
Z
-
C
 
0- %.C
 
O
0A
.C
 
Z
O
C
Ib'
V
4> 
4 
3.Y
~L
L
 
Z
 
.
,4 
0_j, 
*j 
-
-
0 
L
 
L
 
C
0 
P
 
P
-0 
~
 
J
 
I 
w
 
6.
x
 
a
 
I 
A
A
 7 
-A
w
a
M
:
x
.C 
4 G
i M
 
a
.U
 
-9 
O
A
 b-. 
:
z
 
w
 
-
.
u
 
h
I 
U
 
~na 
w
 
u
 
A
 is. 
4
A
.
U
.
 
w
 
_
ig 
1 1
o
n
t
 
n
9
 
iW
 
-
_
 
1- 
: 
=
 
7 
*
-
 
-
-
-
@
- 
6-
-
a
 
a
s
 
a
 
.
65 
1 
o
 
r 
:sr 
r
c
. 
r 
i 
z1
7
2
ar-
.4
-
0
 
-
l
A
 
-
-
-
 
-
-
-
 
o
t1
"
. 
0
0
V
IU
'b
o
D
A
V
@
Table 5.B4 (continued)
PRINT Of MATRIX
I 1 1 1 . 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 I
...................................... 
.. . . . . . .
I I PACTORS FACTORS INST. INST. NET-AC NETwAC NET.AC NET-AC NET-AC I
I I LAPOR CAPITAL , 11RAAN RURAL AGRICULT FOOPROS TEXTILFS OTH.INDU ELECTRIC I
I I I FACTu~iS LAfBOI 1
I 2 I FACTUR3 CAPITAI I
I 3 1 INST, UWRAN I 4143fl45 1616643% 22454. I
I I I INST, Ru4AL I 1532367. 2369921. 30646, 1
I 5I NE T-AC AGQCUg T I -
1 6 1 NF T-AC F I' nPRnS I
1 7 1 NET-AC TEXTILFS I r
A I NE T-AC 011 4-I NnU I
I 9 1 N.T-AC LLFCTWTC I
I10 1 4 T-AC CU~jssRo1C I
1 31 I 'F I-AC I 9It p4ln, 
I1 12 N 'ET-AC TkAJSIn, I
I 13 1 PF T -AC StUVICFS I
I 311 6 J;!b- AC AGPIITJ, T I
I 15 1 GQ1'ss-AC fln.aPRos I
I 16 I GrJ!S-AC ItXTILFS I
1 17 1 GIJOSS-AC UI -1ntJ I
I 1I W 4Jss-AC FLFCThiC I
1 1@ I (JS as-Ac CKST14c I I1 20 1 fPJ:;S-*L ''li Pptjr,, I 1I 21 r.jSS-AC TRA.SPn, I n
I 22 I r " ;'- AC -St v1Cr I I
I 23 I C"tuI T Ah!PC'tj 7 1 764466, 955A3~
1 24 1 Co"'uLI I Fun(M Sris I U.1532. 987517% 1
I 25 I C0'-001T TLYTILFS 1 535440, 3995a7%
I 2p I C'iriu IT IT I Nn I .J 527391. 258932%
I 27 I Cr*"u4T LLECTRTC 1 25502. 15387.
I 2 I cf- IfT CuNrTRC II 29 I Cr'"nIT (It Pwron, I 146741, AFt538
1 30 1 COmuP IT TRAP.Pri, I 1641392, 31122
31 I I C'uD IT StEvICrS I 816b04, 322559.
1 32 1 I 0, TAxS 1 0, 0L I 0. 0.
1 33 I CIs, GoJVEPNMT 1 88004: 4199555.' 2930170. 1535935. 101950, 463222, 119979, 516181. 14546, 1
I 34 I CAPITAL AbRICUO T I 2066961.
I 35 I CAP ITAL F0IiPIWnS 1 218446.
I 36 1 CAPITtL txTTLrS I * 2461t1i.
I 37 1 CAPITAL '11 nU-11inI0 17
I 3h I CAPTIAL ELECTWTC I 67736, 1
I 39 I CAP I TAL CIN STNJC I I
I 10 1 CAPIUAL UItP4(jn, J 1
1 at I CAPITAL TRANSPn, II 42 1 CAPIIAL StvICgS 1 - I
1 13 I C"iS, LAgr I 6 645946. 134152 217181P 324312, 36320t I
1 "a I ToT AL I S703416, 616611: 7125884, 4620644. 2616A781.- 615822. 583272, 1291099. 116606, I
Table 5.B4 (continued)
PRINI UP MATRIx
I 10 11 12 11 14. 15 17 18 19 20 1
I NE7-AC t'67-AC , NET-AC NE7-AC GRASS.AC GROS5.AC GROSS-AC GROSS-AC GRflS.AC GRflSS-AC GROSS-AC II CONSTRUC OLLPWUD; TRANSPO, SERVICES AGRItULT Fnni0FROS TEXTILES nTeiNou ELECTRIC CONSTRUC OILPROD, I
*------------------------------------ ---------- L----- m aa
281687A.
1 0,
I 576280,
I 453608
I 239004,
1 126A892,
2024836.
715820,
47 99; 23150,
-2238843. 1020627.
1A96902;
996479
3??3156.
809h86.
396th1,
I 07,
8707.
1998,
31 60.,
33801.
377128).. 2
I
I
*I
815822.1
583272,
1291099, 1
118606, I
1268692; I
2238643, I
I
I
I
297912. 161477. 61654-.
1830,9., Sn2h. 1it2s6,I
711. 61787s. 7644.,65 1444. 1
58lo, 72007, 541977, 934, 207681. 146152, 1
7'i0. 4016s 26866, 69. 5901. 1
526., 30,41. 70128,. 604. 166. 15070, I
896. 677p. 58858., 9133 4762% 138677, 1
2329. 12637, 178941, ?257. 2464. 4869, 142111. 13S498. 1 1151873. 5495, 173071. 148865, 1
219219. 139t6. 19607. 1219. 14665. 24030. 1
I
I
I
!
I
701. 615538, .226707' 3898 63, 272445,1
0! 0, 04,
166309, 73297. 329775.
N)
------ W-1
I
POIN.1 OF MATRIX
1 21 2 23 24 a 26 27 28 29 30 31 7
I' - m ; foI G*55-40.A GLSS-AC rIIMonOTT CfluhUOflT Cfl'Montt COMMUDIT CC'iM4D0T COIMMflflT COMMOJDIT CO"MOl1T COMOD1T I
I Tw;v.SFfj, btkVjCLS &GRICtIT FVlnrPQOS TEXTILFS nTH-INDU FLFCTRIC CONSTRUC OILPROD, TRANSPO, SERVICES I
I I
I I
I. I
I 1020627,
1 32315,' I
1 1481715,.
1 2323034, I
I 139398., I
2179460. 1
I 138495. 1
1 i672134. I
643657I
672663,
I I014319, 456054, 296777, 424197. 614321, 2979489, 1 Un
I 30685, 350239, I
1 2719, 443S93,
I as, 5o'3A, I
I 43652, 379443, I
I 7419, 3j o2, II 207qu, 5b35..
I 0e 3, 1'12M4, t
I 2171, 3205,51 ,
I 1 %Q 13, 715211,
I 11511, 56740, 224A0?, 138954. 8493, 130183. 6925, 83607, 352S4, 33633. 145974, i
4 I
I I
I 1325, 5259' 42A6 9A4, 750, 2380 152.,754. 703. 769. 186,I
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Table 5.115 (contismed)
PPINI UF MATRIy
I I . 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 I
I I I FACTORS FACTOriS INST, 1IST, NET-AC NET.AC NET.AC NET.AC NET-AC I
I II LABOR CAPITAL !IRRAN WLRAL AGRICULT FOODPROS TEXTILES OTm-INDU LLLCTRIC I
I 1 1 FACiu~ea LAN(W i
I 2 I FACIURS CAPITAI
1 3 1 INST, UWAA1N 1 41420142 1616783 22741. 1
4 I INST. HUR AL I 1531986. 2370126. 30 385,
I 5 1 NF T-AC AGPICuIi I
I 6 I NF I-AC unnPrRis I
I 7 1 NF T-AC TtXTItrS I
I 8 I NF T-AC W-1JrI 1 I
I 9 1 41-AC ELFCTRpC I
I 10 IN r-AC CUHSTRC I
i 11 1 "E T-AL UIl P.an, 1
t 1? I NFT-AC TRANSPn, I
I 03 I PE T-AC SLPvICrS I
I 14 I GwliS- AC AnaICUi T 1
I 15 1 Gwu.S-AC FjrnaPRoS I
I 16 1 G,.'OSS-AC TLXTILI S I 1
I 17 I GIZUSS-AC 01-H. n'.Mij I
I II 1 GQW9S-AC LLfCTRTC I
I 19 1 G.ptlSs-AC CUPISTI~IC I
I 20 I G(uISS-AC OILPROn, I
2 1 I .0JSS-AC TRA.Sl'f, I I 1n
I 22 1 rO33-AC Stvi t rS I
I 23 1 C(""u)l A(QrtCU I I 717q74, 970866;I 2I 1 CriU IT F unPnS 1 154642, 1(002112%
I 25 : C,'1-WiT TtII TLFS 1 510893, t04667b
I 2b I C uI"IMj T (IT W. I r 1 5?2912, ?6?2501
I 2T I CI" jU IT ELfCT4,C I 25286, 15584. z
I 2R I Cn-U; I T C&"rT1R1C II 29 1 CriuLWIT I.PLPwn, i 145494, 89673
1 30 1 Cf)"uf)IT TR'At.SPh. I 162996, 31521
1 31 1 C ul"uUIT StJ.vCv CS 1 829499, 326692,
I 32 1 pm:?, I Ay f 1 1 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
1 33 1 Co'ss. G(ivfPP.T I 87982.' 4199919. 2905286. 1155616. 102207, 463610, 120021, 55646, 14540, i
I 34 I CAPIIAL At.IICU I 1 20742080
1 35 1 CAPItAL VFi00Pkr0S 1 218631,
I 36 I CAPITAL TLYTILFS 1 246191 3T 1 C AP I TAL OTH-INoU 1 5101 314 I CAPITAL ELFCTRTC I 67698, 1
1 39 1 CAPITAL CWISTH11C I
I 4 0 1 CAPITAL LILPRUn, I
I 41 1 CAPITAL TRAtjSPCO. I
1 u2 I CAPITAL SLRVICFS I I
I 43 I CONS. LABOR I 647579, 134264, 217258; 323976, 36298, 1
4 4a I TOTAL I 0761982. 81A6827.' .065367, 4t79852. 2823991ke 816505, 583476, 1289763, 118536, I
Tnble S.RS (continued)
PRINI OF MATRIV
1 10 11 12 13 14, 15 .~ 16 17 16 19 20 K
.. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. ..-----. .. ..-.. ..---...-- -.-
I N[7AC NtT.AC IET.AC NET.AC GRfAC AC GRfSSoAC GRSS-AC GRrSS-AC GROSS.AC GROSS.AC GRfSS.AC K
I ConsT'kJC OILPHUD, TRANSPn, SFaVICES ' AGRItuI? FOODPR0S 7EX71LES nTm.INDU ELECTRIC CONSTRUC OILPROD. I
-. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . . - .. e
26?3994,
816505,
583476,
1269763,
118536,
1268284,
I
2237638, I
I
0, 0
7318?, 329458.
811173 1299999.
26549, 183253.
1647, 731.
39617, 5859.
107, 750,
741, 526,
896.
1947, 2327.
31470, 42107.
33920, 21955.
161703,
5031,
610008,
11989,
015,
30UA,
6770,
I?627,
135u6a,
13914,
61903,
111285,
7641.
541512.
26h4 fE
7822,
58803,
17869.
151745,
19590.
2923746,
714694, 1695077
47673, 231146, 995s?0,
2937630, '01902P, 3?20055, 3780012. 2374910, j616044, 2294776.
365, 1445, I
933, 207558, 146088. I
69, 5A99, 1
603, 166, 15065, I
9377, 4758, 138806. I
2254, 2462, 4864, I
5492, 172972. 148802, I
1218, 14657, -24017, 1
I
138415. 1671291. 2722625, I
0.
166219.
I 0,1 576004,
1 453391,
I 238890,
I 1?2e24,
I
'Table 5.115 (continued)
PRI141 OF MAIRIw
I GflS.C G.US.C C~OTT cflm"'(JT* cnemmnDTT cnmmo~fliy cU$mmnD!T cflmMODIT commCIDIT Cf*MODDJ cflmmODIT3
I TRAA.SPO, SLRVICES AGRICULT FnnPPRnS TEXTILFS OTH-INOU FLECTRIC. CONSTPUC OILPROD, TRANSPO, S3ERVICES I
I 1039022,'
2325965,
1 3946046
2177537.
16712914
Wit,1 35sssr: i~d 4-56029. 29614.; 423812.
,?7190 1 104
43617, 7%
Ze?7S,5 b 9 7
22141, .217
10#0~269 l~b'
11495, 50096, 225267, 139100:' *65a 130066S' 6921. 83565*
1 1310450, 5@1643, 0730606, 2901094: 177S914. 27314180 . 145333, J754856, 7
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
6432*0,
b?11?4. I
*3389, 2'75549, I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
'39682, 704735., 3124326, I
0
ww"mw woomewwwwwo -. ft wow W-W
i0ossx,
Tai11 '1.* It' (4osI I n e16-4)
PRINI (W MATMIx
I 3 33 14 35 16. 37 38 39 40 - t 42 I
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